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Abstract 
The  relation  between  reality  and  language,  the  instability  of  language  as  a 
signification system, the representation crisis, and the borders of interpretation are 
the  controversial  issues  that  have engaged not only philosophers,  but  also  many 
authors,  translators,  and  literary  critics.  Some  philosophers  like  Derrida  accuse 
Western  thinking  of  being  obsessed  with  binary  oppositions.  In  Derrida’s  view, 
Western  tradition  resorts  to  external  references  as  God,  truth,  origin,  center  and 
reason to stabilize the signification system. Since these concepts lack an internal 
sense and there is no transcendental signified that can fix these signifiers, language 
turns to an instable system by means of which no fixed meaning can be created. 
Many  authors  like  Beckett,  Stoppard,  and  Caryl  Churchill  also  noticed  this 
impossibility of language. While Derrida’s deconstructive approach to this crisis has 
an epistemological nature, these playwrights present an aesthetic solution by turning 
the deconstructive potential of language against itself in text and performance.  
This dissertation aims at exploring their performing methods and dramatic texts 
to demonstrate how their delogocentric strategies work. By analyzing their plays, I will 
examine  if  their  use  of  signifiers  that  have  no  references  in  reality,  intentional 
misconceptions, disintegrated subjectivities, decentered narratives, and experimental 
performances  can  help  them  undermine  the  prevailing  logocentrism  of  Western 
thought. The examination of the change in aesthetic strategies from Beckett, who 
belongs to earlier stages of post modernism, to Caryl Churchill, who should perform 
in a globalized world with increasing dominance of speed and information, is another 
aim of this research. In my  view, Beckett’s obsession with unspeakable, absurdity, 
and  disintegration  of  subjectivity  develops  to  Stoppard’s  language  games, 
metadrama, and anti-representation and culminates in Churchill’s anti-narrative texts 
and pluralistic performances. The monophony of Beckett’s dramatic texts is replaced 
by the polyphony of Churchill’s performances, which are a mixture of theater, dance 
and music. However, all explored dramatic texts in this dissertation have something 
in  common:  they  are  language  games,  which  have  no  claim  on  a  faithful 
representation of reality or transcendental truth. 1 
Introduction 
The clarity of language has always been the aim of those who were in search of 
truth or meaning. Because of the inefficiency of their medium, namely language, their 
hermeneutical efforts for finding the exact meaning, the truth, or the core of an idea in 
a text have failed. Throughout the history of thought, the reluctance of language to 
yield to clarity, and its high potential for creating misunderstanding, ambiguity, and 
vagueness  have  been  the  main  hindrances  for  theologians  or  philosophers  for 
understanding the metaphysical form of reality. Their ideal of finding a transparent 
language through which the reader can settle a concept or idea without problem, has 
permanently been  disappointed  by  the  free  play  of  signs.  With  the  weakening  of 
positivistic approaches to language and thought in the twentieth century, language 
crisis  took  new  dimensions.  Not  only  language  but  also  the  issue  of  truth  were 
examined in a new light. By bringing language into a focus of interest for philosophy, 
philosophers like Mauthner and Wittgenstein opened the way for new interpretation 
of  reality  and  its  representation.  Wittgenstein’s  book  Tractatus,  for  instance,  is 
devoted to the examination  of  the  relation between  thinking  and  language. In his 
view, the borders of language determine the borders of our world (Tractatus: 5.6), 
because  we  can  only  explain  our  experiences  through  words.  Thus,  as  Begam 
maintains, “Where there are no sentences, there is no truth…” (1996:16) Wittgenstein 
proposes in this book, that tautological expressions of logic are literally nonsense; 
they do not convey any information about what the facts are, they only reveal the 
underlying structure of all language, thought, and reality (Tractatus: 6.1). In his later 
books,  like  Philosophical  investigations,  he  takes  a  closer  look  at  language  and 
comes  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  ultimate  language;  we  have  only  local 
language games (Sprachspiele), whose rules are set in the games themselves. One 2 
word in a language game may vary in signification in the other. Wittgenstein’s idea 
that  “Alle  Philosophie  ist  nur  Sprachkritik”(Wittgenstein,1953:  299),  invalidates 
philosophy as an ontological means for discovering reality or transcendental truths.  
Following Wittgenstein, many other twentieth-century philosophers, like Derrida, 
Lyotard, and Foucault, deny the stability of signification system and the referentiality 
between language and reality. In Derrida’s view, for instance, meaning is perpetually 
deferred by supplementation or substitution. In his texts Writing and Difference and 
Of Grammatology, he argues against the validity of logocentrism in the world after 
Nietzsche  and  Freud.  Freud’s  claim,  that  writing  is  not  completely  conscious  and 
Nietzsche’s statement, that “truth” is just “a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
and anthropomorphisms”  (Nietzsche,  qtd.  in  Anthony  Easthope  &  Kate  McGowan 
114),  contradict  the  positivistic  presumptions  about  language,  identity,  and  truth. 
Derrida believes that although the “decentring” that happened in our age is “part of 
the totality of an era,” nevertheless, “the  Nietzschean critique of metaphysics,  the 
critique of the concepts of being and truth,….the Freudian critique of self-presence, 
that is, the critique of consciousness, of subject, of self-identity” and “Heideggerean 
destruction  of  metaphysics  of  onto-theology,  of  the  determination  of  being  as 
presence,” have played an important role in this disruption of the concept of structure 
(1970:226). Derrida also maintains that there is no pre-existent truth, “transcendental 
signifier,”  or  “logos”  to  which  we  can  appeal  to  find  meaning.  Derrida’s 
deconstruction, as Ulmann maintains, “Affirms the importance of ambivalence, of the 
relation between terms rather than the choice of one term over another” (1999:23). 
Derrida  calls  the  futile  search  for  truth  and ultimate meaning,  by  resorting  to  the 
binary oppositions or “transcendental signified,” the logocentrism of Western thought. 
Additionally, criticizing Saussure’s structuralist interpretation of sign, he affirms that in 3 
a system of signification, meaning can only be inferred; no sign or chains of signs can 
give in a determinate meaning. In his view, one cannot speak of truth apart from 
signification.  Different  elements,  such  as  substitution,  differentiation,  repetition,  or 
non-identity of the original truth, are involved in the creating of meaning in language 
and  make  the  ultimate  meaning  unattainable.  Derrida  also  stresses  that  the 
“undecideability”  of  meaning  is  not  just  an  outcome  of  figurative  langue,  but  it  is 
inherent  in  language  itself.  Since  meaning  must  be  decided  in  a  system  of 
differentiation, it will be open to different interpretations or inferences. In his view, 
pure original concepts, from which the Western thought has always dreamed, those, 
which  were  supposed  to  control  the  chain  of  words,  granting  them  the  desired 
decidability, do not exist. Although context can control meaning to some extent, it is 
not stable enough to fix it. Nealon believes that, “For Derrida, undecideability is a 
consequence of the functioning of the general system, a system that is grounded in 
difference  rather  than  identity,  a  system  that  cannot  purge  the  difference,  the 
nonpresence...” (1993:44).  
To overcome this undecideability, Western philosophy after Plato has tried to 
resort  to  “presence”  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  misunderstanding  and 
misinterpretation. The preference of speech over writing comes from the same idea 
that the presence of phonetic sounds and tone of the speaker can provide us with 
exact  meaning.  In  Grammatology,  Derrida  criticizes  this  tendency  towards  the 
subordination of writing to speech, or priority of presence over absence, and calls it 
“phonocentrism”  or  “logocentrism”  of  Western  thought.  Derrida’s  attack  on 
phonocentrism is indeed an attack on the whole “metaphysics of presence,” which 
has dominated Western tradition since Plato. This criticism incorporates not only the 
priority of speech over  writing  and dominancy of meaning, but also the prevailing 4 
rationalism  in  Western  thought.  Central  to  logocentrism,  suggests  Derrida,  is  the 
belief  that  the  whole  body  of  human  knowledge  originates  in  a  primal  language 
granted  to  humans  by  God  or  another  transcendental  signified.  To  prove  the 
existence  of  the  world  and  the  ethical  system  hidden  in the “holy  word of God,” 
philosophers have to prove the existence of a first cause. The absence of God in the 
modern Philosophy after Nietzsche changed the Cartesian view of world into a more 
pessimistic one. The confidence of modern man in anchoring himself in a secure 
relation to his environment was weakened. The  claim to the presence of abstract 
truths in many fields was replaced by the hesitancy of subjective views, which refuted 
the efficiency of language as a strong  argumentative  medium. Many philosophers 
began to examine the nature of language as the medium of retrogressive arguments. 
The transparency of this medium, which was the goal of all those who were trying to 
present  a  rational  discussion  or  a  body  of  knowledge,  was  questioned.  Some 
philosophers  like  Wittgenstein  ceased  to  see  language  as  a  unified  signification 
system, affirming that the meaning of a word is determined according to the system 
in which it functions. As Norris suggests: 
 
If  meaning  could  only  attain  to  a  state  of  self-
sufficient  intelligibility,  language  would  no  longer 
present  any  problem  but  serve  as  an  obedient 
vehicle of thought. To pose the question of writing in 
its radical, Derridean form is thus to transgress- or 
violently  oppose-  the  conventional  relation  of 
language and thought (30). 
 5 
Derrida’s  delogocentrism  denies  the  possibility  of  finding  transparency  in 
language  and  affirms  that  “the  central  signified,  the  originality,  or  transcendental 
signified is revealed to be never absolutely present outside a system of differences, 
and this absence of an ultimate signified extends the domain and play of signification 
to infinity. (Derrida, qtd. in David lodge and  Nigel Wood, 2000: 246). Furthermore, 
from a poststructuralist view, reality is the world perceived in a human sign system 
which determines and interprets events and objects. As Derrida in “Structure, Sign, 
and Play in The Discourse of the Human Sciences” maintains, “In the absence of a 
center or origin, everything became discourse…” (1993:225) Thus, there is no direct 
reference between words or concepts of language and objects in the real world; in 
other  words,  language  actuates  reality.  If  between  a  signifier  and  a  signified  no 
identity  or  representation  exists,  meaning  falls  into  a  net  of  possibilities  of 
interpretation, which makes it rather perplexing and misleading than transparent. 
Unlike metaphysical philosophers, who strive to escape from this multiplicity of 
meaning or ambiguity   o f   a   w r i t t e n   t e xt, some modern and postmodern authors, like 
Samuel Beckett, Tom Stoppard, and Caryl Churchill use this potentiality to escape 
from the boundaries of language and text. The “unreadability” of their works derives 
from  their  intentional  protest  against  language,  which  resists  their  challenges  for 
articulating themselves. In a letter to Axel Kaun, Samuel Beckett expresses hope that 
“the  time  will  come….when  language  is  most  efficiently  used  where  it  is  most 
efficiently misused” (qtd. in Marjorie Perloff. 1996:120).  
This dissertation aims at exploring the delogocentric aspirations of these writers, 
who  subverted  the  tyranny  of  dramatic  text  and  the  overhang  of  thought  over 
language by innovations in text and performance. Tracing the changes in the literary 
style and dramatic techniques of these writers, as a consequence of the reciprocation 6 
between  existing  philosophical  and  language  theories  and  their  art,  is  another 
undertaking  of  this  study.  Beckett’s  protest  against  the  logocentrism  of  Western 
thought, in my view, still suffers from monophony in Bakhtinian term, but Churchill’s 
experimental style creates a carnivalesque theater, which defies all logocentric power 
structures, including that of a dramatic text. In my thesis, I offer as in-depth analysis 
of some plays by Beckett, Stoppard, and Churchill, which share a deep critique of the 
discourse through which Western thought has claimed to discern reality and subject 
positions.  Although  the  three  playwrights  offer  very  distinctive  approaches  to 
deconstructing a text, I try to examine the methods by which they succeed to create 
texts without a “legitimation narrative.” I n   m y   v i e w ,   t he understanding of their texts is 
based  rather  on  individual  inferences  and  linguistic  experiences  of  the 
reader/spectator  than  logocentric  binaries.  The  binaries  like  good/evil, 
spiritual/physical, man/woman and God/evil, lose their validity and determination  in 
their texts, which contradict their own words. They introduce a kind of literalization 
onto the stage performance, which defies the supposed theatrical presence and fulfill 
the Derridean deconstructive aspiration. 
I have chosen drama as the study field of my dissertation because in theater, 
many  other  factors  other  than  pure  text  are  at  work,  which  make  theater  the 
appropriate genre for escaping the dominancy of language. Movements, gestures, 
face  mimics,  lights,  and  spectacle  are  all  semiotic  elements,  which  escape 
determinate meaning and prepare more room for different interpretations. Moreover, 
drama is a form of writing that tries to create the illusion of presence and spontaneity, 
while absence and arbitrariness are inseparable from it. As Jernigan points out: 
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The tenets of aesthetic and theoretic postmodernism 
would  seem  to  be  effortlessly  captured  and 
expressed in theater. For instance that reality, truth 
and  identity  are  determined  by  language  and  the 
various  discursive  and  power  formation  inhabiting 
language,  the  core  premises  of  poststructuralist 
theory  is  enacted  in  aesthetic  postmodernism 
through  its  self-reflexivity,  its  foregrounding  of 
artifice,  its  play  with  the  author  function,  its 
textualizing  and  decentring  of  character  and  its 
experiments  with  narration.  What  can  be  more 
obviously self-reflexive, more obviously a vehicle of 
self-representation than theater? (2001: 9) 
 
This  self-reflexive  quality  of  theater  suggests  that  there  are  just  words  and 
conventions in theater; there is no truth or reality outside the unique performance of 
every night. The bond between character and the body of an actor can be broken in 
different performances of different  directors.  Being performed in a new language, 
evoking  new  connotations,  the  dialogs  acquire  new  dimensions.  With  the 
disintegration  of  a  universal  language,  postmodern  theatre  undertakes  to  de-
theologize itself, changing the concepts of self, speech, and presence and looking 
into historical and cultural contexts for new possibilities to express itself.  
The  artificiality  of  theater  in  re-presenting  truth  or  reality  becomes  the  main 
basis for a postmodern approach. The space that a director or an author creates to 
give the illusion of a real world becomes the scope of imaginary characters in the 
body of actors to show that they are experiencing something new. The spectators, on 
the other hand, pretend that they are sharing a real experience, although they  are 
aware  of  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the  whole  game.  Jernigan  believes  that  “the 8 
playwright’s  word  and  often  his  or  her  vision  [is]  inevitably  subject  to  potentially 
radical meditation by directors and actors. The closure of the text is also, more or 
less, shattered by exigencies of staging and contingencies of performances”(2001:9). 
Besides, the illusory “presence” of the characters on stage paradoxically contradicts 
the logocentric preference for presence and contributes to a poststructuralist theory 
of  theater. Theatrical  presence  is  indeed  an  illusion;  although  the  characters  are 
present,  their  presence  does  not  help  the  accessibility  of  truth  or  meaning;  it 
manipulates the truth and provides the ground for a deconstructive approach. “New 
performances,”  as  Elinor  Fuchs  suggests,  “have  complicated  the  spectator’s 
experience  of  theatrical  presence.”(74)She  also  believes  that,  “Derrida  opened  a 
theoretical route to the new theater, where old vocabularies of plot and character had 
lost their interpretative power.”(72) In her view, by denying the capability of human 
beings  “to  enter  a  self-same  present”  (Fuchs,74),  Derrida  challenges  the 
metaphysical illusion of theatrical presence. 
This  dissertation  undertakes  to  examine  the  possibility  of  producing  non-
definitive, deconstructive texts by using Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, End game, and 
Not  I,  Stoppard’s  Rosencrantz  and  Guildenstern  are  Dead,  The  Real  Inspector 
Hound, and Dogg’s Hamlet, Churchill’s Blue Heart, Softcops, Mad Forest, and This is 
a Chair as proof texts,. I am concerned with that part of Derrida’s criticism of Western 
philosophy  that  deals  with  issues  of  reality,  meaning,  identity,  and  metaphysic  of 
presence. I explore the dramatic works of these authors to see if Derridean concept 
of  deconstruction  and  delogocentrism  is  practically  applicable  in  theater.  My 
approach, however, does not aspire to be a deconstructive one. 
In my analysis of the dramatic texts of the mentioned playwrights Lyotard, with 
his definition of postmodern situation and the impact of such situation on postmodern 9 
narrative, and his prophecy that “the legitimation narratives will meet rejection in the 
postmodern era,” is another point of interest. Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition 
asserts that the grand or meta-narratives of the past, according to which the validity 
of  other  texts  was  evaluated,  can  no  more  inspire  certainty.  His  proposed 
“incredibility towards meta-narratives” in postmodern era, provides the basis for later 
arguments against the dominance of the grand narratives of the past on literature 
and  life.  Lyotard  maintains  that  the  same  principle  that  is  used  to  legitimate 
knowledge  is  used  to  legitimate  decision-making  in  society,  government,  laws, 
education,  and  many  other  basic  elements  of  society.  Legitimation  in  the 
Enlightenment was tied to what Lyotard calls meta-narratives, or grand narratives. 
Meta-narratives are the philosophies which make ethical and political prescriptions 
for  society,  and  generally  legalize  decision-making  and  the  settlement   o f   w h a t   i s  
considered truth. In his view, the liberation of humanity through science (the modern) 
is  a  meta-narrative,  and  the  establishment  of  a  universally  valid  philosophy  for 
humanity is another one. Lyotard claims that postmodern age has deprived us from 
the belief in meta-narratives and the legitimating function they once played in society. 
(The Postmodern Condition) The overarching narratives of past are replaced by local 
narratives or, in Wittgenstein’s terms, language games. These limited contexts have 
clear  rules  for  judging  knowledge  and  evaluating  behaviors,  which  help  different 
social groups to regulate their behavior through linguistic codes. In Lyotard’s view the 
heterogeneity of these games makes the consensus impossible. By breaking life into 
different micro-games, with particular rules for judging and acting, the dominance of 
metanarratives  is  destabilized.  He  coins  the  word  "paralogy"  to  explain  how  the 
legitimizing principle in postmodern age works. Fragmentation, repetition, syntactic 
failure, polyphony, and chaotic structure are the features of the petite-narrative of the 
postmodern age.  10 
By  scrutinizing  the  interaction  between  the  ideas  of  these  postmodern 
ideologues and the dramatic methods of the mentioned playwrights, I indicate how 
the  episodic  structure,  which  jumps  forward  and  backward  in  time  rather  than 
following  a  smooth progress  of narration,  along  with  repetitive  patterns and other 
techniques, help these authors produce postmodern deconstructive narratives. In my 
view  Beckett,  Stoppard,  and  Churchill  take  a  deriding  standpoint  from  Western 
thought  by  writing  texts  that  lack  a  decidable,  definite  meaning  and  creating 
performances that defy old concepts of spectacle, character, and plot. The first three 
chapters of this dissertation examine Beckettian drama, which, as Martin asserts, 
“breaks down the barriers between speech and writing and presents a postmodern 
carnivalesque  notion  of  language:  his  display  of  the  ambivalence  of  language 
connotes the lack of determinant meaning in his texts” (Martin, 2004:3). In Beckett’s 
plays presence becomes meaningless; the speech incomprehensible; and language 
totally  confusing.  Reaching  a  meaning  in  Beckettian  drama  is  difficult  because 
characters have lost the assurance necessary for meaningful expressions. They are 
compelled o speak, although they have no interesting thing to exchange. They speak 
to overcome the fear of loneliness. Their words echo in the cold fearful solitude in 
which they are trapped and make their miserable life tolerable. 
In Waiting for Godot, for instance, the futility of a binary signification, the non-
relationality  of  the  coined  word  “Godot,”  the  resistance  of  the  play  to  define  the 
identity or the meaning of this absent entity, and the absence that invalidates the 
characters’ presence embody an unsolvable ontological problem, which challenges 
the spectator’s interpretative assumptions. Beckett refuses to give a fixed meaning 
for  “Godot,”  asserting  that  he  himself  does  not  know.  The  word,  like  Derrida’s 
différance, escapes a one-to-one correspondence in signification system because it 11 
does not refer to a concrete object in the outside world. There is no signified to give it 
a  meaning  and  this  “absence  of  an  ultimate  signified,”  as  Abraham  maintains, 
“Extends the domain and play of signification to infinity” (246). The insufficiency of 
language as a means of communicating idea is also shown in Lucky’s speech. The 
miserable philosopher of the play tries to express himself trough the words that fail in 
conveying  meaning.  The  ambivalence  of  his  situation  is  that  his  lecture  is 
simultaneously meaningless and meaningful; his philosophy is entangled in the grips 
of rhetoric. The paralyzed philosopher is also bereft of the logic necessary for his 
arguments  and  repeats  the  motif  “of  reason  unknown”  throughout  his  long 
mechanical lecture. By asserting that,  “Time will tell,” he attempts to persuade  the 
unseen audience that the sacred truth can be accessed someday. His argument, like 
that  of  his  idealist  predecessor  Descartes,  proves  to  be  ineffective  because  the 
thinking  self  is  bereft of  a  structured  language. His  speech turns  to  be a  chaotic 
mixture  of  words,  or  a  language  game  without  rules.  The  metaphysical  signified 
“divine apathia,” “divine athambia,” or “divine aphasia” signifies nothing in the realm 
of experiencing reality; it is just an abstract word made for Lucky’s language game. 
Like Godot, this divine existence can only be defined in the boundaries of language 
or in a series of arbitrary rules and does not have a counterpart in reality. 
Endgame is another language game, which, as Martin points out, “Examines the 
irony  that  is  at  the  heart  of  human  relationship…”  (2).  The  characters  know  and 
openly  announce  that  they  are  playing.  Hence,  the  theatrical  space  between 
character and actor disappears. Ham and Clov play different roles simultaneously: 
they are father and son, director and actor, author and performer, and master and 
servant. Their role-playing keeps them from breaking down in a meaningless world, a 
world  dominated  by  insignificant,  incoherent  memories,  a  world  without  any 12 
progression. The experience of reality becomes pointless in their case because there 
is no world outside the characters’ minds. From the characters’ limited view, the two 
windows of the play, only a selected perception is possible; therefore, they take the 
stage for reality. They do not even try to bring their representation close to reality; 
they live in this representation and set the rules of their game under the very eyes of 
the audience. Hamm, who yearns for being in the center, announces now and then, 
“Me to play,” and Clov scrutinizes the audience by his binaculars and comments on 
their reaction. Tired of the misery of their arbitrary life, the characters try to reduce 
the burden of their theater/life by story-telling or speaking. Words, however, do not 
help them communicate; they deepen their misery. Being exhausted from the futility 
of communication through words, Hamm cries, “Then babble, babble, words, like the 
solitary child who turns himself into children, two three, so as to be together, and 
whisper  together,  in  the  dark”  (Beckett,  1990,  26)  The  words  become  babbles, 
conveying  no  meaning,  the  contact  is  just  appearance,  and  the  center  for  which 
Hamm craves cannot be achieved. His centripetal quest fails because in the thought 
and philosophy of an apocalyptic world no divinity, no transcendental signified keeps 
the ties to the center. 
This decentredness not only prevails the world but also the self in Beckett’s 
work.  Not  I,  for  instance,  demonstrates  how  the  wholeness  of  a  subject  is 
disintegrated into a mouth, which speaks uninterruptedly, and an ear, which listens to 
the obscure narration. The Mouth in Not I relates the story of a “she” whose identity 
remains  unknown  to  the  audience.  The  auditorium,  to  which  the  mouth  speaks, 
remains in darkness of anonymity as well. The mouth speaks with “lips”, “cheeks” 
”jaws” and “tongue.” No more identity, no more knowledge. Identity and language 
become one and none of them reveals any truth. As Martin maintains: 13 
 
Beckett’s use of “character” in this manner provides 
us  with  a  window  into  the  theoretical  gap  that  is 
fundamental  to  postmodern  thought.  This  “gap” 
represents  that  absurdity  of  language: 
simultaneously,  language  provides  us  with  an 
excess  of  meaning  while  also  providing  a  lack  of 
meaning  because  language  is  always  already 
overdetermined.  Language  is  slippery;  we  explain 
concepts through the use of other concepts, via the 
chain  of  signifiers;  thus  we  can  never  “get  to”  the 
truth. We are alienated from (or lack) absolute truth 
(3). 
 
Mouth’s hopeless struggles to narrate something meaningful fail because her 
head is filled with “buzzing” words that resist producing any meaning. The totality of 
self is also lost in the broken structure of language. The narrator and the narrated are 
not distinguishable in the fragmented narration. As Martin maintains, “Not I does in 
fact succeed in making a poem out of the decentring of the speaking subject and the 
delogocentring of language, discourse in general”(14). 
In all of the three mentioned plays, the tradition of Western world in providing the 
reader/spectator with a meaningful definitive text is ignored. The pauses and silences 
that are integrated in the body of the play and share to the understanding of the 
situation,  the  overlapping  systems  of  signification,  the  inability  of  the  language  to 
communicate,  and  the  inevitable  gaps  in  the  language  and  existence  of  the 
characters,  which  cannot  be  filled  or  closed  in  spite  of  their  hopeless  challenge, 
contribute  to  the  Derridean  view  of  delogocenrism  and  deconstruction.  Beckett 
challenges against the closure of the gaps in the signification system by the broken 14 
sentences of Not I, by the meaningless exchange of words between Estragon and 
Vladimir,  by  showing  the  gaps  in  the  thinking  system  of  Lucky,  and  by  undoing 
Hamm’s  struggles  for  maintaining  his  authority  over  the  text.  As  Martin  asserts, 
“Discourse  is  constituted  by  the  uncontrollable  free  play  of  signification;  it  is 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time. It simultaneously limits and orders our 
world, our thoughts and our emotions”(14).The gaps become deeper in Beckettian 
drama  as  he  moves  from  his  early  plays  to  the  later  ones,  till  the  silence  of 
“unsayable” overcomes language. 
Stoppard  contributes  to  Derridean  challenge  against  the  prevailing  logocentric 
thought  in  western  tradition  by  building  his  metadramatic  texts  on  the  borrowed 
elements of the other texts. He takes his point of departure from the mimetic theories 
of art, which take art as a representation of the real world, by employing the symbolic 
order of other texts as the realities for his texts. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are 
Dead, analyzed in chapter four of this study, is a metadramatic work, which borrows 
dramatic  elements  from  Shakespeare,  Beckett  and  Pirandello  to  provide  the 
audience with a new reading of Hamlet’s story. “The metaphysics of presence” loses 
its validity in this play because the characters are declared dead from the beginning; 
they should be understood in their absence. This ambivalence of presence/absence, 
this remoteness of truth, which makes the accessibility of the signified impossible, 
contributes a lot to Derridean idea that no sacred -text and no author-God could exist 
in postmodern thought and literature. The literariness of characters’ being, and the 
arbitrariness of the plot invalidate any search for reality in the background of the play. 
The characters hopeless search for identity also becomes meaningless because they 
have no power on Shakespeare’s established text that has already determined their 
fate. Thus not only language, but also the characters are reduced to signs which 
should be perceived in an ambiguous system of signification. How could two unreal, 15 
dead characters come upon knowledge about their identity or reach the inaccessible 
eternal truth? The gap in their existence is too deep to be filled with a meaning. Since 
the whole world of the play is an arbitrary one, the language becomes more than ever 
foggy, misleading, and obscure.  
The  characters  try  to  discover  pattern  and  purpose  in  their  existence  by 
appealing to scientific logic, but patterns and purposes are denied to them in the 
world of the dead. They cannot find the missing part to complete the puzzle of their 
existence  because  such  a  part  does  not  exist.  In fact they are obsessed  by the 
logocentrism of Western metaphysics; their lives need a piece of narrative of past, or 
a  prophecy  of  future,  or  a  piece  of  information,  like  the  reason  why  they  are 
summoned, to find a meaning. But meaning remains absent from the text of their 
existence; the world of uncertainties, in which Ros and Guil are put, does not provide 
them  with  any  reasonable  answers.  As  Andretta  states  it,  ”The  inaccessibility  of 
knowledge, the inscrutability of fate, the absence of logic, justice and moral purpose 
in the universe, the difficulty of communication, all underscore the absurdity of life 
and man’s inevitable plight”(1993:40). In their search for truth, they come upon the 
disastrous knowledge that truths are just foggy concepts which evade recognition. 
Guil’s protest that, “Words, words. Words, they’re all we have to go on” (45), is the 
protest of the postmodern man against a language that confines his existence. If 
“truths” are just ambiguous, undefined terms, asks Stoppard, why not abandoning 
them? Like the “Chinese philosopher from the T’ang Dynasty2,” who “dreamed he 
was a butterfly and from that moment he was never quite sure that he was not a 
butterfly dreaming it was a Chinese philosopher”(Stoppard:66), we can never be sure 
about our cognitive integration. Stoppard, like Derrida and Lyotard, asserts in his play 
that, “Reality is susceptible of many versions and many perspectives, each of which 
is valid but not necessarily true.”(111) By denying the existence of objectivity, truth, 16 
and logic, Stoppard takes his point of departure from the positivism of Enlightenment; 
by writing a sub-text, which finds meaning just through intertexuality, he breaks the 
boundaries of modern drama and defies the modernist concept of author/God. The 
text of R&G does not refer to a story in the real world or to certain truths; on  the 
contrary, it aspires to move smoothly among the polyphonic worlds of  literary and 
philosophical traditions. 
In his later plays, like After Magritte or Jumpers, Stoppard puts forwards other 
ontological questions about the world that the stage characters inhabit and about the 
boundary  between  reality  and  performance.  The  philosopher  George  Moor,  for 
instance, who struggles to justify the existence of God or the eternal Truth in his 
lecture, is unable to deal with his own domestic problems. As Stoppard in Hapgood 
asserts, “Truths which are important don’t reside in particular events in the physical 
world….on the contrary, the essential truths are foggier things which we recognize 
instinctively rather than analyses and establish by demonstrative proof” (1988:73). 
Moor’s bombastic lecture is nothing but a tricky language game, which just leads to 
blurred concepts. In After Magritte, Stoppard questions the reliability of perception. 
As  Andretta  observes,  “In  his  paintings,  Magritte  tried  to  show  that  reality  is 
susceptible of many versions and many perspectives, each of which valid but not 
necessarily true” (111). Following Magritte, Stoppard opens his play with a bizarre 
tableau, which proves to be just a domestic scene that has nothing to do with the 
narrative that Inspector’s “panoptic eye” tries to extract from it. Stoppard ridicules not 
only the Inspector’s attempt to discover the truth, but also that of the audience. 
The Real Inspector Hound, which is the focus of the fifth chapter of this study, not 
only subverts the boundaries of representation and reality, but also demonstrates 
how  destructive  the  audience’s  interpretative  tendencies  can  be.  By  producing 17 
different levels of spectators and narratives, Stoppard opens a metadramatic window 
in his dramatic work  and engage the spectators in his ontological questions. The 
incomprehensibility  of  language  and  its  insufficiency  to  provide  us  with  clear 
ontological answers is what Stoppard in Dogg’s Hamlet demonstrates. He creates an 
aesthetic distance for the audience between the abbreviated performance of Hamlet 
and the scenes that the schoolboys, in a strange English, perform. Wittgenstein’s 
theories of ostensive learning turn to a farce of dumb communication between Easy-
as the learner of Dogg’s language- and schoolboys, or the construction workers of 
the play as teachers. English in its new sense can only be understood accidently and 
after a lot of erroneous trials. Wittgenstein’s philosophical attempt for composing a 
world out of linguistic experiences is ridiculed in Stoppard’s play. He demonstrates 
how unreliable Wittgenstein’s “logical space” is. Torn from their context, the habitual 
words  become  nonsensical  for  Easy  and  for  the  audience.  The  audience  of 
abbreviated Hamlet  should  have  the  same  experience,  because  the  English  they 
know and speak is used in a new sense. The parodic prolog of Shakespeare at the 
beginning  of  Dogg’s  Hamlet,  which  is  an  amalgam  of  most  quoted  sentences  of 
Hamlet, shows the futility of bombarding the audience with ideas. The Shakespeare 
of this prolog, like his predecessor Lucky, tries to keep the authority of his text and is 
unaware of the nonsensicality of his lecture. Whether Easy learns English in its new 
sense or not remains unclear. In any case, the audience cannot share any linguistic 
experience  with  the  characters/actors.  Stoppard’s  language  game  leaves  the 
spectators in perplexity, resisting their interpretative desires by robbing them from 
their only medium of interpretation.  
Jernigan believes that “a thoroughly postmodern work would simultaneously raise 
ontological  questions  about  the  nature  of  the  past  and  epistemological  questions 
about how we are to know the past, all the while remaining incredulous about that 18 
past’s  grand  meta-narrative  (2001:148).  In  his  view,  Stoppard  raises  many  such 
questions  but  finally  finds  answers  for  them.    Jernigan  differentiates  between 
Stoppard’s  anti-realism  and  that  of  Caryl  Churchill,  and  maintains  that  instead  of 
“encouraging  his  audience  to  leave  with  widely  different  perspectives,  Stoppard 
strives  to  instill  a  homogeneity  of  thought.”(66)  I  think,  the  postmodernism  of 
Stoppard  lies  in  the  multiplication  of  the  textual  voices  participating  in,  and 
simultaneously  commenting  upon  the  dramatic  event,  the  anti-representational 
narrative form, the disruption of the coherent narrative, and the logical impossibility of 
his theatrical spaces.  
In Churchill’s work, “the incredulity toward metanarratives,” and the alienation of 
reality start from her earlier works like Traps, with its permanent change of signs, and 
culminates in her later books, like A Mouthful of Birds, Ice cream, and Hotel. Her anti-
narrative style in This is a Chair and Blue Heart, discussed in the last two chapters of 
this study, are deconstructive attempts, in Derridean sense, to subvert the domination 
of text and thought in theater. As Aston maintains: 
 
In challenging the ways in which we make sense of 
meaning, Churchill’s experimental style demanded a 
different  reading  of  the  staged  world:  one  where 
rules  are  broken  and  meaning  is  constantly  being 
made  and  unmade  through  the  language  of 
performance  rather  than  the  word  of  the  dramatic 
script(2001:81). 
 
In Blue Kettle, for instance, the words “blue” and “Kettle”, which are arbitrary signs at 
the  beginning,  gradually  devour  all  other  words  and  create  a  linguistically 19 
incomprehensible text. Because of the multiplicity of references, even in the play’s 
internal system of signification, the signifiers lose their referentiality. 
While  the  master  narratives  of  the  past  searched  unification,  Churchill’s 
deconstructive  works  are formed  by fragmentation. The repetitive form of Heart’s 
Desire, for instance, rejects any consistency in narration and fights against unification 
of  textual  elements.  As  Jernigan  maintains  “while  Heart’s  Desire  questions  the 
sovereignty of the author and director and draws an analogy between their power in 
producing theatre to that of the head of the household, Blue Kettle takes things even 
further by questioning the sovereignty of the text itself (2001:41). The sovereignty of 
texts is also questioned in Mad Forest and This is a Chair. The titles of the short 
scenes of This is a Chair propose important political or social issues, like “The War in 
Bosnia,” or “Genetic Engineering.” But, instead of discussing these issues, Churchill 
provides  us  with  the  scenes  of  the  routine  life,  like  dating,  feeding  a  child,  or 
discussing a trivial thing. The discrepancy between our expectations, raised by the 
titles, and the staged scenes breaks the epistemological stability in this play in  a 
Magrittean style. Jernigan believes “while Stoppard tries to fix heterotopias, Churchill 
revels in them in such a way that her drama becomes heterotopian” (2001:37) I think 
whereas Stoppard’s approach to postmodern issues is rather textual or theatrical, 
Churchill’s approach is socio-political and anti authorial. Her theater fights against 
those  powers,  which  in  the  name  of  being,  presence,  absolute  truth,  or  faithful 
representation, try to give shape to society and art.  20 
 
Chapter 1   
 
Beckett and the Impossibility of Language 
 
All  his  life  Beckett  struggled  with  language, 
dissatisfied  with  its  inability  to  express  exactly  the 
meaning that always just eluded him. What he nearly 
achieved was a scream of agony containing the total 
impotence of a human life (Cadler 4) 
 
Beckett’s work has been signified as “the literature of silence” by Ihab Hassan. 
The reason is the futile attempt of these works to communicate in a situation in which 
words do not cooperate with the writer in conveying meaning or in articulating ideas. 
In Ohio Impromptu, Beckett repeatedly asserts that, there is “nothing left to tell.” His 
obsession with language derives from the incompatibility of words with the thoughts 
and feelings they are supposed to convey. The writer is thus pushed towards creating 
a “literature of unword” (Beckett 1983: 173). His awareness of the impossibility of 
metaphysical immobility of signifieds made him think about silent speaking, in which 
nothing can  be  approached  through  naming.  He  aspires,  therefore,  to  create  the 
“unnamable.” Most of his critics agree that because of its inherent impossibility, his 
language is rather a barrier than  assistance in the way of understanding him. His 
works, like abstract paintings, can be perceived in different ways without coming to a 
definitive interpretation. He intentionally avoids providing the audience with a definite 
logocentric text with decidable meaning. The failure of language to communicate, the 21 
disability of words to convey a fixed signification, and the inefficiency of texts to come 
to  a  closure,  are  all  portrayed  as  inevitable  in  his  works.  As  Barella  maintains, 
“Beckett, destroying grammatical, syntactic, lexical rules and meaning, creates a sort 
of  non-language  (or  rather  a  way  of  expression  which  is  to  a  certain  extent  not 
subject to conventional rules). His readers cannot be conventional either; they have 
to interpret the text at different levels from the lexical to allegorical” (1999: 54).  
Beckett’s  obsession  with  language  led  him  to  the  exploration  of  different 
philosophical  insights  into  the  relationship  of  thinking  and  language.  His  first 
published  work,  Whoroscope,  is  a  long  poem  dedicated  to  the  examination  of 
Cartesian project for liberating the thinking self from the constraints of body. The 
aspiration of the Cogito to free itself from the restraints of reality, which was a serious 
matter for Descartes, turns to be the subject of literary parody for Beckett. The same 
parody becomes the central theme of Murphy, an explicitly philosophical novel. The 
criticism of Cartesian enlightenment, idealism, and dogmatic interpretation of world 
can  be  traced  throughout  Beckett’s  literary  career.  His  treatment  of  these  ideas, 
however,  is  often  ambivalent  and  parodic  rather  than  clear-cut  and  serious.  His 
“Godot,”  though  having  the  mysterious  characteristic  of  a  religious  savior,  is 
presented  too  ambiguously  and  mockingly  to  embody  the  possibility  of  a  sacred 
solution  for  the  eternal  suffering  of  humans.  The  demythification  of  theological 
interpretation of being, though very dominant in  Endgame,  cannot  be  taken  as  a 
leitmotif in this play; the multiplicity of the levels of meaning hinders the critics from 
understating  it  to  a  criticism  of  theological  dogmatism.  Although  its  reference  to 
religious theme of apocalyptic ending of the world can be inferred from the title, the 
halt position of the characters and the promising appearance of the boy at the end of 
the play, though uncertain, deny a checkmate to the play. Beckett, though familiar 22 
with the ideas of Heidegger and Sartre in this relation, avoids taking a philosophical 
position and remains skeptic about determined definitions. The classical concept of 
self-identity is another realm of investigation for Beckett. If the Cartesian “self-thinking 
thought” cannot exist and the possibility of accessing reality through perception is 
also questioned, identity can only be defined in terms of language. Since language 
itself  is  an  unstable  system,  no  stable  identity  can  be  extracted  from  its  abstract 
definitions.  The  search  for  self-identity,  an  identity  separate  from  language  and 
environment, ends in the negation of self in Not I. The traumatized self loses its ability 
to differentiate between first person “I” and third person “she.”  
The  examination of  philosophical and ethical considerations can be observed 
throughout  Beckett’s  works.  The  ambiguous  waiting  of  the  two  vagabonds  for  a 
savior or a “second coming” in Waiting for Godot, the speculations about the end of 
the world in Endgame, the endeavors of a self to capture his identity by resorting to 
the past in Krapp’s last Tape, the hopeless efforts of the individual for remaining 
invisible in Film, the difficulty to say “the unsayable” in Unnamable, and the negation 
of  a  center  in  quad, demonstrate  how  the  spirit  of  time  is  reflected  in  his  works. 
Kearney  believes  that,  “Beckett’s  demythologizing  of  the  scientific  pretentions  of 
Cartesian idealism, dogmatic theology and linguistic positivism may be seen as a 
literary counterpart to Jacques Derrida’s recent philosophy of deconstruction. Derrida 
develops Heidegger’s destruction of the logos of being into a radical deconstruction 
of  the  logos  of  language”  (1987,  291).  Beckett’s  approach  to  philosophical 
arguments, as Kearney mentions, is a literary one. His dramatic and fictional works 
obliterate the certitude of all philosophy, theology, and language by turning them to 
parody or  pastiche.  His  literature  not only questions  the nature of God, self,  and 
reality, and endorses the role that language in the determination of such concepts 23 
plays, but also stresses the difficulty of embracing the formlessness of being into a 
form of art. Hence, he calls his art an “art of failure,” an art whose very medium, 
language, turns against itself.  
Feeling defeated by an impossible language, Beckett turns to the theories of 
language expressed by  Mauthner  and Wittgenstein to examine new explanations. 
Mauthner’s  assertion  that  there  would  be  no  thought  without  language,  and 
Wittgenstein’s suggestion that world is only commensurable through words, seemed 
to express what Beckett endeavored to say. Wittgenstein‘s statement in Philosophical 
Investigation that,  “W ovon Man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss Man schweigen,” 
is  very  similar  to  what  the  character  of  the  Unnamable  experiences.  To  capture 
silence, to free oneself from the babbling of words, however, seems to be impossible 
for Beckett. Consequently, the comic efforts of Beckett’s characters to stop talking -
like his efforts to stop writing- fail; language resists every conscious confrontation. A 
split appears between what the characters claim to do and what they really do. In 
other words, the constative and performative dimensions of language oppose each 
other. Language loses its function as a vehicle of meaning in his drama and becomes 
obscure and incommunicable;  therefore,  instead of influencing other characters or 
the audience, it remains ineffective and aimless.  
The incompetence of language to capture silence or to create fixed meaning is 
portrayed in all of Beckett’s works. As Kearney points out: 
 
Beckett’s  writing  masterfully  deconstructs  itself  by 
directing our attention to itself as writing, that is a system 
of sounding signifiers irretrievably at odds with the ideal of 
a  corresponding  silent  signified.  It  is  only  by 
deconstructing  the  word’s  pretention  to  achieve  self-24 
adequation by means of silence, that we can uncover its 
hidden  self-alienation.  The  Irony  which  Beckett  makes 
such great play of is, of course, that one is obliged to use 
language to deconstruct language (360). 
 
This  deconstruction  takes  place  during  the  very  process  of  creating  a  text.  The 
endless  repetition  in  his  plays,  which  seems  to  be  necessary  for  the  process  of 
creation, manifests Beckett’s uncertainty about the stability of his expressions. Like 
all unstable systems, his texts fail to complete themselves and reach a meaning.  
The parodic quest of the two clowns of Waiting for Godot for absolute meaning, for 
instance, like other similar quests in his works, remains futile. The unnamable God 
does not show himself, the past remains unreconstructable, and the future obscure. 
The impasse of memory drives the characters towards the invention of stories about 
their past and quoting their own words. The permanent repetition of these quotations 
causes the loss of their significance and renders the play a spiral descending towards 
a non-closure. The characters either repeat their own actions and words (intratextual 
references) or those of others (intertextual references). These frequent references 
break the structure of the play into fragments and hinder the reader/audience from 
bringing his different interpretations to a final conclusion. Danzieger believes that, “A 
narrative  that  zigzags  between  multiple  versions  of  itself  is  bound  to  destroy  the 
illusions of reality that most readers tend to crave (11). Beckett breaks these illusions 
in his plays by portraying characters, scenes, and texts which escape representation. 
The illusion of reality in Waiting for Godot, for instance, is destroyed by staging an 
empty scene with a withered tree, peopled by two vagabonds, who are obsessed with 
serious ontological questions. The scenery proposes more a circus with two clowns 
than the real world. However, the characters are suffering in their comic situation. 25 
Their tie with time and space is broken and they lack both personal and historical 
memory, but they are searching for something to give a meaning to their existence. 
Mr.  Godot  is  the  solution,  the  “logos”  which  can  bind  up  the  fragments  in  their 
narrative  and  brings  it  to  a  conclusion.  The  identity  of  this  absent  presence  is 
unknown though, both for the characters and for the audience. As Worton maintains: 
 
Much has been written about who or what Godot is. 
My own view is that he is simultaneously whatever 
we think he is and not what we think he is: he is an 
absence,  who  can  be  interpreted  at  moments  as 
God,  death,  the  lord  of  the  manor,  a  benefactor, 
even Pozzo. But Godot has a function rather than a 
meaning. He stands for what keeps us chained - to 
and  in  -  existence.  He  is  the  unknowable  that 
represents hope in an age when there is no hope; he 
is whatever fiction we want him to be - as long as he 
justifies our life-as-waiting (1995: 70-71). 
 
Godot can answer the questions which engage the characters’ mind; he can define 
past, present, and future for them; and he can give them a task to do, if he comes.  
His  everlasting  absence,  however,  frustrates  their  hopes  and  makes  them 
nervous. The following dialog shows the hidden desire in the characters to liberate 
themselves from the distressful act of waiting for an unknown or metaphysical entity: 
 
Estragon: [His mouth full, vacuously.] We are not tied! 
Vladimir: I don’t hear a word you’re saying. 
Estragon: [Chews, swallows.] I’m asking if we’re tied. 26 
Vladimir: Tied? 
Estragon: Ti-ed 
Vladimir: How do you mean tied? 
Estragon: Down 
Vladimir: But to whom? 
Estragon: To your man 
Vladimir: To Godot? Tied to Godot? What an idea! No question of it. [pause] For 
the moment. 
 
Vladimir’s  denial  of  their  bondage  to  Godot  is  followed  by  a  pause,  showing  his 
hesitation, and a phrase which contradicts the first statement, emphasizing that this 
bondage is just a temporary one. The temporariness of their waiting, however, is 
discarded  in  the  progression  of the play  because  the same  act  is  repeated. The 
characters  get  more  obsessed  with  finding  a  way  out  of  their  miserable  situation 
every time that Godot’s presence is postponed. Estragon’s lament, “Nothing to be 
done”  (Beckett  1990:11),  repeated  later  by  Vladimir,  expresses  the  agony  of  the 
human race, trapped in the circularity of life between birth and death. Vladimir’s reply, 
though irrelevant to what Estragon has said, expresses his deep despair of going on 
the same vicious circle: “I am beginning to come round to the opinion. All my life I’ve 
tried to put it from me, saying, Vladimir, be reasonable, you haven’t tried everything. 
And  I  resumed  the  struggle”  (11).  As  a  Christian,  however,  he  knows  that  being 
desperate is a sin; therefore he tries to overcome his emotions and tells Estragon 
that they must take heart and keep waiting. To justify himself he resorts to the Bible, 
or to the immobile Word, stressing that, “Hope deferred maketh the something sick.” 
“The something,” which he cannot remember, or is unable to utter, turns his religious 
philosophizing  to  a  parody.  He  also  tries  to  console  himself  by  resorting  to  the 
probability of being saved like one of the two thieves who were hanged together with 27 
Christ. The fact that he loses his heart very soon and welcomes Estragon’s idea of 
hanging themselves while waiting, shows that the center to which he tries to resort 
cannot hold for a long time. This process of losing and taking heart repeats itself 
throughout the play and they keep waiting. 
During this act of waiting, they should do something to pass the time; therefore, 
they try to reconstruct the past by evoking the different pieces of their narrative from 
their memory: 
 
Vladimir:  Together  again  at  last! We’ll  have  to  celebrate  this.  But  how?  [He 
reflects.] Get up till I embrace you. 
Estragon: [irritably.] Not now, not now. 
Vladimir: [Hurt, coldly] May one inquire where His Highness spent the night? 
Estragon: In a ditch 
Vladimir: [Admirably.] A ditch! Where? 
Estragon: [Without gesture.] Over there. 
Vladimir: And they didn’t beat you? 
Estragon: Beat me? Certainly they beat me. 
Vladimir: The same lot as usual? 
Estragon: The same? I don’t know. 
Vladimir: When I think of it…all these years…but for me …where would you be 
…? [Decisively] You’d be nothing more than a little heap of bones at the present 
minute, no doubt about it. 
 
The evocation of the memories of the past just reveals that they had to go through 
the  same  kind  of  tormenting  experience  in  the  past  and  that  there  will  be  no 
promising end for their narrative. They are doomed, like Prometheus or Sisyphus, to 
repeat the same undertaking, without knowing the philosophy behind it or its goal. 
The inevitability of the situation has paralyzed them so much that they cannot react to 
it. Estragon does not even know if he was beaten the same as before. Vladimir on 28 
the other hand tries to philosophize and justify the whole suffering. Throughout the 
first act of the play, he introduces different elements of Christianity to give a meaning 
to their deeds, but he finally gives up and asserts angrily that, “Nothing is certain 
when you’re about.” 
This  uncertainty  manifests  itself  in  their  dialogs,  which  are  sometimes  the 
repetition of each other’s sentences. What they cannot communicate is the pain and 
suffering that they have: 
 
Vladimir: It hurts? 
Estragon: Hurts! He wants to know if it hurts! 
Vladimir: [angrily] No one ever suffers but you. I don’t count. I’d like to hear what 
you’d say If you had what I have. 
Estragon: It hurts? 
Vladimir: Hurts! He wants to know if it hurts! 
 
Wittgenstein  believes  that  propositions  about  pain  are  among  those  speech  acts 
whose communicative aspect can never be sure, because one has no idea what kind 
of experience of pain the other side has, and how one can sympathize with him. The 
exchange  of  feelings  between  Estragon  and  Vladimir  turns  to  an  absurd  role- 
changing  for them.  Like  clowns,  they repeat whatever  they hear,  discharging  the 
words  “hurt”  and  “suffering”  from  their  signification.  Communicating  misery  in  this 
scene turns to a pastiche, demonstrating the incommunicability of experience through 
language. It is more a language game of imitating suffering than communicating it. 
Repetition distances them from the original pain.  
The role attributed to Godot is putting an end to the characters’ pain and turning 
their game of chaotic structure, fragmented message, and decentered narrative to a 
linear and ordered modern work. His presence is supposed to produce a meaningful 29 
whole of their shattered existence. Nevertheless, Godot is an equivocal entity. Like 
Jehovah  of  Old  Testament,  his  wrath  can  be  frightening,  and  like  Messiah,  his 
Second  Coming  can  be  redeeming. He  punishes  if  the  characters  leave,  and he 
redeems if they stay and wait. Although waiting is promising, the void of hope and 
order  in  their  existence  and  the  circularity  of  their  experience  are  severe  and 
perturbing.  The  characters’  yearning  for  turning  Godot’s  absence  to  presence, 
resembles  the  endeavor  of  Western  thought  for  substituting  the  absence  of  the 
immobile signified by  the presence of theoretical logos. Presence promises clarity 
and creates a concrete, touchable truth. Vladimir’s desire to have an exact picture of 
Godot’s appearance shows his desire for bringing him down to the level of human 
understanding: 
 
Vladimir: (Softly) Has he a beard, Mr. Godot?  
Boy: Yes Sir. 
Vladimir: Fair or... (he hesitates)...or black?  
Boy: I think it's white, Sir.  
 
Vladimir tries to adjust Godot’s picture to what Western metaphysic has provided for 
him  as  the  foundation  of  his  logocentric  beliefs.  Estragon,  however,  is  more 
concerned  about  Godot’s  personality  and  his  behavior.  For  Didi,  the 
priest/philosopher of the play, the physical image of god figure is accompanied by the 
religious  menace  of  punishment.  Godot  is  the  logos,  positioned  in  the  center  of 
metaphysical thought. 
As  an  entity  that  escapes  definition,  however,  Godot  is  closer  to  Derrida’s 
definition of “différance” than to the metaphysical concepts of divine logos. Derrida 
describes différance as “the formation of form” (Derrida 1976: 63), “the historical and 
epochal unfolding of Being” (Derrida 1982: 22), something that negates origin. The 30 
absent  Godot,  throws  the  idea  of  "origin,"  of  true  original  meaning,  into  radical 
question, because it cannot be easily categorized or adjusted to an object outside the 
text; it can be a lot of things simultaneously and nothing at all; it is an aporic being, 
which escapes interpretation. The characters’ attempts to capture this non-entity, to 
enter this unknown creature into the realm of known by meeting him or making him 
present are all in vain. He does not appear and the repetitive structure of waiting, of 
meaninglessness, of babbling words, keeps going on to infinity.  
Inventing  devices  to  make  their  waiting  tolerable  is  the  only  thing  that  the 
characters can do in Godot’s everlasting absence. Their language manipulation, their 
exchange of trivialities, and their  role-playing have the same function for  them  as 
carrot eating: they are pastimes. Hence, the characters move easily from one topic to 
another without bringing it to a definite conclusion. They speak in order to feel that 
they are still living. When the element of communication is omitted from speech, the 
bound between language and characters’ deeds will be broken. Didi and Gogo claim 
that they go and they do not move; they speak about pain but they do not convey any 
feelings. The whole situation, therefore, creates a kind of non-relationality between 
language and reality. Since the tie between language and reality is broken, words 
lose their vocation of expressing feelings or thoughts; they become the very feelings 
or thoughts: 
 
Vladimir: Say I am happy 
Estragon: I am happy 
Vladimir: So I am 
Estragon: So I am 
Vladimir: We are happy. 
Estragon: We are happy. (Silence) What do we do now, now that we’re happy? 
(56) 31 
 
In this dialog, they seem to imitate the feelings that are prescribed for them by the 
text. Their emotions are products of language and as arbitrary as the language itself. 
Instead  of  being  expressive,  language  becomes  creative; the  characters  play  the 
emotions that language dictates. Consequently, the feelings become alien for them 
and  they  ask  themselves,  “W hat  do  we  do  now,  now  that  we  are  happy?”  The 
disconnection between thought and language turns the words to their toys. Playing 
with  these  toys  helps  them  overcome  the  anxiety  created  by  the  aimless  act  of 
waiting and fills the gap in their existence. The scenes are more extended language 
games than vehicles of meaningful communication. The aim of these games is not 
giving  fun  to  the  characters,  but  defending  them  against  a  world  they  cannot 
comprehend or cope with. Neither is there any thought behind all their exchanges. 
They do not even know what they should do with thoughts: 
 
Vladimir: Oh, it’s not the worst, I know. 
Estragon: What? 
Vladimir: To have thought. 
Estragon: Obviously. 
Vladimir: But we have done without it. 
Estragon: Que voulez-vous? 
Vladimir: I beg your pardon? 
Estragon: Que voulez-vous? 
Vladimir: Ah! Que voulez-vou? Exactly(60). 
 
The language that the characters use strikes the spectator as unreal because it 
does not fit into the situation in which the characters act. Although the sound effects 
of the words are there, they do not stimulate a meaning. The association on the part 
of audience fails because there is no correspondence between characters’ deeds 32 
and  their  words.  The  articulated  words  remain  dangling  and  create  a  kind  of 
detachment between performance and audience. Since the characters switch quickly 
from one subject to another, building a logical interpretation becomes impossible for 
the  spectators.  Besides,  the  incompatibility  between  language  and  character’s 
behavior  hinders  the  reader/spectator  from  coming  to  a  semantic  conclusion.  As 
Banham points out: 
 
When we reach the “edge of language” through the 
encounter with that which defies naming, we find that 
language itself is an edge which cuts between the 
world and the one  who  speaks….If  language  is  at 
such an edge than to engage with language is to be 
forced into a poverty which is original. This poverty 
consists in learning that grounding of utterances is 
nothing.  Before  and  after  language  is  nothing 
(1999:55). 
 
Language loses its continuity  in  repetition, in the exchange of banalities, or asking 
and  answering  questions  that  play  no  role  in  the  progression  of  the  narrative. 
Narrative development is replaced with fragments of speech which are irrelevant to 
each other and to the narrative as a whole. The characters themselves claim that 
their  words  are  meaningless  sounds,  signifying  no  truth.  They  show  their 
disconnection  with  reality  by  showing  doubt  about  being  somewhere  or  doing 
something. Their words are not supported semantically by a nonverbal reality or a 
transcendental truth; they are merely language games.  
Even in their arguments about serious religious topics, like the disparity between 
different narratives of the four Evangelist about the saved thief, they are more playing 33 
with  words,  throwing  them  aimlessly  like  balls,  than  performing  an  organized 
argument. Their dialog resembles the discussion of two clowns in a circus over a 
serious matter: 
 
Vladimir: One out of four. Of the other three two don’t mention any thieves at all 
and the third says that both of them abused him. 
Estragon: who? 
Vladimir: What 
Estragon: What’s all this about? Abused who? 
Vladimir: The Savior. 
Estragon: Why? 
Vladimir: Because he wouldn’t save them. 
Estragon: From Hell? 
Vladimir: Imbecile! From death. 
Estragon: I thought you said hell. 
Vladimir: From death, from death. 
Estragon: Well what of it? 
Vladimir: Then two of them must have been damned. 
Estragon: And why not? 
 
Vladimir,  the  religious  thinker,  is  in  search  of  truth  in  the  holy  text  of  the  New 
Testament. But even in this text, there is no certainty. The probability that one of the 
thieves  is  saved  is  one  to  four,  because  just  one  of  the  Evangelists  mentioned 
salvation. The characters may, like the two thieves, be both damned. No sacred text 
can relieve them by securing truth or providing them with a promise of redemption; 
grand  narratives  can  no  longer  inspire  confidence.  Vladimir’s  perplexity  is  the 
confusion  of  a  layman  in  understanding  the  body  of  metaphysical  knowledge, 
presented to him as a logocentric unchangeable text. Beckett refutes the stability of 
these texts by presenting truth as an unauthorized, confusing, or even chaotic matter, 
which, like “hell” and “death” in Estragon’s mind, is not really distinguishable. Yet the 34 
characters are so stricken with a cosmic distress that they crave to find the ultimate 
truth of their destiny. Regardless of whether or not the ultimate mysteries of reality 
can  be  clarified  by  grand  narratives  or  metaphysical  systems  such  as  religion  or 
philosophy,  they  insist  on discovering  the  truth behind  narratives. The  destructive 
control  of  religious  grandnaratives  over  their  life  is  manifested  either  in  their 
conversations or their constant references to  these texts as the origin. As Worton 
observes: 
 
Suspicious  of  all  authority  and  especially  of  the 
authority  of  the  founding  texts  of  Western  culture, 
Beckett studs Godot and Endgame with references 
to these very texts in order to make his readers think 
and  speculate,  to  make  them  participate  in  his 
anxious oscillation between certainty about what is 
untrue and uncertainty about what may be true. This 
abdication of authorial power and this appeal to the 
creative intervention of readers mark Beckett out as 
one of the founding fathers of, and one of the major 
witnesses to, our Post-Modern condition (85). 
 
The “uncertainty about what may be true” manifested itself, as we observed, in the 
conversations  between  Estragon  and  Vladimir  about  the  Holy  Scripture,  the 
memories of the past, or the identity of Godot, who, like a meta-narrative, should 
define their life. The grand mysteries, however, resist clarity because their encoding 
foundation is a vague language. Language keeps dominating truth so strongly that 
breaking away from its grips resembles coming out of a well by excavating it. 35 
The relationship between language and power is shown in the scenes of Pozzo 
and Lucky. Master Pozzo controls his servant, Lucky, by the power of words. Pozzo’s 
one-word commands manage and direct Lucky. Like a programmed robot, he reacts 
just to the orders that he hears from Pozzo. “Back”, “stop”, “turn”, “basket”, are the 
key words that the programmed lucky responds to. Pozzo, as the controlling agent 
issues orders and lucky performs them automatically. Orders, maintains Wittgenstein 
in Philosophical investigations, are tools for proving that we are understood by others 
and that we are able to impose our will on them. The rational philosopher has turned 
to a mock figure in Beckett’s play, who only babbles the words dictated to him. Like 
Lyotard, Beckett questions the power of reason by demonstrating the dominance of 
non-rational  forces,  which  contradict  the  traditional  notions  of  humanism.  His 
philosopher cannot defend human being as the central subject of knowledge,  who 
masterfully  controls  heterogeneity  and  difference  in  the  way  of  progress.  After 
questioning the validity of theological grandnaratives, Beckett goes further in Lucky’s 
speech to expand his critique to philosophical metaphysics. By demonstrating the 
scientist/philosopher’s  slavery  to  power  structure,  he  dismantles  all  philosophical 
searches for truth, origin, or immobile signified.  
Furthermore,  Beckett  mocks  Cartesian  “cogito  ergo  sum”  in  his  mock 
philosopher,  Lucky.  Descartes’  idea,  that  being  can  be  made  perceivable  by 
meditating, is discarded in Waiting for Godot. Thinking is presented as something 
controllable,  like  other  human  activities  such  as  dancing  or  singing.  Pozzo  asks 
Vladimir and Estragon what they prefer Lucky to perform for them: “Shall we have 
him dance, or sing, or recite, or think, or_” Lucky can start any of these activities by 
Pozzo’s command. The control of power agents over philosophers’ thinking process 
is depicted in the way Pozzo directs lucky. That thinking is an agent of language, not 36 
vice versa, is also portrayed in Lucky’s thinking, which is an observable activity; he 
thinks aloud and in terms of language. Pozzo claims that, Lucky “even used to think 
very prettily once, I could listen to him for hours.” The modern idea that the source of 
language is thinking, is substituted by the postmodern notion that one can think only 
when language is out there! Lyotard believes that, when one is within the framework 
of  an  institution,  whether family,  religion,  university,  or government, the rules and 
orders of this institution control his language games. In other words, the established 
grand narratives of these institutions shape our lives and determine the way we think.  
Lucky’s speech, which is a parody of a philosopher’s lecture, shows the depth of 
chaos in the postmodern thought. His demented thought/discourse, which obstructs 
and violates  the  limits  of Western metaphysics,  not  only  deconstructs  the  sacred 
philosophical text, but also discloses the lines of objective thought. As Brewer puts it: 
 
Drawn  to  the  side  of  the  signifier  rather  than  the 
signified (though as immaterial meaning), the hybrid 
“thought-performance”  breaks  down  the  distinction 
between words and their meaning. The disjunction 
between character’s actions and their speech is here 
repeated  in  the  disjunction  between  discourse  as 
performance and his cognitive content. (152-153) 
 
Language dissolves  itself  into  a  kind  of  rhyme  sequence,  like  the  one  in  nursery 
rhymes, in which the meaning plays no role. His declamations turns to be an ecstatic 
performing act, very similar to a show or a mystic dance, which goes out of control as 
lucky approaches the end of his speech. Indeed the other characters have to stop 
him with violence because he destroys the modern order with his postmodern chaos. 37 
Furthermore,  none of the different functions  of  language  works  in  his monolog; it 
does  not  communicate;  it  denies  self-expression;  it  has  no  effect  on  the  other 
characters; and it conveys no meaning. What Derrida calls aporia, or the impossibility 
of language,  is  realized  in  Lucky’s  lecture;  whatever we try, we cannot  access a 
meaning. His speech is a pastiche of the different postulates of Western thought and 
nonsense, as if different voices are uttering ideas from different phases of the history 
of thought. It is a polyphony, or better to say a cacophony, of all philosophical and 
theological ideas about existence. 
The failure of both sacred and secular narratives in making sense of human 
existence is demonstrated in this cacophonous lecture, directed by Pozzo, the power 
agent. With  Pozzo’s command, “Think pig,” the thinker, Lucky, starts performing a 
text/think. But after uttering one sentence, first Pozzo and then all three characters try 
to stop him because he has broken the presumed order of his language game. The 
performance, however, is  already  out  of  control; the  actor  continues  to  shout  his 
unauthorized text out. The beginning, with its disappointed reference to God, this 
“Prima  causa,”  seems  like  the  desperate  attempt  of  a  positivist  philosopher 
(Descartes?) who contempts his own beliefs with “quaquaquaqua” and “for reasons 
unknown.”  The  “qua,”  or  the  Latin  equivalence  for  God,  develops  into  the 
cacophonous  “quaqua”  of  a  duck  in  the  outcry  of  this  postmodern  lecturer.  Both 
Western  Christian  metaphysics  with  its  God  of  “Divine  aphasia”  “apathia”  or 
“athambia” and modern Enlightenment, with  its causa prima prove to be ineffective 
and  ridiculous  in  this  chaotic  speech.  The  modern  man  of  reason,  “for  reason 
unknown”,  has  metamorphosed  to  a  bestial  creature  which  destroys  his  own 
generation  and  leaves  the  ruins  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki,  or  the  scandal  of 
Holocaust. The promise of the Age of Reason, that man can come closer to God than 38 
angels, is broken by his being “the waste and pine” (Beckett, 1990:42). Man can 
neither physically nor spiritually (by resorting to metaphysics) be redeemed. Lucky’s 
speech displays a turn away from empirical reality of which Descartes was so sure. 
The Cartesian cogito, or the indisputable first truth, is bereft of validity in this kind of 
philosophic chaos. Logic, the desired proof of existence, is lost in anarchy. This loss 
of logic, of center, and of metaphysical justification for existence creates a farce out 
of a serious thinking process.  
Referentiality is also discarded in Lucky’s lecture. Instead, Derrida’s différence 
is realized in the words that move between borders of different concepts and never 
fall in a single concept. Language fails to convey any fixed meaning and hinders the 
text from becoming a meta-text. As Nealon points out: 
 
Beckett directs Lucky’s long monologue against the 
popular  notion  that  philosophy’s  job  is  to  restore 
unity to man’s learning, a job which philosopher can 
only do by recuperating some metanarratives which 
link together all moments in human history within a 
single,  continuous  metaphysical  system.  Lucky’s 
think,  though,  is  a  narrative  that  disrupts  and 
deconstructs all notions of universal ahistorical meta-
narrative- all Godots (1992. 47). 
 
Since the characters do not achieve the unity and certainty that they expect, they try 
to  stop  the  delogocentrized  Lucky  violently.  By  damaging  Lucky’s  hat,  they  can 
restore the programmed philosopher to a controlled state of mind. The authority and 
order overcomes the chaos and freedom of thought and Pozzo turns back to his 
former state of power and control of text. 39 
Pozzo’s desire for controlling text and maintaining his authority is demonstrated 
effectively in the following dialog between the two vagabonds and him: 
 
Estragon: Why doesn’t he put down his bags? 
Pozzo: I too would be happy to meet him. The more people I meet the happier I 
become. From the meanest creature one departs wiser, richer, more conscious 
of one’s blessing. Even you…[He looks at them ostentatiously in turn to make it 
clear they are both meant]…even you, who knows, will have added to my store. 
Estragon: Why doesn’t he put down his bags? 
Pozzo: But that would surprise me. 
Vladimir: You are being asked a question. 
Pozzo: [Delighted.] A question! Who? What? A moment ago you were calling 
me sir, in fear and trembling. Now you’re asking me questions. No good will 
come of this 
 
By  ignoring  their  questions,  despising  them  as  “the  meanest  creatures”  whose 
function  it  is  to  serve  him,  Pozzo  tries  to  impose  his  control  over  their  texts. 
Conversation  for  him  means  issuing  orders  for  others  to  be  performed,  not 
communicating with them. For this reason Pozzo does not let a conversation begin 
that is not authorized by him. He neither answers the questions nor listens to what 
the other characters say. His sharing of feelings with them is just a role playing. After 
lamenting for a while that he is a miserable creature and is suffering because of 
lucky’s misconduct, he pulls himself together and asserts that, “There wasn’t a word 
of  truth”  in  what  he  said  (34). It  is  strange  that  neither  Estragon  nor  Vladimir  is 
offended by this theater; they even participate in it.  
Being relieved from the tense situation, Vladimir and Estragon return to their 
familiar act of waiting, taking the whole thing for a pastime. Vladimir  admires the 
evening as being charming and Estragon as unforgettable. Then, they try to identify 40 
the type of theater in which they were engaged; was it a pantomime, a circus, or a 
music hall? Indeed, it is a farce, created out of the denied misery of all characters 
involved  in  this  scene.  The  seriousness  of their  tragic  situation  is  reduced  to  the 
ludicrous playfulness of farce. The implicit self-reflectivity of their final comments on 
their own performance also renders a metatheatrical characteristic to this scene and 
reduces  its  tragic  sense.  Furthermore,  the  binary  opposition  between  reality  and 
performance or representation vanishes. The parallel that is drawn between life and a 
theater stage anticipates two important postmodern notions: first the belief that life is 
dominated by text, or language; second that life, like theater, is just a representation 
of reality by means of language.  
Then,  Pozzo  says  “audio”  to  depart,  but  they  do  not  move.  The  scene  is 
repeated many times till they finally leave without leaving any effect on the lives of 
the two characters. Estragon even denies their being a pastime by asserting that, 
without them,  time  “would  have  passed  in  any  case”  (46).  Speaking  about  them, 
though, becomes a theme for a new narrative/game for them. Vladimir’s attempts to 
connect them to an empirical reality of the past fail because Estragon is unable to 
recognize  anything  familiar  in  them.  Vladimir  logocentric  aspiration  to  unite  the 
different pieces of their narrative and to give them a meaning remain futile. Instead, 
Estragon’s uncertainty makes Vladimir doubt the trustworthiness of his knowledge 
because all they have is just scattered pieces of information that cannot be bound 
together. Their author, the absent Godot, has also forsaken them. The appearance of 
the  boy  at  this  point,  asserting  that  “Godot”  will  not  come,  takes  away  all  their 
courage and wakes the idea of suicide in them. Although Vladimir tries to keep heart 
by  asserting  that,  “Tomorrow  everything  will  be  better,”  the  idea  of  hanging 
themselves is expressed in Estragon’s regret for not having the rope necessary for it. 41 
They  do  not  even  have  the  means  to  put  an  end  to  their  narrative.  Without  a 
metaphysical being, the Logos, or a controlling agent, they cannot bring their text to a 
closure. 
 
The  uncertainty  aroused  in  them  increases  as  they  lose  their  hope  for 
redemption. If nothing happens, if there is no progression in the world, if every thing 
is just the repetition of the same phenomenon of waiting in vain, then, they may just 
imagine  that  they  exist.  The  Cartesian  subjectivity  cannot  connect  them  with  an 
empirical reality. Vladimir even doubt about their “Dasein.”: 
 
Boy: What am I to say to Mr. Godot, sir? 
Vladimir: Tell him… [He hesitates] …tell him you saw us. [Pause.] You did see 
us, didn’t you? (50) 
 
He needs a proof for their existence. His longing for finding a center, a logos or an 
explanation for the phenomenon of being is fully expressed in his imploration to the 
Boy: “Words, words. [Pause.] Speak” (49). He needs words, Godot’s words perhaps, 
to adjust his presuppositions with a transcendental truth. Words, these messengers 
of clarity, are the only means for creating finality for him. The Boy, however, denies 
them  the  promised  message  and  they  remain  in  the  same  anxious  situation  of 
uncertainty. This dangling state, which can keep going to eternity, is so distressing for 
the characters that a disparity appears between what they say and what they do: 
 
Vladimir: Well, shall we go? 
Estragon: Yes, let’s go. 
[They do not move.] 
 42 
With Godot’s refusal of coming, the access to the center and to the meaning is 
denied  to  the  characters  and  spectators  simultaneously.  The  continuing  absence 
deprives the characters of salvation and the reader/spectator of completing the gaps 
in narrative. As Brewer asserts: 
 
Characters  invent  plays  and  games  to  undo  the 
authority  and  limiting  effect  of  theater’s  frames  of 
meaning. The principal medium of such inventions is 
language,  the  same  language  that  is  assigned  to 
semiological  ends.  Yet  it  is  the  paradoxical 
Beckettian  attack  on  language  through  the  use  of 
language that allows for the remarkable number and 
variety  of  plays  and  linguistic  inventions  to  be 
performed. Repetition, contradiction, phatic refrains, 
rhythms, slippages and word series… (1987:153) 
 
The plentitude of references outside these language games hinders the audience 
from  constructing  a  homogeneous  narrative.  The  contingency  of  language  is 
intentionally used to defy the idea of a solitary truth.  
 
The  second  Act  starts  with repetition,  repetition  of  the  same  scene  and  the 
same act of waiting. Estragon is again beaten and suffers from the pains of the past. 
Even his refusal of embracing Vladimir in the first scene is repeated here. The only 
change in the whole scene is the appearance of a few leaves on the tree. The cyclic 
structure of  Vladimir’s song at the beginning of this act, which repeats itself as a 
natural sequence of its course, portrays both repetition in text and repetition in life. In 
Beckett’s play the recurrence of circular actions and dialogs, contrary to Cartesian 43 
circle which seeks a reference point outside itself, is usually within a predetermined 
cycle. Waiting for Godot moves within the same obsessing questions which it creates 
and  so  takes  its  point  of  departure  from  modernism.  Beckett’s  repetition  can  be 
considered Derridean in the sense that it negates the possibility of supplementing an 
absence.  HIs  employment  of  repeated  structures  defies  Western  tradition  of 
completeness  and  order.  The  repetitive  structure  of  the  play  also  denies  the 
progression of time. The stage direction of the first scene of the second Act tells us 
that just one day has passed. Vladimir insists too that they were there yesterday, but 
the tree has got  some leaves now and Estragon can scarcely remember anything 
about the events of the first act. The boy cannot remember the characters either. 
Pozzo and Lucky have also changed a lot for a day: Pozzo has gone blind and Lucky 
dumb. The concept of time cannot be fixed here because memory, this third speech 
act in Wittgenstein’s theory of language, fails to connect them to any historical time. 
In other words, although time functions as a driving force both for the characters and 
the spectators, because of the shortage of memory its continuity makes no sense 
This contradiction between the concept of time in the text and the linear concept of 
time increases the uncertainty and anxiety created in the first Act and culminates in 
the  confusion  and  hopelessness  of  both  characters  and  spectators  in  finding  the 
truth. The play suggests that if all days are alike, how can one perceive the passing 
of time? Godot’s arrival, if it happens, can realize future; without his coming the past, 
present, and future lose their distinction.  
The only thing that can give the characters a sense of the past and create an 
identity for them is the invention of stories about their past life. However, like the play 
itself, their stories can never have an end. They were in countries, which they cannot 
remember or differentiate. Both narration and subjectivity in the characters become 44 
unreliable sources. The skeptical conclusions, developed in Cartesian argument on 
dreams,  insanity  and  illusion,  is  testified  here  without  coming  to  a  persuasive 
conclusion.  The  belief  in  an  unchangeable  reality  is  treated  with  postmodern 
skepticism and relativism in Beckett’s play, a philosophical skepticism from which 
there is no escape.  
In  the  absence  of  a  “comprehensive  image,”  through  which  truth  can  be 
apprehended  immediately,  they  should  resort  to  “phantasia.”  They  frame  their 
phantasia in words for they are “incapable of keeping silent.” The assertion that they 
“won’t think” and “they won’t hear” while talking manifests the automatic nature of 
conversing for them, which lacks any teleological end. Language is described as the 
assimilation of “dead voices,” “noise like wings,” “leaves,” “sand,” or “ashes,” which 
“talk about their lives” because “to have lived is not enough for them” (Beckett, 58). 
Didi and Gogo need to speak about their lives too. The sound effect of the words is 
more important for them than the meaning they are supposed to convey. They seem 
to recite a poem, one which keeps them amused while waiting; an escape from time. 
The words gather in their heads and disperse so quickly that no structured text is 
produced. The long silences between their short sentences show their inability to 
perform any meaningful dialog. Vladimir’s imploration, “Say something,” is responded 
by Estragon’s answer, “I am trying,” (59) and is followed by a long silence.  
Being disappointed with the hope of redemption, the characters turn to the idea 
of death as an escape from their miserable situation. In the disappointing absence of 
a  metaphysical  savior,  the  tree  on  the  stage  can  become  their  redeemer.  Their 
repetitive reference to the tree, which has both symbolic and intertextual function, is 
indicative of the role it plays in their life. It symbolizes not only change, nature, and 
life, but also crucifixion and resurrection. As Worton observes: 45 
The  many  references  to  the  tree  are  not  so  much 
circular as labyrinthine. Wandering in a textual maze 
with no centre, the reader follows up one reference, 
establishes a sense, and then comes across another 
reference which suggests another sense. The tree is 
not just 'an arbitrary feature in an arbitrary world' nor 
is it a symbol of hope. Rather, in its multiplicity, it 
serves  as  an  indicator  of  the  play's  strategies  of 
saying  indirectly  -  and  functions  as  a  'visual'  and 
'concrete' representation of - the essential textuality 
of the play (77).  
 
The  tree, like many other things, is a topic for discussion for the characters.  They 
return to it whenever all other topics are exhausted. Estragon interprets the changes 
in the tree, or even the existence of it, as one of Vladimir’s “nightmares.” Finally they 
agree that it has no use for them. The idea of hanging themselves to it, however, 
lingers till the end of the play. The tree, as the only concrete prop that the playwright 
has introduced in the structure of the play, irritates the characters. Its denial suggests 
an attempt to deny the use of representation in theater. The characters defy the idea 
that this allegorical element plays a necessary role in the progression of the narrative. 
The characters, like the audience, are tired of perpetual reinterpreting of it.  
Another  symbolical  element  in  the  play  is  hat:  it  gives  Lucky  the  ability  to 
perform; it helps Vladimir finding out something unknown, and it grants the characters 
a  new  identity.  Estragon,  for  instance,  tries  on  Lucky’s  hat  to  see  if  it  makes  a 
difference and decides to wear it instead of his, which is already worn out. Hat  for 
Estragon becomes a seat of beliefs, ideologies, thoughts, or even subjectivity. But 
substituting his theological beliefs with philosophical ones (having Lucky’s hat instead 
of his) does not bring any solution; the mystery of being remains unsolved for him. 46 
The  other  symbol,  Godot,  resists  being  adhered  to  a  fixed  signified  as  well.  Its 
identification as a metaphysical or transcendental signified is lost in the obscurity of 
the text and uncertainty of the characters. Consequently, the symbolism of the play 
fades into game playing; words, hats, shoes, and carrots, just fill the theater space for 
the  characters.  Characters’  clownish  exchanges  and  the  quick  shift  of  every 
discussion from seriousness of modernist tragedy to the popular discourses of music 
hall deprive the symbols of the play from acquiring any eloquent signification.  
This strategy of doing and undoing of latent meaning can be seen in all other 
discourses of the play. Beckett intentionally makes his audiences overinterpret the 
topics  of  the  play  by  proposing  thoughtful  or  eloquent  connotations,  which  he 
immediately  deconstructs  by  driving  serious  discussions  into  farcical  baloney. 
Additionally,  the  elements  of  undecideability,  self-referentiality,  negation  of  linear 
time, and repetition, which have taken the place of modern elements of certainty, 
representation, continuity, and resolution, hinder the discourse of the play to fall into 
a serious modernist discourse. The discursive strategies, which are constructed and 
deconstructed  perpetually,  turn  the  discourse  of  the  play  into  a  postmodern  one. 47 
 
Chapter 2  
 
 
The Defeated Author and his Endgame 
 
 
Vladimir’s hope that meaning, unity, presence, or Logos may  someday come 
back to life and text becomes totally frustrated in Endgame; the search for meaning 
and closure in this play is disappointed from the first sentences. The play starts with 
“It is finished,” giving the hope that some end has been achieved, and goes on to 
prove that the paralyzed author/director of this game or play is unable to attain his 
aim of bringing an end to the text or to the world. The second sentence is, “It is nearly 
finished,” and the third, “It must be nearly finished.” The hope and certainty of the first 
sentence  turn  to  hesitation  of  the  third.  Even  the  tenses  of  the  sentences  sway 
between past, present and future. The nature of “the thing” that is going to end is 
unclear as well. What is it really? A game? The world? life? The text? Or the endless 
playing of the roles? The multiplicity of referents hinders us from any comprehension 
or interpretation. In any case, Clov is looking forward to this end because it means 
the end of punishment for him. “The impossible heap” is going to have its last grains 
and he waits for it. His waiting, however, is a passive one. Like the two tramps of 
Waiting for Godot, he just plays his given role faithfully: “I’ll go now to my kitchen, ten 
feet  by  ten  feet,  and  wait  for  him  to  whistle  me”  (Beckett  1990:93).  The 48 
actor/character  (Clov)  is  shown  to  be  in  a  power  relation  to  the  author/director 
(Hamm); he should appear on the stage whenever he is summoned. 
Hamm, the blind paralyzed author/director of this game or play, appears later 
from under the bloody handkerchief of history with the assertion, “Me to play.” Is he 
going to fulfill his vocation of bringing an end to the play? The answer is negative; he 
is just a miserable creature, whose bombastic words cannot bestow him a logocentric 
position.  His  lament,  “Can  there  be  misery-[he  yawns]-loftier  than  mine?”  is  an 
ambivalent proclamation. Despite the assumed loftiness, his incapability as an author 
to achieve a center or to provide an unconditional end deprives him of any heroic 
characteristic.  Although  he  claims  he  has  the  power  to  “end  it”,  yet  his  invalidity 
contradicts his boastful claims. Being bereft of all his capabilities, he tries to take the 
role of a paralyzed Hamlet: “And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to…to end. Yes it is, it’s time 
it ended and yet I hesitate to-[he yawns] end”. But the indecisive mock hero of the 
play can only make a pastiche of his work and himself because his perceptions are 
completely dependent on Clov’s reports of the outside world. This confinement of his 
imagination to the fictitious world reconstructed by Clov’s words turns language to his 
only  reality.  Since  words  are  his  single  resource;  he  tries  to  play  with  them  as 
effectively as possible to create his logocentric, teleological game. He is obsessed 
with a logocentric desire to bring a center to the world and to the text; therefore, he 
permanently demands to return to the center, where he can find equilibrium, power, 
control, and security. Though, the center, or the Logos, he is searching for is not 
achievable in the apocalyptic world of Endgame. Chaos has denied center, clarity, 
and certainty to our author; he must do without them.  
In  the  absence  of  clarity  and  certainty,  the  characters  can  only  interpret  the 
world around them. As Henning suggests: 49 
 
If life is, in fact, a dream to be interpreted, hence an 
interpretation  that  can  only  be  interpreted,  we  are 
faced  with  the  problem  of  interpreting  from  the 
inside,  as  it  were.  How  can  we  judge  among 
interpretations? Are some truer than others? Better? 
And what would this mean? Can interpretation ever 
constitute knowledge? (95) 
 
Hamm tries to ignore these questions and keep control over his text, but even the 
spectacle  of  the play  confirms  the futility  his  attempts  to  clarify  something  that  is 
inherently  obscure.  The  darkly  lit  stage  (suggestive  of  the  interior  of  the  human 
mind?) and the two highly projected windows, which give just a very limited insight 
into  the  world,  powerfully  suggest  that  the  outside  world  is  only  restrictively 
perceivable.  Eyes  (the  two  windows  of  the  play?),  as  well  as  other  senses,  are 
unreliable  sources.  So  are  Clov’s  reports  of  the  world  because  he  cannot  see 
appropriately. He even denies the existence of nature: 
 
Hamm: Nature has forgotten us. 
Clov: There’s no more nature. 
Hamm: No more nature. You exaggerate. 
Clov: In the vicinity.  
Hamm: But we breathe, we change! We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! Our 
ideals! 
 
They can only trace the existence in the changes they observe in themselves; they 
cannot  fix any  reality.  In  the  absence  of  a  solid  proof  for  their  observation,  they 
should interpret the world the way they want. Hamm desperately examines the bricks 50 
of the wall around him (the limits of his perception?) and cries,  “All that’s hollow.” 
They are unable to find a way out of their miserable situation or to connect to a 
historical time.  
Their apocalyptic world, however, transfers no tragic sense because in their life 
everything  is  superficial;  they  laugh  at  their  own  misery  and  their  own 
philosophizing.The same superficiality is shown in their treatment of their personal 
history:  they  laugh  at  the  unlucky  parents,  who  are  thrown  in  the  garbage;  their 
memories of the past are so mixed with fictionality that no truth cab be extracted from 
them; and oblivion hinders them from closing the gaps while reconstructing the past. 
They  know  that  time exists  because  they  can feel  it  by  the  changes  they  see  in 
themselves, but because of the repetitive nature of the daily activities rebuilding a 
linear history is impossible for them:  
 
Nagg: I’ve lost me tooth. 
Nell: When? 
Nagg: I had it yesterday. 
Nell [Elegiac.] Ah yesterday. 
 
Time is just a word in their world, a dangling signifier, a concept that is not related to 
a concrete referent. In order to make sense of this concept, resort to their memories 
to find something significant in the past to distinguish it from present: 
 
Nagg:  When  we  crashed  on  our  tandem  and  lost  our  shanks.  [They  laugh 
heartily.] 
Nell: It was in the Ardennes. [They laugh less heartily] 
Nell: On the road to Sedan. [They laugh still less heartily.] Are you cold? 
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Their attempts to master reality, however, do not help them reconstruct a history or 
an identity; their past seems as uncertain and unhappy as the present. Instead of 
giving them relief, the memories, revitalizing the past suffering, create pain in their 
hearts. This game of remembering the past neither reduces the suffering they feel 
nor constructs anything around them. On the contrary, speaking about the  painful 
memories  of  the  past  and  trying  to  laugh  at  them  makes  their  dialog  self-
deconstructive. The articulated words  do  not fit  in the  reaction  they  create  in the 
characters.  Instead  of  being  sad  or  thoughtful  about  the  misery  of  these  past 
memories  they  laugh  at  them.  Their  dialog  turns  to  a  parody  of  the  concept  of 
memory.  Beckett  suggests  here  that  tracing  the  lines  of  a  narrative  to  create  a 
pleasant totality is just a dream or even a nightmare; human beings, like the tailor of 
Nagg’s story, can rather add to the chaos of their life narratives than producing a neat 
histoire. The language game that the characters invent to legitimize their past is just a 
cheap  version  of  the  metanarrative  of  existence  and  has  no  referentiality.  By 
contrasting characters’ narratives of the past and their reactions to them, Beckett 
breaks  the  hermeneutic  bond  of  meaning  and  deconstructs  characters’  meta-
narrative  of  historical  time.  The grotesque  image  of  the  two  miserable  creatures, 
trapped in garbage cans and placed in an apocalyptic surrounding, also deconstructs 
the metanarratives of love, which they try to resort to. Their sentimentalism does not 
fit  in  their  situation.  These  deconstructive  strategies  drive  language  in  a  playful 
function.  The  Characters’  interactions  fall  in  a  realm,  in  which  there  is  no  sever 
distinction between real and imaginary.  
The  characters  in  Endgame  are  not  only  engaged  in  their  own  game  of 
storytelling, but also in those of  Hamm  and Beckett. If  we  take role playing as an 
attempt to give temporary order to the disorder we feel around ourselves, it is an art, 52 
which like the tailor’s handicraft, aspires to give  shape to the chaos. Nevertheless, 
this logocentric yearning for creating order, for restoring a center, fails in this play 
because language has lost its vigor in producing shapes. The stories that they relate 
each other, or the dialogs that they perform, lack a structure because the characters 
do not have the certainty or power to put an end to the games they play. The speech 
act of memory, in Wittgenstein’s term, is like language itself just performative, not 
communicative. The recurrent dialogs, which are performed with a reversal or change 
of the characters’ roles stresses that no identity or reality provides the background for 
the characters’ stories. The same words heard from one character are uttered by 
another. Bereft of all meta-references and historical certainties, the characters have 
to refer to their own texts as the only reliable reference. They cannot even control the 
course of their own dialogs. Their chaotic dialogs hinder the audience from extracting 
a conventional plot. As Schwab observes: 
 
The  audience  could  give  up  its  search  for  neatly 
circumscribed wholes and instead, try to illuminate 
the iridescent plasticity of characters and play. This 
would also mean abandoning an interpretive gesture 
of  closure  in  order  to  become  involved  in  a 
decentring language game of endless substitutions, 
that is, a game in which fragmented units of speech 
appear  to  be  randomly  substituted  for  each  other 
(89). 
 
Their words achieve meaning in the structure of the language game in which they are 
engaged. Hamm’s game, for instance, as Schwab suggests, is “an end-game which 
focuses  on  ending  and  non-ending”  (90).  The  end  game  is  indeed  an  unending 53 
game,  which  moves  in  a  domain  which  the  characters  cannot  control.  As  Clov 
expresses it: 
 
I say to myself-sometimes, Clov, you must be there 
better than that if you want to let you go-one day. 
But I feel too old, and too far, to form habits. Good, it 
will  never  end,  I’ll  never  go.  [Pause.]  I  don’t 
understand that either. I ask the words that remain-
sleeping,  waking,  morning,  evening,  they  have 
nothing to say. [Pause] (Beckett, 1990:132). 
 
The words do not have clear referents; they do not communicate anything; they do 
not help the character to express themselves; and they do not help the audience to 
come to a closure in the narrative. 
Not only are the characters/actors of this play unable of extracting or producing 
meaning,  but  also  Hamm,  the  director/  author.  He  is  even  afraid  of  creating 
meaningful speech: “We are not beginning to…to…mean something?”He asks Clov 
fearfully.(108) Clov takes his question as a joke: “Mean something? You and I, mean 
something![Brief laugh.] Ah that’s a good one” (Ibid). Since there is no link between 
the signs that they use and the desired sense, they cannot bring any order or center 
to the whole textual world,  in  which  they  live.  Clove  openly  accuses  Hamm,  the 
author, of teaching him the words that lack any signification: “I use the words you 
taught me. If they don’t mean anything anymore, teach me other. Or let me be silent” 
(113). What can “morning” mean for the characters, if there is no difference between 
morning and night? Sleeping and waking for them are parts of  their performance; 54 
they do not have any performative function in the real world. Hamm’s sleeping begins 
with having the handkerchief on the face and ends when Clov takes it away.  
Time does not have any meaning either; the day starts whenever they decide 
and ends with their own decision. In fact the structure of the play denies any world 
outside their role-playing. There is no representation in their performance; it is just a 
game  with  its  own  rules  and  regulation,  which  determines  the  reality  it  needs. 
Hamm’s permanent demands for having a centralized position to control the course 
of his game are resisted by centrifugal tendencies of other characters. The ridiculous 
attempt  of  the  modernist  author  in  creating  a  neat  kind  of  literature,  far  from  the 
chaotic reality, proves to be ineffective. 
Instead,  repetition  dominates  his  game/text.  Repetition  happens  not  only  in 
language  but  also  in  action.  Hamm’s  repetitive  acts  of  sleeping  and  waking  up, 
moving to the center and diverging from it and asking for his pet, Clov’s movement 
between the two windows, or between the stage and his kitchen, his ascending and 
descending the ladder, and the repetitive appearance and disappearance of Nag and 
Nell,  all  deny  the  linearity  or  teleological  ends  of  performance  or  narration.  In 
Beckett’s  work,  as  Connor  observes,  “Repetition  is  not  only  a  form  of  survival  in 
language, it is a way of negating it, for, if repetition is the sign of the endlessness of 
language (it is always possible to say something again), then repetition is a strategy 
for turning language against itself, using words to erase other word (1988:16-17). The 
inseparability  of  repetition from  games  justifies  these  repetitions and  stresses  the 
arbitrariness of any game/performance. 
Since  the characters  pretend  to  be  real  ones  playing a real end-game,  and 
simultaneously deny their realness by commenting on their own words and behavior, 
a  deconstruction  of  text  and  performance  happens.  The  creation  of  an  exact 55 
representation of the reality in  realistic theater derives from a Cartesian idea that 
reality  is  clear  and  accessible.  Beckett,  on  the  contrary,  emphasizes  the 
incommensurability  of  the  real  by  giving  different  versions  of  an  action.  The 
characters in Endgame deny representation by their metadramatic reference to their 
role playing. Clov, getting up the ladder, lets the telescope falls and says, “I did it on 
purpose.”  He  then  turns  the  telescope  on  the  auditorium  and  comments  on  the 
audience:  “I  see  .a  multitude…in  transports…of  joy.  [Pause.]  That’s  what  I  call  a 
magnifier.” and turning to Hamm asks, “Don’t we laugh?” (106) Hamm, too, insists on 
signifying  his  speech  as  aside  and  ridicules  Clov  for  not  knowing  the  theatrical 
conventions.  These  metadramatic  devices  are  parts  of  Beckett’s  attempt  at 
deconstructing  the  conventions  of  mimetic  representation.  Furthermore,  the 
insistence of the author/director (Hamm) on not having the intention to mean anything 
denies the signification of words and transparency of language. The movements of 
his  game/play  aim  at  undoing  the  interpretational  or  cognitive  strategies  of  the 
audience for closing the gaps of meaning The audience is engaged in the attacks 
and counterattacks of the players or in the ending and non-ending strategies of the 
designer of the play. Every time that the spectators think they have reached the end, 
something blocks their way to close the circle of understanding. Thus, the characters 
play a double game, one on the stage and one with the audience. Schwab believes 
that,  “The  corresponding  aesthetic  strategy  which  consists  in  the  rejection  of  the 
structure  of  double  meaning,  and  the  denial  of  closure  produces  very  complex 
effects.  It  not  only  challenges  the  familiar  relation  between  manifest  and  latent 
meaning,  but  also  unsettles  the  audience’s  habits  and  conventions  of 
communication”  (93).  The  spectators  of  Endgame  are  confronted  with  language 
games whose rules are unknown for them. Since contrastive differences provide the 
basis for understanding a text or the meaning of a dialog, a text which is stripped 56 
away from contrastive opposition, a text in which the words constantly cancel out the 
predicted meanings and defy the attempts to stabilize comprehension, fights against 
the construction of the text and becomes deconstructive. In Endgame, as Schwab 
suggests, “The pervasive structure of negation and contradiction frustrates all partial 
investments  of  meaning  and  thereby  fundamentally  impedes  every  gesture  of 
interpretation which strives for closure” (91).  
Besides, both characters’ application of words and their treatment of the words 
they hear, demonstrate the undecideability of meaning and ambiguity of language. 
The following dialog is an example of such ambiguities: 
 
Hamm: Is Mother Pegg’s light on? 
Clov: Light? How could anyone’s light be on? 
Hamm: Extinguished! 
Clov: Naturally it’s extinguished. If it’s not on it’s extinguished. 
Hamm: I mean Mother Pegg. 
Clov:  But  naturally  she’s  extinguished  [Pause.]  what’s  the  matter  with  you 
today? 
Hamm: I am taking my course. [Pause.] Is she buried? 
 
The  incongruity  between Hamm’s  questions  and Clov’s  responses  is  indicative  of 
difficulty of fixing a sign in the signification system; we are confronted with an aporia 
in dialog. The words light and extinguish, which are semantically related, are put in 
an aporiac situation so that they lose their referentiality. The context of the dialog 
does not betray any meaning either. The denotative meaning of the word “light” does 
not fit  in  Pegg’s  situation(being  in a  dustbin  she  cannot  have  any  light)  and  the 
connotative meaning, life, cannot be  put  in a correlative relationship with the word 
extinguished. If we take her light as a symbol for her life, again Clov’s question, “How 
could anyone’s light be on?” is irrelevant. Hamm’s correction is rather confusing than 57 
clarifying. The binary opposition in this conversation blocks the way of perception 
instead of illuminating it. The rest of the conversation keeps blurring the meaning for 
reader/spectator,  opening  new  gaps  in  meaning  whenever  he  thinks  that  he  has 
accessed  a  closure.  Clov’s  assertion,  that  Pegg  “is  extinguished,”  breaks  the 
referentiality  between  the  adjective  “extinguished”  and  its  referent  Pegg,  and 
entangles the spectator in a net work of different associations, which ultimately tire 
his  interpretative  attempts. This  absurd  language  game deters the language from 
being  a  means  of  communication  and  distorts  the  process  of  comprehension  in 
audience. The spectators begin to question their power of understanding and feel 
disappointed from permanent dissolution of meaning. 
Schwab believes that different “disillusioning strategies” are at work to prevent 
the spectators from imposing their logocentric needs on the text of Endgame. As she 
maintains: 
 
The  subtlest  and  most  far-reaching  of  these 
strategies is the “withdrawal of double meaning”, i.e. 
the  play’s  insistence  on  rejecting  latent  meaning 
which  interestingly  enough  itself  operates  as  a 
double  strategy.  The  separation  of  conscious  from 
unconscious appeals accounts for the fact that the 
spectators themselves are decentred subjects. The 
importance  of  this  double  strategy  lies  in  allowing 
them  to  transgress  the  border  between 
consciousness  and  the  unconscious.  As  our 
decentred  subjectivity  depends  on  polarizing  these 
domains,  transgressing  the  boundaries  between 
them also affects our decentred condition (Schwab 
96). 58 
 
This  subdivided  consciousness  hinders  the  audience  from  passive  observing  and 
make him participate in the action of the play, the way that Artaud in his ritualistic 
theater aspires. Beckett makes us think both about the reception of a text and the 
accessibility of knowledge. By putting the audience in such a decentered position, he 
moves away from the modern concepts of consistency, order and construction and 
comes close to Derridean concepts of delogocentrism and deconstruction.  
Beckett’s delogocentric strategies also work through absence and the role that this 
absence  in  the  whole  performance  plays.  From  the  beginning  of  the  play  the 
characters are waiting for an end; the impossible heap cannot be completed without 
a transcendental force interfering in the course of their game/narrative, putting an 
end to it. Life is somehow absent in this play, both inside and outside the shelter in 
which  they  live.  Since  their  own  experience  does  not  give  way  to  acquisition  of 
meaning,  they  should  appeal  to an  imaginary  absence  to  acquire  significance for 
their being. The impaired characters of Endgame, who suffer from different sorts of 
disabilities, are just a duplicate of what they are supposed to be. The king of the 
game is crippled and blind, Clov cannot sit and the other two are confined to their 
dustbins. Although life is dead in this grotesque world, the players have to continue 
their biological life/game. There is no break in the predestined repetition of their game 
and time plays no role for them. Every exit is followed by an entrance. Even after the 
final performance, repetition continues on the life stage; finality is denied to them. 
The  hope  of  being  the  last  creatures  in  the  world  becomes  disappointed  by  the 
appearance of the Boy, who can be the threatening herald of a new life. They have 
already exterminated the flea and the rat, which predicted the possibility of life and 
the  impossibility  of  an  end,  but  the  Boy’s  appearance  invalidates  Hamm’s  game 59 
strategies for achieving closure; the game continues to infinity and fixes the absence 
in their narrative. The characters, like those in Waiting for Godot, must cope with the 
eternal absence of a supplementary element.  
To  fill  the  vacuum  of  this  absence,  the  author/director  Hamm  appeals  to 
storytelling. Nonetheless, none of his stories can be finished orderly. His attempts to 
create a meta-narrative, which have the power of controlling the sub-narratives of 
other characters, fail because he cannot bring all the  scattered fragments under a 
stylized narrative. Not only his narration, but also all other narratives of the play fail to 
communicate. None of the many autobiographers/narrators of this play can provide 
us with a plausible account or a version of truth; their experiences are all invented 
and arbitrary. Furthermore, Clov’s refusal to listen to Hamm’s story can be interpreted 
as  the  audience’s  resistance  against  easy  reception  of  playwright’s  fiction  or  his 
authoritative power. If the author/director tries to control the course of the play with 
his grand narrative, the characters, as the producers of sub-narratives, can disturb 
the unity and homogeneity of the text and impose their chaotic, pluralistic system on 
the  presupposed  order  of  modern  text.  Not  only  Clov,  but  also  other  characters 
refuse to listen to Hamm’s story; his father even asks for payola to listen to his story. 
Hamm, on the other hand, tries to manipulate them or play tricks on them to impose 
his narrative on them. His audience, which is tired of the supposed task of finding 
truth in his chaotic fragments, is not interested in participating in this game. Finally, 
the unique voice of the playwright, which used to dictate everything, loses his might 
and submits to other narrative voices; postmodern chaotic polyphony destroys the 
modern principled unity.  
The invention of  a past for the characters in  Endgame is indeed a hopeless 
effort for constructing an identity. By deconstructing their efforts, Beckett undermines 60 
the  idea  that  characters  are  able  to  present  a  self-image  in  their  performance. 
Autonomous  character  proves  to  be  an  illusion.  The  subject  is  shown  to  be 
discontinuous and arbitrary. The arbitrariness of Hamm’s subjectivity is displayed in 
his narrative style: 
 
Hamm: One! Silence! [Pause.] Where was I? [Pause. Gloomily.] It’s finished, 
we’re finished. [Pause.] Nearly finished.[Pause.] There’ll be no more speech. 
[Pause] (116). 
 
By these self-conscious interruptions and the comments that he gives on his own 
narration like “No, I’ve done that bit,” “That should do it,” or “Nicely put, that”, he 
separates himself as a narrator from the narrated of his stories, fulfilling the aesthetic 
aspiration of many postmodern authors to separate themselves from their texts. He 
becomes the absent author in the present actor. His hesitation in portraying the past 
events, the continuous breaks in speech, the pauses and silences, the change of 
tone from narrative to normal, and the lack of a given structure shows the inability of 
the author to authorize his text. The self-conscious attempts of the modernist author 
to bring order to his text fail, and an unexpected fragmentation prevails his creation. 
Beckett  demonstrates  the  failure  of  all  attempts  at  creating  a  cohesive  narrative, 
independent  from  contingent  language  and  disordered  world.  Since  the  author, 
Hamm, cannot overcome “non-closure,” his narrative, like that of Endgame, circles 
back to the beginning. Furthermore, the narrative moves so swiftly between different 
versions of itself that it destroys the illusion of  reality the audience tends to have. 
Hamm’s trick in introducing the elements of reality in the structure of his game, the 
description of the weather for instance, does not save his narration. Like the tricks of 
realistic  theater  in  creating  an  illusion  of  reality,  his  artifice  is  dismantled  by  the 
theatricality inherent in his game/play. Hamm’s attempts for telling a story, like those 61 
of Beckett, prove to be deconstructive practices in the absence of something worth 
saying.  
Hamm is not only an author, but also an actor. He and other characters play 
both  their  human  roles  as  a  part  of  a  divine  play  and  their  role  as  characters. 
Commenting continuously on their roles, they stripe the audience from any illusion 
that  they  are  watching  a  representation  of  reality.  Hamm  permanently  refers  to 
different theatrical conventions like aside, soliloquy, or exit to affirm that they are 
playing on a stage. Interrupting the dialogs to correct a point, or to change it, hinders 
the spectator from sitting undisturbed on their seats or being emotionally involved. 
Near  the  end  of  the  play,  when  the  spectators  are  aroused  by  Clov’s  emotional 
monolog, he suddenly declares that, “This is what we call making an exit” (132). The 
Brechtian technique of alienation works here in a very peculiar way. The validity of 
both subjectivity and narration as media for accessing a unified truth is so discarded. 
As Begamm maintains: 
 
Various forms of self-reflexivity and intertextuality, for 
example,  undermine  the  mimetic  notion  that 
literature  mirrors  what  lies  beyond  it  in  the  world, 
while  ideas  like  the  “death  of  the  author”  and  the 
“loss of the origin” undermines the expressive notion 
that  literature  reveals  what  stands  behind  it  in  the 
mind of its creator (1996:15). 
 
Beckett's  great  art  in  his  plays  is  dismantling  the  formal  structure  of  the 
playwrights  of  previous  traditions  and to offer a new form  that  suites  the  chaotic 
structure  of  existence  of  the  postwar  world.  He  breaks  “the  centered  circle”  that 62 
Derrida  in  Structure,  Sign,  and  Play,  as  the  “image  of  authority  and  control,” 
identifies. Worton believes that, “This abdication of authorial power and this appeal to 
the creative intervention of readers mark Beckett out as one of the founding fathers 
of,  and  one  of  the  major  witnesses  to,  our  Post-Modern  condition”(Worton  85). 
Beckett himself anticipates the coming of a new form in literature: 
 
There will be a new form and that this form will be of 
such a type that it admits the chaos, and does not try 
to say that the chaos is really something else. The 
form  and  the  chaos  remain  separate. The latter  is 
not reduced to the former. That is why the form itself 
becomes  a  preoccupation,  because  it  exists  as  a 
problem  separate  from  the  material  it 
accommodates. To find a form that accommodates 
the mess, that is the task of the artist. (qtd. in Pilling 
1995:74) 
 
Another  feature  that  gives  Beckett’s  play  a  postmodern  characteristic  is  his 
fragmentation of text. By frequent use of pauses and silences, introducing different 
topics  without  bringing  them  to  an  end,  breaking  the  course  of  narrative  by 
commenting on the text, he tries to avoid dominating the audience with a uniform 
idea. Pauses and silences give the reader/spectator the chance to fill in the blanks 
with their own ideas. The words that the characters fail to find are substituted by the 
ideas of the audience, which may radically differ from what they say after the long 
pauses  or  silences.  Worton  believes  that,  “This  strategy  of  studding  a  text  with 
pauses or gaps poses the problem of elitism, but above all it fragments the text, 
making  it  a  series  of  discrete  speeches  and  episodes  rather  than  the  seamless 63 
presentation of a dominant idea” (75). In the circularity of Beckett’s centrifugal texts, 
the spectators move from one interpretation to another without being able to stabilize 
the  signification  process.  Even  the  most  familiar  quotations  or  references,  for 
instance to Bible, suffer from the same uncertainty or unreliability.  
Intertextual or intratextual references, which are very frequent in Beckett’s work, 
are presented  in  a tentative  way.  Numerous  intertextual  references  can be found 
both  in  Waiting  for  Godot  and  Endgame,  which  are  just  intended  to  deny  the 
originality desired by modernism. One should permanently reconstruct a text against 
another one or against itself in Beckett’s works. This reconstruction, however, is not 
illuminating at all because most of his references are used in a parodic or satirical 
sense;  therefore  trying  to  extract  a  signification  out  of  them  is  fruitless.  This 
intentional  misleading  strategy,  or  trapping  the  audience  in  a  net  of  fake 
intertextuality, helps Beckett frustrate the illusion in audience that allusion to familiar 
texts is an aid in understanding them. The  defamiliarisation of the familiar senses 
inaugurates  “the  incredulity  towards  metanarratives.”  Lack  of  seriousness, 
unreliability  of  the  articulators  of  the  references,  the  element  of  parody,  and  the 
inappropriateness of the references to the context in which they appear, all provide 
the opportunity for Beckett to destabilize the relationship between signifiers and their 
referents and to deconstruct his text. As Gibbs points out: 
 
Watching this play [Endgame], we too exhaust our 
means of diversion and delusion, slowly “discarding” 
them like the pieces sacrificed in a lost chess match. 
In the end, faced with the same Great Doubt as the 
characters before us, it will be our choice whether to 
accept  the  continued  suffering  of  an  ambivalent 64 
dualism or throw off these conceptual shackles and 
seeing  the  horrors  and  joys  as  the  same  achieve 
nirvana through the veil of tears (108). 
 
This  discarding  of  the  illusion  of  reality  in  Endgame  is  accompanied  by  the 
removal of a standard communicative language from our experience. Language is 
reduced  to  fragments  of  information  which  cannot  be  bound  together.  These 
language  fragments,  which  are  devised  to  legitimate  the  characters’  surrounding 
world,  fail  to  fill  in  the  void  of  a  metaphysical,  transcendental  ground  for  their 
existence. Instead, they teach us how to perceive the world without our traditional 
eternal  truths.  Since  all  these  secondary  games  find  sense  in  their  relation  to  a 
primary metagame of closure, the absence of this end hinders the discourse of the 
play  to  access  unity.  The  impossible  heap  of  the  play,  therefore,  can  be  the 
impossibility of bringing the grains of words into a comprehensible unit of meaning. 
The individual signifiers remain floating in this heap, unable of connecting to immobile 
signifieds or contributing to a transcendental, fixed truth.  
The fragments of experience, identity, and meaning, which remain impotent till 
the end of the play, deprive Hamm of constructing his desired homogeneous text. 
The words in Endgame, like in many other Beckett’s play, turn to have revolutionary 
identities that frustrate all the attempts of the author to bring them under a unified 
entity. The author becomes dethroned because the action defies the text. In Barth’s 
view giving an author to a text is limiting its signification. If we omit him from  the 
background,  the  attempts  for  deciphering  a  text  become  futile.  In  Endgame  the 
discrepancy  between  narration  and  stage  action,  between  words  and  mimics, 
between  desires  and  deeds,  between  speakers’  immobility  and  narrative’s 
movement, dismantles the authoritative strategies which aim at bringing order to the 65 
narrative  by  resorting  to  the  author’s  linguistic  reservoir.  The dying  author cannot 
save his text from decentredness, even if he sits metaphorically in the center. His 
promise of conclusion, “I’ll soon have finished with this story”, is denied immediately 
by  his  own  hesitation,  “Unless  I  bring  in  other  characters”  (118).  His  inability  to 
continue is also revealed in his contemplation, “W here would I look for them?” His 
final remedy “let us pray to God” is an elegiac appeal to some metaphysical absence 
to help him,” and his immediate blasphemous disdain, “The Bastard! He does not 
exist!” is the disappointment of all his metaphysical attempts, concerning writing and 
living: To find a way out of the impasse of text or of life is not easy. His cry of despair, 
“The end is in the beginning and yet you go on” (126), can be Beckett’s objection 
both to writing and living. One is obliged to write, though he has nothing to tell or at 
least the language does not assist him in expressing himself; one has to live because 
he  cannot  determine  his  end;  that  is  a  miserable  situation.  Hamm,  like  Beckett, 
cannot  stop  storytelling,  because  “alone  against  the  silence”  he  hears  “babble, 
babble, words, like the solitary child who turns himself into children, two, three, so as 
to be together, and whisper together in the dark.” It is somehow inevitable for  the 
writers to submit themselves to these “millet grains” and to speak, despite the fact 
that their words do not communicate anymore. Like the grains of time that do not 
“mount up to life” Hamm’s (Beckett’s?) words do not mount up to an orderly text. Both 
for Hamm and for Beckett language becomes impossible. As Henning puts it: 
 
Without  the  divine  Logos  it  provides,  man  cannot 
slake  his  taste  for  an  Ultimate  Word.  Thus,  he 
cannot  attain  what  he  wants  most  of  all  from  the 
world,  and  perhaps  even  more  than  the  world:  a 
final,  certain  answer  to  all  questions,  a  solid 
foundation or core of Truth, sure and unchanging, a 66 
stable point of reference on which he may rely, the 
lasting security, the peace this would bring (112). 
 
If  self-reflectivity,  foregrounding  of  the  artifice,  the  play  with  author  function, 
textualizing and decentring of character, and experimentation with narrative can be 
taken  as  the  aesthetic  aspirations  of  Poststructuralism,  Beckett  has  fulfilled  all  of 
them in Endgame. 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
The Fragmented Self: Beckett’s “Not I” 
 
 
In Beckett’s earlier dramatic works the duo structure of characterization plays a 
very important role. Estragon and Vladimir, Pozzo and Lucky, Hamm and Clov, Nagg 
and Nell are somehow bound to each other. They are either in a power relationship 
to each other, like Pozzo ad Lucky, or one of them has authority over the other, like 
Estragon and Vladimir or Hamm and Clov, or they share the same misery, like Nagg 
and Nell. Although most of them are trauma-stricken characters, trying to escape 
from  their  everlasting pain, the matter that they are suffering together reduces the 
effect of painful memories they try to remember and to  forget. In these works the 
disintegrated self is still in the framework of a unified body, trying to remember a past 
that can justify its being. Both Vladimir’s struggle for finding a logocentric explanation 
for his being and Hamm’s attempt at presenting a legitimation narrative and bringing 
harmony  and  centeredness  to  the  chaos  and  decentredness  around  him  are 
constructive attempts, which are undone by Beckett’s continuous introduction of new 
openings. Like the two ashbins in Endgame, which suffer from everlasting separation, 
the fragments of their texts cannot unify in a homogeneous narrative of self. 
This disintegration develops to character delineation in Beckett’s later works: his 
characters “fall into pieces”, as he describes it. Krapp’s character is split between his 68 
memories  of  the  past,  embodied  in  a  recorded  voice,  and  his  present being. He 
strives nervously to bring the two pieces of his self together by adjusting the narrative 
of the past to the present entity. The dismembered mouth in Not I, like all memory- 
hunters in Beckett’s later plays, is a piece of the split self, which tries to connect to 
the missed entity by appealing to her memories. The fragmented character, which 
appears as a mouth speaking uninterruptedly to a completely cloaked auditor, is a 
narrator and a narrated at the same time. The isolated mouth speaks while the rest of 
her body is covered in darkness. Through the stream of its monologue, we discover 
that a seventy-year-old woman, who has been silent most of her life, has suddenly 
started to speak. The sudden outburst of words, according to Mouth, is the attempt of 
the suppressed woman at releasing herself from the "buzzing" in her head, an almost 
involuntary  act.  Throughout  its  interior  monolog,  Mouth  refuses  to  take  the  first-
person pronoun, and pretends that she is speaking about a “she.” This absent she, 
however,  is  present  in  the  speaking  “I”  throughout  the  play.  The  autonomous 
confession  of  Mouth  is  observed  by  a  silent  Auditor,  a  shrouded  figure  whose 
reactions are concealed from the audience and except for his four slow movements, 
no other responses can be seen from him. Mouth's hysterical need to talk, and the 
way that she pours out the words, makes the meaning of her speech unimportant; It 
is  the  image  of  the  play  that  gives  the  work  its  power.  the  dangling  mouth  and 
tongue, which move swiftly to get rid of the buzzing that disturbs the psyche, create 
an unforgettable tableau. We see every movement of the Mouth without realizing, or 
minding to realize, what we hear. The disintegrated self, with its body negated and its 
whole being restricted to this single oral cavity, transfers the hallucinatory feelings 
obsessing it to the audience through this steadily moving cave. Mouth is moved by 
the words that have an enchanting power over it and move it due to the demands of 
articulation.  Language  is  portrayed  as  a  controlling  agent,  which  determines  its 69 
course  in  a  mechanical  progression.  To  stop  is  to  die;  thus  the  speaking  Mouth 
continues its act even after the play ends. Although communication is denied to her, 
yet  a  compulsion  drives  her  to  speak,  to  break  the  wall  of  her  seventy  years  of 
silence. Beckett implies in this play that speaking is a pushing drive. Even if you 
speak to a passive audience, like the Auditor, or language resists your attempts in 
expressing yourself; you are compelled to utter words. Mouth’s speech is not meant 
to be communicative; it is an interior monolog uttered loudly. Like Krapp who listens 
to his young voice coming from a tape recorder, Mouth reacts to an inaudible inner 
voice, and speaks before an invisible auditorium or judge. The self in  this  play  is 
disintegrated  into  the  two  organs  which  are  related  to  language:  a mouth,  which 
utters  the  words,  and  an  ear,  which  hears  the  words.  The  reality  of  body  or  of 
existence is reduced to two arbitrary organs which function autonomously.  
The way that mouth speaks, and the effect that this rapid movement has on the 
nerves  of  the audience, render language  an irritating nature. The  close-up  on  an 
isolated body fragment along with the fragmented narrative, uttered brokenly from a 
mouth moving anxiously in a dark space, conveys the same state of trauma, in which 
the voice is seated, to the audience. For the spectators it creates most of all a break 
in  their cognitive  perception;  they  are  bereft  of  their  expectation  of  an  illusion  of 
reality. The former Beckettian characters, though strange in their behavior, still were 
in the category of a human being, embodying something that the audience could 
adjust to an outer reality. In this play, however the spectators are confronted with a 
dark theatrical space, which comes to life with the first movements of the lips and the 
tongue.  After  the  first  shock  of  confronting  with  such  disillusionment,  they  are 
attacked with a flood of words pouring on their heads without giving them the time for 
analysis  or  interpretation.  The  fragments  of  the  narrative  that  the  mouth  hears, 70 
repeats,  or  utters,  increase  the  anxiety  that  the  first  scene  has  created  in  the 
audience. Furthermore, the swiftly escaping words defy every kind of perception or 
interpretation. Watching Not I on the stage, the spectators feel such a disruption of 
cognition that they only wish to escape the pressure of this non-cognitive reception. 
Their attempt to create a relation between the image and the voice remain fruitless 
and they are drawn with the Mouth into the trauma that it is experiencing. 
In this immediate experience of anxiety, language plays the role of an intensifier. 
Each  attempt  for  closing  the  text  on  the  part  of  audience  is  confronted  with  the 
resistance of the Mouth with a renewal of narration. The sentences are reformed by 
an unheard inner voice and are reproduced in another form. The narrative cannot 
come to an end because the text suffers from  perpetual amendment. Enoch Brater 
believes that, “The repetition, extension, and alliteration of sounds expand the limits 
of the written word and makes the listener discover that such limits are much wider 
than might have been initially supposed” (1994:39). In Not I, however, the collapsing 
words, which leave just sound effects, make the text intangible and create a sort of 
anxiety  in  the  spectators.  The  words,  which  cannot  complete  their  vocation  in 
constructing a bridge between the articulating Mouth and the listening audience, fall 
apart from a center of text and meaning in a centrifugal movement. The speech is like 
a crazy flood that overwhelms the audience without giving it the opportunity to resist 
it. With character’s perpetual emphasis on self-denial, the perplexity, created by this 
sudden flood of words, increases. Auditor’s hands, which rise in protest and drop with 
compassion, show the inevitability of moving from "self" to "other" in order to discover 
the "self." This repeated gesture, which is the only interruption in the torrent of words 
uttered by Mouth, focuses the audience on the "self" as a divided entity, an entity, 
whose longing for communication destroys the space between “self” and “the other.” 71 
The  incapability of the self in finding the answers to its ontological/epistemological 
questions,  including  its  own  existence,  results  in  self-denial.  This  ruined  space 
creates  disturbance  in  the  spectators’  habitual  act  of  cognition  and  makes  them 
anxious. 
Indeed  Beckett  intentionally  transfers  the  anxiety  of  his  characters  to  the 
audience. His post-war characters are always challenging the anxiety aroused from 
the feeling of a catastrophe: Estragon and Vladimir, left alone on a deserted stage 
and  confronted  with  the  vanished  civilization,  think  desperately  of  hanging 
themselves; Hamm and Clov, like the reminders of a nuclear war, cannot do anything 
but waiting for their end; Krapp cannot stop his hopeless reconstruction of an absent 
past to fill in the vacuum of the present identity; Mouth is overwhelmed by the inner 
pressure  of  a  nervous  monologue.  The  fretful  struggles  of  Becket’s  deformed 
characters  for  liberating  themselves  from  internal  and  external  burdens  affect  the 
audience and  involve  them  in  the  anxiety  of  these  hopeless  creatures.  For  these 
characters,  there  are  no  more  sacred  texts  or  legitimation  narratives  in  which  all 
answers can be found. Since language itself is an endless “play of differences, the 
characters  feel  themselves  entrapped  in  a  spider  net.  Malkin  believes  that,  “The 
unique  twentieth-century  intersection  of  rationality  and  genocide,  of  advanced 
technology  and  nuclear  destruction,  of  an  ideology  of  progress  and  a  practice  of 
barbarism,  have  become  constitutive  paradigm  of  the  postmodern  mind”(25).  The 
helpless victims of this strange age are so panic-stricken that they disintegrate into 
broken selves. As Adorno in “Trying to understand Endgame” states it, “The position 
of the absolute subject, once it has been cracked open as the appearance of an 
over-  arching  whole  through  which  it  first  matures,  cannot  be  maintained.(PDf 
doc.127 ) 72 
The massacre of the World War II, the possibility of a nuclear war in future, and 
millions of dead bodies(mentioned both in Waiting for Godot and Endgame), which 
have lost meaning for the powers because of their massiveness, reduce the value of 
the individual and destroys all the dreams of progress of modernism. The ego, which 
used to have the touch of rationality and equilibrium in positivist philosophy, loses its 
control over the psyche and the totality of the self is broken to pieces; self-identity 
becomes  a myth  like other modernist  myths.  Beckett’s demythologizing  strategies 
undo all myths of Western tradition including that of a rigid, unified self. A fragmented 
existence deprives the characters in Becket’s later plays of the unity of an entity. 
They  are many in one; therefore, they speak with different voices, voices that are 
sometime even contradictory.  
These hopeless fragments of self, like the two speaking voices of Not I (one 
heard, one unheard), try to acquire unity by appealing to the past memories. Through 
their  narratives  of  the  past  they  should  access  a  unified  self.  The  trauma  of  the 
characters, however, resists any kind of rational explanation or linguistic articulation. 
Expecting a neat, linear discourse from the trauma-stricken characters of the postwar 
age is futile; their narratives are self-reflexive, repetitive, decentered, and chaotic. 
Trauma, says Malkin, “is generally agreed to be the result of an overwhelming event 
or events, not fully experienced by the victim during its occurrence, which leads to 
repeated  hallucinations,  intrusive  dreams,  uncontrollable  actions,  along  with  a 
numbing that distances the emotional effect of the event” (29). The anxious character 
of Not I, for instance, is under the pressure of different fragments of its broken self to 
confess a unity. The  narrating mouth is permanently interrupted by an inner voice 
interfering, correcting or commenting on her narration: “Imagine what position she 
was  in!...whether  standing…or  sitting…but  the  brain-…What?  Kneeling? 73 
Yes…whether  standing…sitting  or  kneeling  but  the  brain-
What?...Lying?...Yes…whether  standing…sitting…kneeling…or…or  lying…but  the 
brain still…” (377) The voice that interferes is the absent self which is just present in 
the character’s mind. This absent presence not only frustrates the character, which is 
always  defending  itself  against  its  attacks,  but  also  frustrates  the  audience  by 
deferring  meaning.  The  different  fragments  of  the  self  try  to  join  the  speaking 
fragment to reconfirm an “I,” which the  speaker is continuously denying, but their 
unifying  strategy  fails;  like  her  chaotic  narrative  she  remains fragmentary.  Barella 
believes  that,  replacing  the  “narrator”  and  “narrated”  with  a  Derridean  écriture, 
Beckett  inaugurates  literary  postmodernism  not  by  attempting  to  overcome 
modernism but by surrendering himself to a form of absolute textuality, the narrative 
equivalent of “différance” and “unnameability” (7). Furthermore, in picturing a self that 
is filled with the voices of others, Beckett comes very close to poststructuralist notion 
of  self.  His  negation of the holistic  view  of  self  and his  emphasis  on  the  role  of 
language  in  making  identity  anticipate  poststructuralist  interpretations  of  self  and 
Derridean aporia of subjectivity.  
The dispossession of self in Not I results in the open-ended sentences, floating 
fragments of narrative, contradictory images, and disconnection of voice and image 
in  the  play.  The  isolated  mouth  and  the  veiled  ear  give  the  impression  to  the 
spectators that they are observing a trial. The Mouth (defendant) tries to convince the 
Auditor (judge) that the unknown “she” is not guilty. Since the Judge/Auditor does not 
respond, the anxiety in her increases. The Auditor plays the role of the Lacanian 
gaze; even its absence does not reduce its hidden observation. The  failure  of  the 
Mouth in separating herself from the guilty “she” and proving herself a responsible “I” 
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As  the  play  progresses  the  rhythm  becomes  faster,  the  words  more 
incomprehensible,  and  the  voice  shaking.  The  dark  background,  which  stands  in 
contrast with two red lips speaking uninterruptedly, adds to the atmosphere of terror 
and  creates  anxiety  in  the  spectators.  They  are  confronted  with  a  schizophrenic 
presentation  of  self,  which  despite  its  strangeness  is  not  completely  foreign.  The 
scattered memories resist making a personal history; the shattered body does not 
admit  oneness;  the  disintegrated  psyche  does  not  achieve  balance;  and  the 
language  loses  referentiality.  Beckett  defies  the  idea  of  a  single  presentation  of 
identity in this play. The broken pieces of memory, which are supposed to restore 
wholeness for the Mouth, become circular pieces of speech returning continuously to 
their beginning without any  progression.  Mouth, a totally language-based  identity, 
remains trapped in the constraints of self-interpretation; no claim of autonomy can 
rescue it. 
Furthermore, the shattered memory of the old woman deprives the audience 
from a cohesive memory as well. In Derrida’s view, the catastrophe of memory is its 
disability of reconstructing any past. Since knowing fully is denied to us and every 
memory is a heterogeneous reservoir of the fragments of our dislocated past, the 
ideal  of  mastery  over  past  or  extracting  an  identity  by  appealing  to  memories, 
whether  personal  or  historical,  is  not  realizable.  Poststructuralism  rejects  the 
unconditional  understanding  and  stresses  that  identity  is  both  temporally  and 
spatially dividable. It is the reason that neither Krapp nor the speaking Mouth can 
connect themselves to the past identity. There is not a fixed real identity that goes its 
course without change. Reality in this sense is no longer an unchangeable, unique 
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forms his own version of reality by weaving his desires and linguistic experiences in 
the texture of his observations; therefore, authenticity of memories is relative. 
The degree of authenticity of Mouth’s narration, however, does not play any role 
in Beckett’s play. The speaking mouth is under the pressure to speak, to pour out the 
words that are buzzing in her head. The brain does not have any control on the 
process of word making; words are not supposed to relate her to a reality outside her 
mind.  As  she  herself  confesses,  “W ords  were  coming…a  voice  she  did  not 
recognize…at first…so long since it had sounded…then finally had to admit…could 
be none other…than her own…certain vowel sound… she  had never heard” (379). 
She (the narrator) repeats many times that “she” (the narrated) had no idea what she 
was saying. The trial/psychotherapy of Not I has a circular structure; it returns without 
any progression to its beginning. In fact the play can be started anywhere in the 
monolog because it is just a continuous torrent of words without a structure. The 
meaning of the words does not play any role; the piece is meant to work on the 
nerves of the spectators, producing torturing images in their mind. The unconscious 
production of language deprives the narrated from any connection with reality. She 
cannot even stop Mouth from speaking. She gradually feels that her lips, or better to 
say  the  speech  organs,  are  moving,  producing  something  that  she  does  not 
recognize as her voice. At first she insists that, “It was not hers at all,” but seeing “the 
whole being …hanging on its words” (379) she has to give up and to admit that it was 
her  voice.  The  strange  thing  for  her  is  that  with the restoration of language “the 
feeling  was  coming  back”  and  “then  thinking”.  Beckett  here  comes  very  close  to 
Derrida in recognizing the role of speech in giving form to the feelings and thoughts. 
Feelings and thoughts return as soon as she finds her connection with words. But 
this critical point of reunion with language is the starting point of disintegration for the 76 
self. Mouth does not perform the orders of the brain to stop speaking anymore, and 
gradually assumes control over the rest of the body; the speaking Mouth becomes 
the dominant organ and the rest of the self is dissolved in the unheard inner voice 
and the buzzing, which disturb the speaking Mouth. The speaker avoids identifying 
herself  with  the  narrated  “she”  because  her  access  to  language  has  granted  her 
articulacy. As Malkin maintains: 
 
Beckett’s  late  texts  enact  a  typically  postmodern 
reshaping  of  our  notions  of  theatrical  space  and 
time;  they  perform  multiple  dissolutions  of  the 
boundaries of the (mostly absent) self and stress the 
process of viewer reception over the self-sufficiency 
of  the  text.  These  texts  are  self-reflexive,  open-
ended, multiply fragmented- from the fragmentation 
of  the  image  on  stage  (Mouth,  Listener),  to  the 
fragmentation  of  speech  and  text  and  perception 
(39). 
 
Indeed, Not I is intended to be a denunciation of unified self and an approval of the 
fragmentary nature of identity. As Malkin suggests: 
 
Not  I  invests  in  every  form  of  fragmentation  and 
splintering,  imaging  through  text,  figure  and 
performance  a  consciousness  inherently  multiple, 
crucially  divided  against  and  within  itself.  This 
demonstration of splintered being produces far more 
than  a  binary  opposition  of  unified  I  versus 
fragmented  self.  Mouth  is  both  cognizant  of  self-
fragmentation (and seemingly gives it some united 77 
“form”  through  the  formless,  instantly  disappearing 
medium  of  voice)  and  herself  prisoner  to  a 
nonunitary  logorrhea  that  she  did  not  initiate  and 
cannot terminate. Moreover, and increasingly as the 
play  continues,  the  words  that  have  “come”  are 
contested  and  denied  by,  perhaps,  additional 
fragments of self (49-50). 
 
The  fragmentation  happens  in  this  play  in  two  levels:  fragmentation  in  self  and 
fragmentation in discourse. The character of the play is torn between the splitting 
forces  of  her  desires and  the  social  voices  of  “the  other”.  Her  objection  to  these 
unheard voices in different points of the play is both the rejection of a united self and 
a unifying discourse. The repeated questions “What? And Who?” and the following 
response “ N o   .   .   .   S h e , ”  which draws each time a protesting response from the still 
standing Auditor, are the refutation of oneness with “the other.” The inner voice, the 
narrated “she,” and the listening ears remain alien to the distressed narrator. The 
challenge of the ostensibly unified self (the narrating Mouth) to deny disintegration 
disables  the  need  for  acknowledgement  of  the  inner  voices  and  causes  Mouth’s 
further isolation. Furthermore, the lack of a central referent results in the perpetual 
interaction  of  the  inner  selves.  This  endless  interaction  provides  the  linguistic 
foundation for the derangement of a single consciousness. The center can not be 
achieved because the centrifugal forces in the self are very strong. The spectators 
can examine the archeology of a presence that the self once was, just by the ruins it 
has left. The fifth or last self-denial of the Mouth draws no reaction from the Auditor. It 
seems that she/he has accepted that the retrieval of the lost presence is impossible. 
This absence of a centered self brings about the decentredness of the text and 
narrative. We do not see a linear narrative in the whole story of Mouth. It seems that 78 
it  is  fixed  on  a  specific  time  in  the  past  and  its  sudden  act  of  speaking. What  it 
expresses is the feelings and perceptions of this moment of dispersal of self. All we 
know about her is that she is born into this cruel world and is left alone, dumb and 
helpless, till a day in April when she started to pour out the words that had irritated 
her for a long time. The narrator is caught in this moment and cannot escape its 
confusion. The repetition of the same statements in different forms shows her deep 
obsession  with  her  situation  in  this  world.  She  is,  like  many  other  Beckett’s 
characters, obsessed with the same ontological and epistemological questions: Why 
is she brought into this world? What should she do with this “Dasein?” How long 
should  this  suffering  continue?  This  “God-forsaken  hole,”  which  is  a  place  for 
everlasting punishment, disturbs the character in the beginning, but she learns to 
forget  it.  The  character’s  disintegration  starts  when  the  suffering  self  hides  itself 
behind a disguise of oblivion to reduce the burden of the deep anguish. She wears 
the mask of a “she” and starts her performance. Her show, however, is confronted 
with a counter-play. The neglecting self tries to escape the distress, and the suffering 
self imposes the buzzing on her head. She should release herself from the frustrating 
sounds by pouring them out in the form of words. That is a dilemma that Beckett 
himself  was  confronted  with.  Despite  his  awareness  of  the  inconquerability  of 
language and futility of communicating through words, there was a drive in him to 
speak  out;  writing  was  inevitable  for  him.  The  result  of  such  kind  of  compulsive 
writing  is  a  torrent  of  words.  This  compulsion  can  be  compared  to  a  moment  of 
inspiration or performance for an overwhelmed artist.  
This  moment of performance for the character of Not I is also the moment of 
great pressure. She should make her fictive “she” plausible on the stage and in front 
of  an  audience,  which,  despite  of  his  stillness,  functions  as  a  critic  of  her 79 
performance. The actor/ character of the play should have a double performance. As 
an actress, she plays the role of the character retelling her story to the Auditor; as an 
individual she plays her own role in front of an evaluating audience. Malkin suggests 
that, “Diffusion and fragmentation in Not I extend of course beyond the textual to the 
performative and receptive aspects of the play as well” (52). The ray or the beam, 
which Mouth as Moonbeam describes, can be the beam of light that is shed on the 
actress’s speaking mouth, because it shines always on “the same spot.” In fact the 
present  actress  and  the  absent  character  become  one,  the  experience  becomes 
immediate,  and  the  written  text  becomes  the  spoken  words.  Pure  performance 
becomes accessible in this play. It seems that Mouth is describing her position as an 
actress on the stage and the audience is discerning her difficulty in acting. Thus her 
performance becomes self-reflective. The inner pain of the actress, who has to utter 
the words of the playwright under the pressure of the spotlight, is transferred to the 
audience  which  is  participating  in  this  suffering.  In  this  sense  it  is  an  immediate 
experience, an interaction between the present performing actress and the absent 
character. It creates a state of presence that is simultaneously absence. Since words 
do not play any role in this interaction, the binary oppositions disappear and the text 
loses  its  authority  on  the  performance.  What  functions  here  is  not  the  power  of 
cognition, but the immediate reaction of the nerves, perceiving and being involuntary 
involved. The perplexed stares of the spectators prevents Mouth, who is struggling 
under the spotlight to tell the story of a fictional “she,” from distancing herself from her 
invented character and being dissolved in non-being. Her anxiety increases as her 
attempts  at  denying  the  ontological  core  “I”  is  confronted  with  the  sympathizing 
protests of Auditor. Auditor can actually be the audience on the stage; he does not 
interfere in the course of monologue, but his gestures, like the inner voice, affect the 
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This tripartite arrangement (a narrator, an editor personified in different voices, 
and a subject, who is simultaneously present and absent) displays a polyphony which 
occurs  within  a  character.  This  polyphony,  which  haunts  the  character  in  form  of 
indeterminacy, affects the course of her narrative, her childhood memories, and her 
definition  of  love  and  old  age.  The  recounting  voice  cannot  finalize  its  narration, 
because it is continually twisted into questions, either forced from the inner voices or 
aimed  at  the  listening  Auditor.  Contrary  to  Krapp’s  neatly  recorded  memory,  the 
random memory in Not I portrays the chaos of consciousness. The shattered visual 
image helps us imagine the break in the character and the broken sentences give us 
a picture of the distorted psyche, which is unable of producing a proper language. 
The outcome is a kind of non-language or a “text of unword”.  
This non-language creates a fundamental problem in depicting the subjectivity 
of Beckett’s characters because the spectator/reader does not know if the character 
in a Beckettian play is moving in a world delineated by the text or in a world confined 
to the stage. Is he/she immediately present on the stage or incarcerated in the time 
and space of the text? How can the audience come in touch with the meaning if the 
form of the play escapes such meaningful representation? How can one sketch out 
the precise location and the precise position of his characters in the linear narrative of 
life?  The standard  pattern  of  time/space  prescribes  certain  relations  between  the 
time/space  of  the  text  and  that  of  performance.  The  limitation  imposed  on  the 
performance is the result of the fact that normally the enacted events on the stage 
are themselves extracted from a larger number of events, imagined as taking place 
offstage. This spatial and temporal order gives the opportunity to the audience to 
grasp the subjectivity of the characters;  they  can be understood in the performing 
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A  dramatic  narrative,  therefore,  is  perceived  in  two  levels-onstage  and  offstage- 
simultaneously summoned by the dramatist and recognized by the audience. In Not I, 
however, the eventuality of the narrative hinders us from the easy identification that 
we, as the member of the audience, make between Mouth and her narrative. We are 
not observing the experience of a character that through Mouth’s voice is delineating 
her past in a consistent narrative; we are confronted with the interaction of a tripartite 
self in one narrative. Mouth is relating her story to an auditor that is somehow familiar 
with her narrative because he/she protests to Mouth’s denial of identity with hopeless 
gestures. Through Mouth’s narrative we are informed about an absent self, signified 
as “she.” In addition to the present Mouth and the imagined “she” the performance 
stages an unseen “presence,” which dominates Mouth and controls the course of her 
narrative. The narrating voice, which, as discussed before, can also be the voice of 
the present actress, is interrupted by an unheard voice-perhaps that of the author-
that  edits  the  narrative. This  internal  voice,  which  is  unseen  and  unheard  by  the 
audience, is present to Mouth throughout her performance. In addition to these, an 
absent subject, which is not completely embodied either in the narrated o r   i n   t h e 
narrator, exists somewhere. The aspiration of a logocentric modern writing for the 
incarnation of a unified subject -even though the subject might deny subjectivity- in a 
centered, homogeneous text, is so dismantled. 
This  inhomogeneity  is  not  only  discernible  in  the  text  but  also  in  the  spatial 
relations of performance. Since the text of the play is embodied in the body of the 
actor,  that  is  a  fragment  of  the  whole  in  this  play,  performance  turns  to  be 
fragmentary as well. The modernist holistic view of performance is discarded in Not I. 
As Poutney observes: 
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The actress is thus forced to go beyond the norms of 
performance. Rather than a process of assertion of 
building  up  a  character,  she  must  try  to  strip  her 
performance  down  to  the  inner  core,  creating  an 
interior space, an emptiness, denounced of self, yet 
actively  alert  to  the  Beckett’s  text.  In  effect  she 
becomes  a  receptacle  for  the  text  and  it  is  the 
challenge of going beyond the normal boundaries of 
performance that produces the depth of identification 
with  the  role  that  actors  find  so  exhilarating  and 
brings about their close rapport with Beckett (2006 
71-72). 
 
The text turns to a transitory image, the image of an absent being, which struggles to 
haunt the present body of the actor. Since the character in Not I does not have any 
access to its selfhood through a coherent past or in a planned-out future, it exists just 
by acting. The coherent self of such characters as Hamm and Vladimir is gone. The 
whole play is reduced to a moment, to a fragment of action which has no temporal or 
spatial connection with a reality outside this performing moment. It is a piece, stolen 
from some one’s narrative; finality is denied to this piece. 
Beckett has created a situation in Not I in which language has become alienated 
from meaning. This estrangement breaks the “logos” of language as a metaphysical 
myth, which is able to create a transparent correspondence between the words and 
some meta-linguistic signified in the real world. This vocation of language is denied in 
the  pure  linguistic  monolog  of  the  Mouth.  The  impersonal  voice  creates  a  meta- 
language which is just there, like Beckett’s characters, which are just there to prove 
that there is no meaning behind their being on the stage. They are there to express 
their anguish of being in a world whose aim is unknown for them. “The narrative I,” as 83 
Kearney suggests, “is a split I, a not I, forever in pursuit of itself, forever falling short 
of itself. The Beckettian narrator is a victim of the voices he utters and hears, a prey 
to language” (292). 
As  we  observed  the  temporality  of  signification  and  its  dependence  on  the 
immediate presence of sign deny the transparency of language, which was taken for 
granted in Western thought for centuries. Kearney believes that, “Beckett debunks 
our habitual approach to language as a representational expression (Ausdruck) of 
some self-present subject and reveals it as a perpetually self-deferring signification 
(Anzeigen) irreducible to presence” (365). By breaking the links between the words 
that we hear (signifiers)  and  the  expected  immobile  subjects  (signifieds),  Beckett 
invalidates language. The words, which are evacuated from meaning, turn to be just 
sounds, voices, which are alienated from the subjects producing them.  Language 
becomes  a  meta-existence  whose  only  function  is  irritating  the  nerves  of  the 
audience. 
The presence or absence of a subject, the binary opposition of self/other, and 
the apprehensibility of language become secondary in Beckett’s work. Krapp’s failure 
in catching up with his past identity, the collapse of language in Not I, the inability of 
the Unnamable to speak in spite of the compulsion of words, the hopeless cry of 
Breath,  and  finally  the  eternal  silence  of  the  decentered  characters  of  Quads, 
demonstrate  Beckett’s  deviation  from  language  into  a  minimalistic,  silent 
performance. Furthermore he invalidates the Western myth of self-identity. Most of 
his characters have lost their connections with the world as an assured reality. They 
are not sure about the memories of the past; they cannot build a connection between 
what they relate as their life story and what they might call truth. The identity that they 
are trying to construct is perpetually deconstructed by the failure of their memory. 84 
They are under the pressure of serious ontological/epistemological questions whose 
answers  cannot  be  found  in  any  sacred  text;  the  self  is  left  alone  in finding  the 
answer to its questions including its own existence. Since the world of objects can 
only  be  interpreted  through  words  or  language  and  language  itself,  as  Derrida 
suggests, works in a system of differences, an impasse surrounds the searching self. 
The puzzled self cannot express its mystery by this medium because it lacks origin. 
Through the mouth of the narrator of Unnamable, Beckett declares that, “ I   a m   a l l  
these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no ground for their settling.” 
This identification with the words fits in the poststructuralist notion that, identity is not 
an observable, explicable phenomenon; it is an invention of language.  
The instability of the system of signification makes identity an unstable entity as 
well because we can define it just temporarily. The “unnamability,” to which Derrida in 
his study of language refers, is what Beckett has discovered in his Unnamable, an 
entity that is not approachable through naming. This unnamability breaks both the 
bound between individual and reality and the bound between individual and his self. 
Self-identity becomes a relative concept like many other concepts in postmodernist 
thought; it is a story that the individuals invent to interpret their “Dasein.” Beckett 
portrays  this  misery  of  self  in  his  Texts  for  Nothing.  Entangled  in  the  grips  of 
language  and obsessed  with  different tenses,  the  character  tries  to name the  “I”, 
which is reluctant to come from its fictive shell to take an objective identity. Finally the 
author/character  of  these  texts  surrenders  to  the  tyranny  of  language  and  stops 
searching for an independent self.  
Beckett’s approach to this impasse, however, is not a nihilistic or pessimistic 
one; “his answer to our existential anguish,” as Kearney maintains, “is humour” (291). 
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Lucky, for example, is presented with a philosophical laugh at both Christian idealism 
and positivism of the modern age. The poor philosopher is more a slave of his own 
beliefs and language than of his master. The talkative Mouth is more a confused, 
distracted  old  woman  who  deserves  pity  than  a  tragic  figure.  Her  hopeless  self-
negation  and  her  fight  against  a  unified  fictive  character  are  more  funny  than 
disastrous. Even Hamm and Vladimir, as the preservers of the past logos, prove to 
be comic figures by  their insistence on dedicating to the old dogmas. We can just 
laugh at their helpless efforts for keeping the centers that are already fallen apart. As 
Kearney suggests: 
 
Beckett’s entire literary oeuvre embodies a modern 
critique of traditional notions of “identity” –whether it 
concern to the self, being, language, God or one’s 
sense of national belonging. His aim, I suggest, is a 
nihilistic deconstruction of sense into non-sense than 
a playful wish to expose the inexhaustible comedy of 
existence. His writing delights in disturbing all hard- 
and  fast  categories  and  distinctions  which  seek  to 
simplify  experience  –including  those  which  would 
rigidly divide literature  and philosophy; it powerfully 
illustrates how all our rational concepts are ultimately 
related to an ongoing process of artistic rediscovery 
and revision (293). 
 
This carnivalizing of the speech is in indeed a criticism of language. Beckett’s 
parodic images show the deficiencies of all seemingly unbreakable institutions, which 
try to stabilize themselves by appealing to language. He questions the validity and 
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to  present  themselves  in  an  incoherent  being  in  his  works.  The  latent  force  of 
undoing interferes in every dialog to prevent the idea from establishing itself. This 
strategy is the source for hesitations and contradictions, which manifest themselves 
in  frequent  pauses,  silences,  and  repetitions,  hindering  his  texts  from  achieving 
harmonious integrity. The self-evidence of the meaning of a given text, which implies 
that a text is present, limited, and fully realized, is frequently questioned. Beckett 
undermines  the  “metaphysics  of  presence”  by  constant  redefinitions,  gaps  in 
memory,  intratextuality,  and  arbitrariness  of  the  dialogs.  In  reflecting  about  past 
events or searching the missed objects, the characters resort constantly to words. 
The  torrent  of  confusing  words,  uttered  in  these  moments,  discredits  the 
communicative function of language and renders the presence of the characters an 
absent quality. The relationship between word and world is broken. Since Beckett is 
more  fascinated  by  the  shape  rather  than  the  validity  of  the  ideas,  as  Dearlove 
suggests,  “His  narratives  are  united  less  by  stylistic,  metaphoric,  and  thematic 
designs than by unremitting efforts to find a literary shape for the proposition that 
perhaps no relationships exist between or among the artist, his art, and an external 
reality”(3).  These  “non-relational”  narratives  meet  Derrida’s  expectations  of  a 
deconstructive text. 87 
 
Chapter 4   
 
 
Metadrama, Intertextuality, Reality: Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern Are Dead 
 
 
While  the  non-relationality  of  narrative and non referentiality render Beckett’s 
work its post modern touch, the arbitrariness of subject, characters, and plot, the 
pluralistic voices, the idea of a meta-game prevailing the course of events, and the 
rejection of a universal reality brings Stoppard’s work close to the later phases of 
postmodernism. The emphasis on the intellectual uncertainty(R&GAD), the mockery 
of  the  grand-narratives  of  the  past  (Travesties),  the  instability  of  language  and 
fragmentation of narrative (Dogg’s Hamlet), the illusory nature of observation (After 
Magritte,  Inspector  Hound),  postcolonialism  (the  Indian  Ink),  the  relativity  of  our 
perceptions as the result of the discoveries of quantum physics (Arcadia), and chaos 
theory (Hapgood) are all postmodern issues which Stoppard exploits as the topics of 
his plays. He questions the stability of the modernist positivist values in a postmodern 
world,  in  which  the  intellectual,  social,  and  political  perspectives  have  radically 
changed. A faithful representation of reality is discarded in his works by his perpetual 
use of intertextuality, metadrama, theatricality and the games and tricks that he plays 
on  the  reader/spectators  to  rob  them  of  the  sense  of  reality.  The  illusory  scenes 88 
which are taken to be real in the beginning and prove to be just illusions, like the 
opening scene of After Magritte, make the audience skeptic about the reality of what 
it is observing. The uncertainty, created by these scenes, prevents the spectators 
from  occupying their secure seats of passive observation because each time that 
they come to a conclusion the playwright’s tricks and games interfere to block their 
final interpretation. In Stoppard’s work the credible metanarratives of the past turn to 
playful language games, which have no claims on transcendental truth. The travesty 
of the established grandnaratives, the placement of his texts in a web of other texts, 
and the theatricality that he employs to discard any relation between his text and an 
outside reality, manifest his deep “incredulity towards metanarratives.”  
In  Postmodern  Condition  Lyotard  discredits  the  totalizing  stories  about  the 
history  and  goal  of  humankind  that  legitimize  cultural  practices  and  forms  of 
knowledge. For him, metanarratives or master-discourses, which try to establish a 
basis for an overall judgment, are arbitrary legitimations for those who hold these 
discourses as transcendental truths and try to impose them on others. In his view the 
totalitarianism of modern metanarratives such as Hegel’s teleology, Hermeneutics, 
Marxism,  and  Capitalism  has  been  replaced  by  a  postmodern  “heterogeneity  of 
language  games”  (1984:xxv),  which  no  longer  aims  at  providing  systematic 
theorizations of human society or prescribing universal remedies. Instead, the rules 
of these language games only apply to a particular context and have to be agreed 
upon by its present participants. The postmodern condition, according to Lyotard, 
replaces the totalitarian statements with “multiplicity of finite meta-arguments” that 
are “limited in time and space” (1984:66). Wittgenstein’s theory of language games, 
which gives a picture of the regulation of behavior through rules of linguistic conduct 
among sub-groups in society, provides a basis for Lyotard’s little narratives. If giving 89 
credence to total philosophical contexts has become difficult in postmodern age, we 
can refer to smaller context within which we act. This system of judging actions and 
knowledge in confined contexts discards the necessity of metanarratives. Lyotard’s 
“performativity”  stresses  the  inevitability  of  performance  in  a  closed  local  system 
rather than in a universal one. 
What Stoppard in many of his plays does is similar to Lyotard’s “performativity”; 
he tries to replace the universal stages of performance by local ones. Employing 
decentring strategies, Stoppard aims at substituting the eternal and universal truths 
by temporary and “local” ones. The postmodernist literary conventions that his texts 
deploy-such  as  temporal  disorder,  metafictionality,  intertextuality,  and  magical 
realism-  and  the  preoccupation  of  his  drama  with  issues  such  as  fragmented 
subjectivity, cultural hybridity, and skepticism about metanarratives, put him among 
postmodern  playwrights  who  intentionally  undertake  a  deconstructive  and 
delogocentric enterprise. 
 In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, for instance, the global, elevated 
truth of Hamlet turns to be the secondary story of two minor characters, Rosencrantz 
and  Guildenstern,  who  wish  to  bring  their  senseless  narrative  to  a  conclusion.  In 
Keblowska-lawniczak’s view,  “The seeds of delegitimation” (2004:111) are already 
present in Hamlet. She believes that, “In Hamletian world of continually subverted 
meaning, the nostalgia for the lost grand narrative and for the metaphysical appears 
in young Hamlet’s desire to interrogate the ghost of the past and to restore, even if 
the task seems to be impossible, the patriarchal authority”(112). Ros and Guil also 
want to find the origin of their plight by appealing to the past. The desperate hope in 
them for finding a narrative that can legitimate their whole situation has its source in 
the same kind of nostalgia for the ordered past. But the lack of memory disconnects 90 
them from reality and deprives them of an epistemological knowledge of life. The two 
minor characters of Hamlet, like the characters in Pirandello’s play Six Characters in 
Search  of  an  Author,  are  searching  for  a  logocentric  explanation,  first  for  their 
presence, and second for their origin. But unlike Pirandello’s characters, who have a 
story to tell, Ros and Guil are summoned by someone, an author perhaps, to play the 
roles that are not clear for them. Their presence is the consequence of an imposed 
vocation: 
 
Ros (promptly). I woke up, I suppose. (Triggered) Oh- I’ve got it now- that man, 
a foreigner, he woke us up- 
Guil. A messenger. (He relaxes, sits.) 
Ros. That’s it- pale sky before dawn, a man standing on his saddle to bang on 
the shutters- shouts- What’s all the row about?! Clear off!- But then he called 
our names. You remember that- this man woke us up. 
Guil. Yes 
Ros. We were sent for. 
Guil. That’s why we’re here….(16-17) 
 
In Metatheatre, Lionel Abel stresses that some characters have the potentiality to 
impose themselves on playwrights. Stoppard summons Ros and Guil because he 
thinks  they  are  innocent  characters  whose  comical  situation  derives  from  their 
involuntary but inevitable presence in Shakespeare’s text. This presence, however, 
does not explain the purpose of their vocation; they just know that it “was urgent” 
(Stoppard, 17). 
The play opens depicting Ros and Guil throwing coins, wondering that the “law 
of probability” does not work in their game. The observation that they make does not 
correspond to the scientific legitimation narratives of the time. Although their game of 91 
“heads and tails” invalidates one of essential certainties (Law of Probability), they 
continue playing because the main rule of having a winner and a loser is still valid in 
this  game.  Indeed at this  point  they  separate  themselves from  an  outside  reality. 
Unable of connecting their life to a universal narrative or a determinable reality, the 
characters appeal to Shakespeare’s local text for defining themselves. They do not 
know since when they were playing; they do not have any memory of the past; and 
they do not have any plans or destination for future; they just move on aimlessly. The 
assumption that time must have stopped dead, because “the single experience of 
one coin being spun once has been repeated ninety times” (12), helps them explain 
the inaccommodable phenomenological chaos around them. To overcome their fear 
of the unknown, they resort to the authorities of the original text, Hamlet, to control 
the menacing chaos. With great despair, they understand that no authority in the ur-
text  takes  the  responsibility  to  redeem  them  from  the  plight  of  an  obscure 
signification. As Keblowska-lawniczak suggests: 
 
Whether  spies  or  ambassadors,  Ros  and  Guil 
require  legitimation,  almost  by  definition,  the  seal 
that  confirms  their  identities  and  legitimates  their 
movement throughout the play. No grand narrative 
provides  such  a  seal,  and  hence  we  have  the 
growing  sense  of  the  two  being  belated  travellers 
who follow into the footsteps of their predecessors, 
but unlike their imaginary guides, are doomed not to 
discover anything (114). 
 
They  have  to  “act  on  scraps  of  information”  (113).  Being  disappointed  with  their 
search  for  omniscient  knowledge,  they  amuse  themselves  with  different  games, 92 
among  which  the  popular  game  of  asking  question  and  giving  answers.  Their 
logocentric  thought,  however,  prevents  them  from  realizing  that  the  aim  of  these 
questions and answers is not acquiring knowledge; therefore, they become deeply 
frustrated when they cannot find determinate answers. The inability to connect to a 
logical world, to a past which suits in the grandnaratives they have in mind, creates 
fear in them: 
 
Ros: I’m afraid 
Guil: So am I. 
Ros: I am afraid it isn’t our day. 
Guil: I am afraid it is (11). 
 
Moreover, Ros and Guil, as Jonathan Bennet asserts, “are haunted by the fear that 
they are already unreal” (78). Cutting his fingernails, Ros expresses his mistrust in 
science by confiding Guil that, “Another curious scientific phenomenon is that the fact 
that the fingernails grow after death…” (Stoppard, 11). They realize that in their world 
the scientific principles do not work, and it creates fear in them.  
To overcome this existential fear they cling to each other. Guil even tries to 
logocentrize their situation and soothe Ros who is obsessed with many ontological 
questions: “There is a logic at work-it’s all done for you, don’t worry. Enjoy it. Relax” 
(43). But his metaphysical justification is not even convincing for him and at the end 
of his speech doubtfully asks, “Do I contradict myself?” (Ibid)He has lost the certainty 
that the logocentric metaphysics used to provide for him. Cadler attributes certainty to 
a “devotional religion,” which “is a language of its own.” The scripture of this religion, 
as Cadler states it, “Appeals to human insecurity and fear, and the willingness of the 
adherents  to  accept  any  answer  rather  than  none,”  so  that  “the  imprimatur  of 
authority”  will  be  “gratefully  accepted”  (92).  In  Lyotrad’s  view  science  is  another 93 
metanarrative  or  discourse,  which  gives  its  own  explanation  for  overcoming  fear. 
Although  Guildenstern  himself  emphasizes  that,  “The  scientific  approach  to  the 
examination of phenomena is a defence against the pure emotion of fear” (13), he 
tries to explain their situation with this language because it brings a “kind of harmony 
and a kind of confidence” (15). 
The irony of their situation is that they are not aware that the fictional reality of 
their  existence  is  not  limited  in  time  or  space.  They  can  be  born  with  each 
performance and die with its end; therefore their life is an arbitrary one, made by the 
playwright  and  recreated  by  the  director.  This  arbitrariness  is  emphasized  in 
Stoppard’s  character  delineation:  “Guil  is  not  worried  about  the  money,  but  he  is 
worried by the implications; aware but not going to panic about it- his character note” 
(6). Or, Ros “betrays no surprise” about the run of heads he is just “nice enough to 
feel embarrassed at taking so much money off his friend. Let that be his character 
note” (5). These precise descriptions hinder us from mixing these characters with 
those of Shakespeare. Although they are borrowed from Hamlet, they are not the 
same  characters;  they  are  modern  projections  of  Ros  and  Guil,  trapped  in 
Shakespeare’s text. What Stoppard apparently does is summoning them from the 
Hades, rendering them the opportunity of replaying a determinative part of their roles, 
and providing them the possibility to decide their ends. Nevertheless, they cannot 
interfere in the metanarrative of Hamlet because the rules of this game are already 
written.  In  answer  to  Rose  who  asks  “who  decides?”  the  Player  confirms  that 
everything “is written” (88). They cannot change their fate because they are already 
dead in another text. Stoppard context cannot save them; it just engages them in 
another  game.  Guil,  being  perplexed  by  the  Player’s  explanations  about  the 
arbitrariness of their situation, innocently asks: “Operating on two levels, are we?”(71) 94 
These levels of reality and fictionality cannot be separated either. Stoppard violates 
the illusion/reality making rules to create a truth that has no existence other than on-
stage. Ros and Guil are only character/actors and their presence is an arbitrary one 
or  a  non-presence.  Even  the  player  recognizes  them  as  “fellow  artists”  and 
emphasizes  that,  “ W e  have  played  to  bigger,  of  course,  but  quality  counts  for 
something” (22). Ros, irritated by being called a “fellow artist”, objects that, “I thought 
we were Gentlemen” (22). The Player, who does not differentiate between the two 
worlds of reality and fiction, emphasizes that, “For some of us it is performance, for 
other patronage. They are two sides of the same coin”(22).  
This equivocality is imposed on them by the two language games in which they 
are involved. When Ros asks Guil about the thing he is playing at, he, like Hamm 
complaints, “W ords words, words. They are all we have to go on”(45). He also knows 
that they are not going to come upon any knowledge or truth in these games. As he 
asserts, “It’s a matter of asking the right questions and giving away as little as we 
can. It’s a game”(44). The irrelevancy of meaning in these games is a part of the 
deconstructive  project  of  the  play.  Keblowsk-Lawniczal  believes  that,  “Absence of 
insistence  on  meaning  and  meaningfulness,  present  both  in  Lyotard’s  and 
Wittgenstein’s proposition, invites reflection on what is beyond this poorly defined 
sphere”(121).  Stoppard  text,  like  the  two  other  philosophical  texts,  discards  the 
accessibility of knowledge or consistency of meaning; it becomes the playground of 
two simultaneous language games of Shakespeare and Stoppard.  The  characters 
are  also  aware  of  this  duality;  they  know  that  the  rules  change  when  the  game 
changes;  therefore,  they  adjust  their  language  to  the  text  in  which  they  enter.  In 
Stoppard’s text they use a modern language and engage themselves with modern 95 
themes, but in Shakespeare’s text they turn to be Hamlet’s ignorant attendant, who, 
as Prufrock in “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” asserts: 
 
… will do 
To swell a progress, start a scene or two, 
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool, 
Deferential, glad to be of use, 
Politic, cautious, and meticulous; 
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse; 
At times, indeed, almost ridiculous— 
Almost, at times, the Fool.  
 
They are no great men like Hamlet, but little men like Prufrock, who dare not to act 
outside the text; the text determines their identity. The reality of their existence is a 
fiction, interwoven in the web of other fictions; therefore, we can neither speak of 
perception nor of presence in their case. 
The grand discourse of Hamlet becomes the logos with which Stoppard plays in 
order  to  establish  his  local  narrative  of  the  two  poor  attendants,  who  were  killed 
without knowing the reason. Stoppard’s “chief interest and objective”, as he himself 
asserts, was “to exploit a situation which seemed ….to have enormous dramatic and 
comic potential- of these two guys who in Shakespeare’s context don’t really know 
what they’re doing” (Anthony Jenkins 1990:38). He just portrays the chaotic situation 
of these two courtiers, who like their counterparts in Waiting for Godot, are put in a 
metadiscourse of an author, who has omnipotently prescribed their lives. Unlike Didi 
and Gogo, however, who are assumed to be alive and present, our courtiers are 
dead and absent. Since the metatext provides no explanation about their past or their 
future, they are unable to construct an identity for themselves; text determines their 
identity.  Bigsby  believes  that,  “In  his  early  plays,  Stoppard  presents  a  series  of 96 
images  of  the  individuals  trapped  inside  a  mechanistic  world  and  destroyed  by  a 
logical system , which fails to accommodate itself to human aspirations” (6). I do not 
think that Stoppard believes on this logical system; on the contrary, he presents a 
world in which the lack of any expected logic or reason is the cause of perplexity and 
uncertainty in characters. Stoppard deprives his characters from any logical order, 
any  Godot,  who  can  save  them  from  the  chaos  encircling  them.  The  Godot  of 
R&GAD is the original playwright who is already dead. Now they appear as dead 
characters in the play of another playwright, who is  giving them the possibility of 
redefining  themselves  in  a  closed,  circular  system.  Their  hopeless  wandering 
between  the  worlds  of  the  two  plays,  however,  does  not  help  them  redefine 
themselves or find an orientation. They are totally lost in this double game because 
the chaos they experience is not surmountable; the modernist idea of the knowing-
subject is so denied. 
The knowledgeability of the audience is discarded as well; the play gives open 
hints that the spectators are involved in a game (that of the play), and they should not 
have the illusion that the natural rules function there. The audience is bereft of the 
possibility of mimetic representation by  confronting two dead characters of Hamlet, 
who engage themselves with modern epistemological and ontological questions. The 
arbitrariness and theatricality of the play deprives them from forming any illusion of 
reality or constructing  a  reality  in  the  background  of  the  play.  By eliminating the 
binary  opposition  of  presence/absence,  Stoppard  deconstructs  the  philosophical 
discourse that presence helps the perception of reality. Stoppard not only invalidates 
the mimetic theories of theater and emphasizes the fictionality of the genre, but also 
discards the idea that dramatic performance should communicate a metanarrative or 97 
share  in  it.  He  demonstrates  the  inability  of  any  dramatic  act  of  presenting 
unchangeable truths or creating finality in performance.  
The  trauma-stricken characters are,  like didi and Gogo, unable to establish a 
logical  ground  to  stand  on.  The  inaccessible  language  of  Hamlet  is  the  only 
existential basis for them. Hamlet is their key to an unknown world; therefore they 
decide to follow this Godot to find the truth: 
 
Ros: Shouldn’t we be doing something- constructive? 
Guil: What did you have in mind?... A short, blunt human pyramid….? 
Ros: We could go. 
Guil: Where? 
Ros: After him (45). 
 
Hamlet becomes the logos for them through whom they can define themselves. They 
are, however, aware of the theatricality of the whole situation; therefore, they do not 
intend  to  follow  a  real  prince  named  Hamlet,  but  a  text  which  dominates  their 
existence:  
 
Ros  (At  footlights.):  How  very  intriguing!(Turns.)  I  feel  like  a  spectator-  an 
appalling prospect. The only thing that makes it bearable is the irrational belief 
that somebody interesting will come on in a minute…. 
Guil: See anyone? 
Ros: No. you? 
Guil. No. ( At footlights.) What a fine persecution- to be kept intrigued without 
ever quite being enlightened…(Pause) We’ve had no practice. 
Ros. We could play at questions (Ibid). 
 
The textual basis of their existence, as we may confer from the above dialog, is not 
only Hamlet, but also Waiting for Godot. Like the characters in Beckett’s work, they 98 
comment on the genre of theater and their own performance. The whole debate on 
“the intriguing nature of theater” or “the disturbing lack of rehearsal” stresses on the 
intentional self-reflectivity  implied  in  this  game.  They  not  only  know  that they are 
performing, but also participate in the discussion about their performance. 
This metadaramatic technique is a device for Stoppard to break the dominancy 
of the original text. Jenkins believes that, “Throughout the play he breaks our sense 
of illusion to remind us that we are in a theatre watching actors” (43). The existent 
gap between the role and the actor, representation and reality, is not denied in this 
play;  conversely  it  is  magnified.  As  Attila  kiss  in  “Cloud  9,  Metadrama  and  the 
Postsemiotics of the subject,” points out:  
 
Through the performance of the actor, a dialectic is 
established  between  surface  and  depth,  theatrical 
illusion  and  actual  reality,  role-playing  and  original 
identity, and this dialectic inevitably foregrounds the 
problems  of  subjectivity.  At  the  same  time,  the 
theater  as  a  thick  semiotic  context  semioticizes 
every  element  of  the  stage,  and  the  idea  of 
representation is brought into the focus of attention 
by the ostension of the sign and the thematization of 
presence. From a semiotic point of view, this results 
in  a  representational  insufficiency  because  it  is 
impossible to establish the total presence of things 
that  are  absent,  and  for  which  the  theatrical 
representation  stands  on  the  stage.  When  it  is 
staged in the actual theatrical context of reception, 
or the imaginative staging of the reader, drama can 
either  thematize  and  foreground,  or  ignore  and 
conceal the representational insufficiency which is in 99 
its  center.  This  idea  of  presence  and  this 
representational insufficiency have been the primary 
concern  of  drama  and  theater  from  the  earliest 
mimetic  theories  up  to  the  poststructuralist 
deconstruction  of  the  metaphysics  of  presence 
(2001:224). 
 
The  representational  insufficiency  is  thematized  in  R&GAD  by  establishing  the 
presence  of  two  dead  (absent)  characters  on  the  stage,  which  is  essentially 
contradictory.  By  collocating  absence  and  presence  on  one  stage,  Stoppard  has 
created an aporiac situation from which there is no escape, neither for the characters 
nor for the audience. The presence of absent things, though not totally perceivable, 
can be imagined, but the presence of dead people renders representation a surreal 
touch and breaks the boundary of realistic presentation. 
Another  element  that  distorts  the  perception  of  the  audience  is  the  implicit 
intertextuality. In the wandering courtiers of Stoppard’s text, one can trace the longing 
of Pirandello’s characters to terminate their narrative in a new context, the perplexity 
of  the two vagabonds of Waiting for Godot  in  being  situated  in  an  impasse,  and 
Hamm’s hopeless search for a center. It seems that the past dramatic texts have 
contrived  to  appear  in  Stoppard’s  text  in  order  to  destroy  the  modernist  claim  of 
originality, emphasizing the inevitability of intertextuality. In Jenkins’ view, Stoppard 
uses Godot “as part of the game he plays with the audience, juxtaposing its rules with 
those of Hamlet.”(41) He thinks that although Stoppard puts these characters in the 
context of Beckett’s Godot, the narrative differs from that of Beckett in its linearity. He 
asserts that, “Whereas Godot presents us with an entrapping circle or a spiral at best, 
Rosencrantz  is  linear”  (40).  In  my  view  there  is  the  same  kind  of  circularity  in 100 
R&GAD. The play starts with a scene portraying two characters, which are declared 
to be dead in the title of the play, playing a game of tossing coins which proves to be 
against the law of probability and a logical order. Later, the characters enter the text 
of Hamlet, the original context of their existence, to play their roles as Ros and Guil. 
In this context they die again, but in Stoppard’s context they just disappear, first Ros 
and a few minutes later Guil, confirming that they were just actors playing their roles: 
 
Ros  All right, then. I don’t care. I’ve had enough. To tell you the truth, I’m 
relieved. (And he disappears from view.) 
Guil. Our names shouted in a certain dawn…a message ..a summon….There 
have been a moment, at the beginning, where we could have said- no. But 
somehow we missed it. (He looks round and sees he is alone.) 
Rosen-? 
Guil-? (He gathers himself.) 
Well, we’ll know better next time. Now you see me, now you- (And disappears) 
(141-42). 
 
The circle ends here by the play returning to its first stage of temporary absence. The 
audience knows that this absence will change to presence in another performance. 
The fact that Guil even mixes his own name with Ros’s and for a moment, before he 
disappears, hesitates about the role he is playing, stresses that he does not assume 
any  identity.  As  an  actor  he  plays  the  roles  assigned  to  him.  Ros  and  Guil  are 
anonymous individuals, submitted to the play of narrativity. Their disappearance from 
the stage shifts the spectacle to that of Hamlet with the Ambassador’s declaration 
that  “Rosencrantz  and  Guildenstern  are  dead.”  The  play  ends  in  the  middle  of 
Horatio’s monolog with a fading scene, “Overtaken by dark and music.” So returns 
the play to its starting point with no progression. The two  dead courtiers of Hamlet 
remain dead; we just share their trauma in their death sleep, presented to us in the 101 
circularity of repeated performances. Time does not proceed in the world of texts. 
The repetition of the same phenomenon of falling of the coin on its head in the first 
scene is also demonstrative of this standstill of time. Not only is this phenomenon 
repeated, but also their life and death. The repeated appearance of characters in 
different performances or different adaptations defies the linearity of real life.  
Repetition is an indissoluble element of intertexuality. But repeating does not 
mean producing the same; it means that, each textual system includes the traces of 
other discourses and languages. Derridean différance works both in repetition and in 
adaptation because each adapted text is simultaneously similar to and different from 
the original. There is always a renewal, a change in adaptation, though the original 
keep  staying  in  the  background;  it  is  the  same  and  the  other  simultaneously. 
Repetition also includes a non-closure because remaining open to the opportunities 
of new discoveries means structural openness. Intertextuality, therefore, makes a text 
instable, because it interferes in the text, changes it and deconstructs its foundation. 
In Stoppard’s play, for instance, the metatext of Hamlet, which is supposed to have a 
firm construction, is taken to task and loses its dominance. As Scolnicov suggests: 
 
In  a  tone  that  is  always  amused,  ironic  and 
sophisticated,  Stoppard  seems  to  be  conducting  a 
dialogue  with  the  best  in  art  and  philosophy,  and, 
through  it,  articulates  his  position  on  a  variety  of 
contemporary intellectual, social and political issues. 
His  consummate  wit  and  ingenuity  ensure  the 
originality  of  what  is  said  via  intertextuality. 
Stoppard’s wide use of obligatory intertextuality does 
not  however  preclude  an  aleatoric  intertextual 
reading of his plays. In fact, the opposite may be the 102 
case, since the obligatory intertextuality of the plays 
encourages  us  as  readers  to  explore  beyond  the 
work for more and more significant intertexts in ever 
widening circles (1995: 19).  
The  openness of his texts to exploring new traces of ideas makes his plays 
pluralistic. The web, created out of different values, languages, insights, and settings, 
creates a polyphony of different voices in his works, which liberates these texts from 
the  dominance  of  logocentric  thoughts.  In  R&GAD,  for  instance,  the  Elizabethan 
supreme  values  and  formal  language  stand  side  by  side  with  the  contemporary 
uncertainty and relativity of language and thought. The metatext of Hamlet and its 
values are questioned. Ros and Guil are treated not as two traitors, who betray their 
friend, but as two innocent, naïve characters, who are unaware of the aim of their 
mission. They are not killed by a tragic hero (Hamlet), but by an unreasonable man, 
who, instead of demolishing the letter or changing its content, kills them to meet the 
ends of a Shakespearian tragedy. The text of the play becomes the meeting point of 
Stoppard’s critical views and Shakespeare’s text. Looking at one plot from different 
perspectives discards the unity of disclosure, not only for Shakespeare’s text, but 
also for Stoppard’s play. 
This break from traditional conceptions also happens in the notion of subjectivity. The 
safe identity position is disturbed because self is no more a solid homogeneous entity 
that  can  be  separated  from  other.  “What  follows,”  as  Jernigan  points  out,  “is  a 
disintegration of the theatrical contract, resulting in the loss of stage and audience 
relations  as  semiotised  object  and  semiotising  subject,  visually  paralleled  by  the 
Lacanian gaze and eye”(2001:130).The fact that Guil does not distinguish between 
Ros  and  himself,  short  before  his  disappearance  in  the  last  scene,  shows  his 
hesitation in identifying himself or his companion with a name. Their names are just 103 
given  to  them  as  characters;  thus  the  recognition  of  any  self  in  these  names  is 
impossible. They are not the “one in many” which asserts the unity or logos of self; 
they are many in one. If the individual is taken as the production of a cultural imagery 
that circulates identity patterns for the subjects to internalize, it is not necessary to be 
distinctively identified. This makes the spectators move from passive identification 
with the character to the stage of doubtful confusion. The characters represented to 
them are not claimed to be real or even a representation of real; they are made of 
words based on a text without any context. As the Producer in Six Characters in 
search  of  an  Author  explains,  “Characters  don’t  act…it’s  actors  who  act…The 
characters  are  there  in  the  script_”.  Real  character  is  therefore  an  illusion;  all 
characters are the products of the imagination of an author.  Deconstructionist views 
of “the subject as text” could be properly applicable to the analysis of Stoppard’s 
characters. As Kvale maintains: 
 
The  radical  deconstructionist  move  is  to  constitute 
the subject as text (or the text as subject), making it 
impossible  for  that  subject  to  refer  to  itself  in  any 
consistent way, independent of the world of signs it 
is enmeshed in. The text replaces the transcendental 
ego of Kant. In this scheme the subject is doomed to 
perpetual exile from itself. It is exposed to endless 
substitutions  of  meaning.  “The  absence  of 
transcendental  signifier  …extends  the  domain  and 
the  play  of  signification  infinitely”  (Derrida, 
1981:278). By letting the subject be swallowed up in 
the  text,  the  transformation  of  “essential”  rational 
man into “relative” postmodern man is fulfilled (1992: 
124-25). 104 
 
The metamorphosis of rational, educated Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to relativist, 
postmodern  Ros  and  Guil,  who  are  busy  with  different  games,  is  a  fulfillment  of 
Stoppard’s text to turn the centredness of a classic text into the decentredness of a 
postmodern one. The dead characters of the old text, which have purchased their 
way  into  Stoppard’s  text,  are  trapped  in the  structure  of  postmodern  thought  and 
have lost their individuality. 
Moreover,  their  present/absent  condition  deprives  the  audience  from 
experiencing them “live” on the stage and magnifies the difficulty of understanding or 
interpreting them. Since we learn to identify everything in terms of binary oppositions 
and  these  paradoxical  creatures  cannot  be  restricted  in  such  definitions;  the 
metaphysic  of  presence  is  deconstructed  in  their  dual  absence/presence.  The 
characters who discuss their own death cannot be present; still the epistemological 
and ontological questions that engage their mind are familiar for us as the audience. 
The  issues  of  death  and  life,  the  existential  angst  that  they  have,  the 
meaninglessness of the world in which they are put, are ontological issues, which not 
only  engage  their  mind,  but  also  ours.  Nonetheless,  the  incompatibility  of  these 
philosophical speculations with the characters’ situation turns the play to a pastiche 
of these speculations. 
The concept of representation is also parodied in Stoppard’s play. A pure game 
or theatricality, which questions both the nature of reality and that of identity, takes 
the place of  an authentic presentation of  the real world in the naturalistic theater. 
Theatricality  stresses  the  arbitrary  nature  of  presentation,  reminding  the audience 
permanently that they are not observing a natural phenomenon. It is a discursive 
practice which interferes in the aesthetic form of performance and  brings in wider 105 
cultural  implications  in  the  context  of  theater.  Additionally  it  radically  changes  the 
mode of perception. The decentredness derived from theatricality, as kiss asserts, 
gives the audience “a metaperspective on their positionality in the cultural imagery” 
(225).  The  emphasis  on  the  theatricality  and  playfulness  of  all  performances, 
including those of the audience, makes the spectators cease seeing their subjectivity 
as a harmonious one, which is neatly proportioned in the socio-psychic context. By 
revealing the identity crises and epistemological confusion of the characters, which 
are  themselves  the  audience  of  another  play  (Hamlet),  Stoppard  makes  his 
spectators doubt that their perceptions have a solid foundation. In metadrama, claims 
Abel,  there  is  no  sense  of  reality;  the  world  is  just  “the  projection  of  human 
consciousness”  (113).  Furthermore,  he  suggests  that,  metadrama  “glorifies  the 
unwillingness of the imagination to regard any image of the world as ultimate” (113). 
By  involving  the  spectator  in  conscious  playing  instead  of  passive  observing, 
metatheater  destroys  the  illusion  that  the  audience  is  experiencing  reality.  In 
Stoppard’s play, for instance, the surrealistic characters appear on the stage to affirm 
that the spectators are involved in a game: the game of theater. The fact that Ros 
and  Guil  do  not  sense  any  wind  on  the  stage  (Stoppard,  101)  obliterate  the 
naturalistic  interpretation  of  the  world  they  inhabit.  Representation  of  reality  is 
replaced by pure performance. Abel believes that, “The characters are puppets and 
the playwrights insist on the fact that they are puppets and the audience should not 
try to take them as real people” (111). As a defender of fictionality, the Player justly 
stresses that, “We’re actors–we’re the opposite of people” (Stoppard, 68). 
This theatricality makes reality an abstract concept, which can be changed due 
to the individual experience. What the spectators encounter is just a version of reality 
that the playwright or the actors try to present. The audience cannot differentiate 106 
between the stage and the world because it is stressed that the world is a stage 
where we, the actors, play. Besides, we do not even play one role, but different roles. 
This multiplicity of roles is also an integrated part of R&GAD. Ros and Guil enter 
Stoppard’s play as Shakespearean characters to play the roles of modern Ros and 
Guil. In the same play, they leave their present identities to take their past ones by 
entering Shakespeare’s text. They also play the role of the audience not only for the 
theater troop, but also for their own play because they just remain passive spectators 
and do  not  interfere  in  its  action  to  change  their prescribed fate. Contrary to the 
players, who try to establish their own reality in theater, they are passive actors who 
are captured in their roles and would rather get rid of the text and the roles appointed 
to them by an author than to play actively. This multiple role playing  is a part of 
theatricality  that  Stoppard  employs  to  establish  his  on-stage  reality  which  stands 
above the reality of “off-stage world” in Brassell’s term (1985). 
This on-stage reality or fictionality is not related to an objective reality outside 
the fictional structure; it is only a part of the game in which the characters and the 
audience are involved. Stoppard takes the idea of objectivity and truth in science, in 
nature, and in logic for a “colossal confidence trick” and asserts that, “The advancing 
edge of objectivity must be replaced by a revival of radical consciousness.” In  his 
view only the position holders in universities like Goerge Moor, the professor of ethics 
in Jumper, are the defender of such truths. The facts need the support of a theory to 
be acceptable. Ros affirms that, “The sun goes down or the earth’s coming up, as the 
fashionable  theory  has  it”  (92).  It  is  this  “fashionable  theory”  that,  as  Lyotard  in 
Postmodern Condition observes, decides for reality. The postmodern uncertainty of 
truth  and  Lyotardian  paralogy  can  be  heard  in  the  Player’s  statement  that, 
“Everything has to be taken on trust; truth is only that which is taken to be true. It’s 107 
the  currency  of  living.  There  may  be  nothing  behind  it,  but  it  doesn’t  make  any 
difference so long as it is honoured. One acts on assumptions…” (72). Each observer 
of reality gives a new dimension to it, but he does not make it clear. The number of 
observers or witnesses, as Guil maintains, makes the experience more touchable 
and “the more witnesses there are the thinner it gets and the more reasonable it 
becomes until it is as thin as reality, the name we give to the common experience” 
(19). In this sense the world created on stage is more genuine than the real world 
because there are no pretention and no arbitrary values there. Art can present its 
own world, without being obliged to imitate or mirror the reality,  which is anyway 
undeterminable.  The  two  “little  men”  of  Hamlet,  who  seem  comical  outside  the 
framework of Hamlet’s tragedy, are truer than the great Hamlet seeking revenge in 
performing the orders of a great father figure.  
The task of Stoppard’s modern anti-heroes in finding orientation in a world of 
disorder and chaos, a postmodern world of coexistent values and insights is not an 
easy one. They see the grand structure of Hamlet from their own point of view and 
are  confused  about  their  own  roles  in  this  meta-discourse.  Are they  philosophers 
dreaming of metamorphosing into butterflies or they are butterflies dreaming of being 
philosophers,  as  in  Guil’s  story(63)?  Since  postmodern  characters  are  no  longer 
living in a world in which “there were answers to everything,” truth, as Guil asserts, 
“becomes a permanent blur” in the corner of their eyes. The truth that they are trying 
to find does not exist outside the text in which they are moving. If they get rid of its 
grip  they  will  realize  that  they  are  “ambushed  by  a  grotesque”;  “uncertainty”,  as 
Player says “is the normal state.” (71) They are the “two blind men looting a bazaar 
for their own portrait.” And when their portraits are shown to them by the players, they 
are unable to recognize themselves. Like all other “little men,” they “don’t know the 108 
ins and outs of the matter”. It is even appalling for Ros to feel “like a spectator”; the 
grand structure of the world creates fear in him. “The unbearable lightness of being” 
can only be relieved by “the irrational belief that somebody interesting will come in a 
minute.” When  they  are  disappointed  with  being  surprised  by  a  new  comer,  they 
engage themselves in playing games. Although in their discussion with the Player, 
they strongly discard the idea of “being just players”, Ros and Guil, like Didi and 
Gogo,  make  their  situation  tolerable  by  resorting  to  games.  The  order  they  are 
searching for cannot be achieved in their story. Events which “must play themselves 
out to aesthetic, moral and logical conclusion,” fail to come to such a conclusion and 
the  characters  just  disappear  in the end to  appear  again  in  another  piece.  They 
should  know  that  they  can  just  play  their  roles  and  they  “can’t  go  through  life 
questioning” their situation” (72). 
In  such  situations  reality  cannot  fill  the  background  for  the  characters  and 
memory becomes a loose concept. Throughout the play  the characters try to relate 
themselves with a world in which they can be identified, but there is no source of 
information but a text. It is not only the absence of memory that deprives them from 
being attached to a firm identity, but also the fluidity of language. What Ros& Guil try 
to  do  is  to  forget  rather  than  to  remember.  The  centrality  of  remembrance  is 
questioned  in  this  play  because  the  effort  of  the  traumatized  characters  in 
remembering their mission ends in unimportant details; they are unable to form their 
memory in a linear narrative of past. If they do, they will certainly remember their 
disastrous end, from which they try to escape.  This lack of memory hinders them 
from identifying with  the characters of the players’ play. Indeed, they are unable of 
any kind of identification because they are traumatized by their unexpected death. 
The absence of any kind of anticipation or preparation for their fate in Hamlet’s text 109 
has traumatized them so deep that they escape any identity. Like the narrator in Not I 
they  avoid  a  reunion  with  the  self;  they  would  rather  remain  the  other.  The 
differentiation between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern loses its significance because 
their existence finds a sense in the role they play in Hamlet and the relationship they 
have with Hamlet. Although Brassell believes that Stoppard “locates meaning…in the 
identifiable  context  of  Hamlet”  (1985:  62),  I  think  that  Shakespeare’s  text  only 
provides  information  about  these  characters,  it  neither  gives  meaning  to  their 
situation nor explains their plight. Stoppard’s R&GAD stresses that all we have is 
these scattered pieces of information; we are denied an encircling truth. As Andretta 
expresses it: 
 
It [the play] aims at showing that actors, audiences, 
and characters in a play share the same destiny of 
limited  comprehension.  The  actors  and  the 
characters they impersonate do not know more than 
their assigned parts. The audience, likewise, [does] 
not  know  more  than  what  relates  to  their  daily 
routine.  None  are  offered  any  insight  into  a 
comprehensive  reality,  a  metaphysical  pattern,  or 
even a moral or logical purpose that is being worked 
out” (1992: 24). 
 
The only ostensibly logical pattern that they have is language. The characters 
search the order that they cannot find in the real world in language and literature. 
Ros ask for a logical pattern in a play, with a beginning a middle and an end. Guil 
longs  for  a  piece  of  art  that  can  mirror  the  real  world.  The  dramatic  irony  in 
Stoppard’s play dismantles the classic theories of literature, which emphasize the 110 
mimetic nature of art. The poor textual characters are unaware that their whole fate is 
just a text. It is a text that controls their life and gives them an identity, not their life 
that is mirrored in a piece of art. They come to being  and die in a text and they 
reappear, and disappear in another one. They are not only the products of language, 
but also preoccupied or even perplexed by it. In a scene in the first act Guil asks Ros, 
“Has it ever happened to you that all of sudden and for no reason at all you haven’t 
the faintest idea how to spell the word-“wife”-or “house”-because when you write it 
down  you  just  can’t  remember  ever  having  seen  those  letters  in  that  order 
before…?”(41) They  have  lost  their  connections  with the meaning or  signification 
beyond  the  words,  or  even  with  their  shapes.  Like  reality,  language  has  lost  its 
denotative references and is just used to help the characters cop with their playful 
situation.  
Since they are confined to the borders of their textual fate, language controls 
their  freedom  too.  Stoppard  uses  deflation  to  fight  against  the  certainties  of  the 
metatext  of  Hamlet  and  discredit  its  control.  We  can  see  it  in  their  contradictory 
dialogues  or  different  languages  that  they  speak.  As  modern  men  they  use  the 
language of ordinary people, but when they enter Shakespeare’s text, confronting 
Hamlet, Cladius, or other courtiers, they should use the archaic, poetic language of 
Shakespeare.  The  perplexity  and  frustration  that  language,  both  as  a  means  of 
communication and as a controlling agent, creates in them is one of the main themes 
of the play. On one hand, they do not have any other device except language to 
communicate or to explain the phenomena in their environment; on the other hand, it 
hinders them from expressing themselves. Consequently, they start playing with it by 
repetition,  self-referentiality,  or  fragmentation.  “The  system  of  language”,  asserts 
Derrida  (1977),  “associated  with  phonetic-alphabetic  writing  is  that  within  which 111 
logocentric  metaphysics,  determining  the  sense  of  being  as  presence,  has  been 
produced…”(qtd. in Christopher Norris: 43) This sense of being, this presence, is 
disturbed in the world of Ros and Guil by stoppard’s intentional literariness. In his 
text,  performativity  tries  to  dissolve  the  dominancy  of  language  and  text,  making 
language an instable system devoid of any logical pattern.  
Furthermore the play explicitly discusses different views of art and literature. 
Self-reflexivity,  theatricality,  active  role  playing  of  the  audience,  and  the 
interchangeable  roles  of  spectators  and  actors  in  this  play  are  part  of  the 
metatheatrical discourse and a vehicle of intermedial and intercultural transformation. 
This challenging approach, with its underlying assertion on the role of play as a key 
feature  of  human  creativity,  suggests  that  metadrama  can  be a  subject for many 
intersecting scholarly discourses.  112 
 
Chapter 5   
 
 
Beyond Representation: The Real Inspector Hound 
 
 
Derrida believes that the element of presence is absent in performance because 
it fails to represent the logos of presence, which is aimed in a dramatic text. In other 
words  performance  always  remains  in  the  level  of  representation.  In  The  Real 
Inspector  Hound,  Stoppard  breaks  the  boundaries  of  presence/absence, 
subject/object  and  actor/spectator  in  a  farce  of  the  genre  whodunit  to  realize 
Derrida’s deconstructive aspirations. He puts forward the same ontological questions 
about the world that the stage characters inhabit and about the boundary between 
reality and performance as Derrida does. The possibility of cognition, the ontological 
status of reality, the adequacy of language as a means for describing experiences, 
the boundaries of subjectivity, the plurality of the self , and the nature of performance 
are  all  issues  with  which  Stoppard,  like  Derrida,  engages  himself.  He  breaks  the 
double dichotomy of Illusion/reality in life/art through a hybrid performance beyond 
the  boundaries  of  mimetic  theories  of  theater.  From  the  first  scene  of  The  Real 
Inspector  Hound  the  spectators  are  forced  to  quit  their  customary  treatment  of 
performance and their position in it. The mirror, which projects their image on the 
stage, changes their status from passive consumers to active participants and the 113 
scenes  that  follow  deprive  them  of  the  habitual  modes  of  perception.  The  two 
sophisticated spectators of the whodunit in the play, or the two critics, are perplexed 
encountering a play that starts with a pause and announces the stage direction on 
the phone. The audience, confronted with the interchanging role playing and mixing 
identities, experience the same perplexity. They begin to ask themselves if they are 
really percipient “knowing subjects”, discerning an “object” named theater or they are 
involved in an ingenious game. To be a knowing subject, one requires to observe 
and  to  be  aware  that  he  is  observing.  If  one  is  not  sure,  like  the  Chinese 
philosopher(R&GAD), if he is observing or being observed, he will be overwhelmed 
with confusion. 
The interchangeability of subject and object, the merging of real and symbolic, 
and  the  simultaneity  of  presence  and  absence  help  Stoppard  deconstruct  the 
audience’s  sense  of  perception  in  The  Real  Inspector  Hound.  Stoppard’s  non-
traditional and anti-narrative  style  proves  to  defy  the  logocentric  aspiration  of  the 
spectators  who  are  looking  for  conceptions.  Haney  II  believes  that,  “W hile  the 
experience of the sublime is often associated with the grandeur of sayable qualities, 
to  comprehend  the  unsayable  involves  shifting  our  attention  from  conceptuality 
toward the direct experience of non-thought…” (2006: vii). The first stage direction of 
the play manifests Stoppard’s tendency towards this kind of experience: 
 
The  first  thing  is  that  the  audience  appear  to  be 
confronted by their own reflection in a huge mirror. 
Impossible. However, back there in the gloom- not at 
the  footlights-a  bank  of  plush  seats  and  pale 
smudges  of  faces.  (the  total  effect  having  been 
established, it can be progressively faded out as the 114 
play goes on, until the front row remains to remind 
us  of the rest and then, finally, merely two seats in 
that  row-one  of  which  is  now  occupied  by  moon. 
Between moon and the auditorium is an acting area 
which  represents,  in  as  realistic  an  idiom  as 
possible,  the  drawing  room  of  Muldoon  manor 
(Stoppard, 1996: 4). 
 
The word “impossible” at the end of the first sentence shows Stoppard’s awareness 
of the way that the audience may react. He intentionally distorts the audience’s sense 
of order. The opening bizarre spectacle, like the opening scene of After Magritte, 
plays with the logocentric tendency of the audience to interpret and creates false 
expectations  in  them.  The  spectators,  as  Haney  suggests,  “Find  their  attention 
moving from meaning to non-meaning, thought to non-thought, contingency to non-
contingency  representing  two  types  of  intersubjectivity,  as  reflected  in  the  play’s 
bifocal mirror” (35).The primary emphasis on the authenticity of the experience is 
followed by the entering of the audience of the first play into the scenes of the second 
one  to  be  killed  there,  which  strikes  the  audience  with  its  implausibility  and  its 
fantastic  qualities.  In  spite  of  the  pretended  reality,  this  entrance  seems  extreme 
improbable and theatrical. The spectator would surely say, “Impossible,” because the 
cultural external reality, which is the basis for their interpretation, is invalidated here. 
The mixture of different levels of reality not only happens in intra-theatrical fiction, but 
also in the extra-theatrical reality because the audience in this play plays different 
roles  of  actors  and  characters.  The  primary  engagement  of  the  audience  in  the 
performance, which gives place to pure witnessing, discards the connectedness of 
meaning  and  consciousness.  Both  the  interchangeability  of  roles  and  the 
improbability  of  action  create  a  kind  of  detaching,  non-interpretive  mode  for  the 115 
audience. Indeed, the participants start with the desire for interpreting (the two critics 
as  well  as  the audience  of the first  play),  but as  the  boundaries  of  absence and 
presence  disappear,  the  cultural  exterior,  which  is  the  basis  for  their  interpretive 
frameworks, loses its control over them. In his metadramatic experience, Stoppard 
removes the context of one play or mix it with another so that the interpretive devices 
lose their validity. Clear-cut judgments prove to be individual interpretations, which in 
the case of two critics are based on personal benefits as well.  
The primary denial of the illusion and the emphasis on the authenticity of the 
play,  presented  to  the  audience  by  showing  their  reflections  on  the  stage,  is 
destroyed in the course of the play, emphasizing the illusory nature of theater. The 
first impression of the spectators that they are part of the play they discern, or the 
feeling that they are going to participate in the events of the play, is disturbed as they 
fade  from  the  scene  and  leave  the  fictive  audience(Moon and Birdboot)  there to 
continue viewing the second play and playing in the first one. This shift from the role-
player to the audience will also happen later to the actors of the whodunit-within-the 
play. Two of them, Simon and inspector Hound, leave the structure of whodunit to 
enter the other play as audience, demonstrating that the body of the actors can take 
different shapes. The playwright also appears on the stage by announcing the stage 
direction  through  the  mouth  of  a  minor  character.  This  interaction  of  characters, 
playwright  and  spectators  makes  the  distinction  between  fiction  and  non-fiction 
difficult. Schwanitz believes that,  “The audience is led to doubt its own faculty of 
distinguishing between levels of reality and frames of reference” (140). The habitual 
categorization, which functions as a basis for reference, disappears in this play and 
causes the spectators to lose their sense of reality. In the very act of realizing the 
fiction, the audience is robbed of its touch with reality. They start questioning the 116 
nature of reality and the relation between the observed objects and familiar frames of 
language which used to help them interpret the events, theatrical or actual. 
The fictional audience of the play, Moon and Birdboot, who are being observed 
in  the  very  process  of  observing,  give  the  impression  that  the  audience  is  also 
engaged in role playing in a greater design; it is engaged in a double act of observing 
and being observed or double role of knowing subject and ignorant object. The two 
critics  who,  like  the  audience,  are  present  in  the  play  and  absent  from  it,  must 
interpret and evaluate a whodunit, a version of Agatha Christie’s Mousetrap. In their 
restless waiting for the beginning of the performance, they realize with frustration, 
that the play has already begun with a pause. They are not there to observe or to 
give detailed comments because they already have a formulated interpretation and 
want to adjust the play to its frame:  
Birdboot: Underneath?!? It’s a whodunit, man!- Look at it! 
(They look at it. The room. The BODY. Silence.)  
Has it started yet? 
Moon: Yes (7) 
 
The  whole  scene  gives  the  impression  that  they  are  supposed  to  watch  a  play, 
categorized under the genre of whodunit or thriller. They even have a predetermined 
criticism, based on the cultural subjectivity outside the performance. Birdboot openly 
declares that he and his fellow critics “had a meeting in the bar and decided it’s a 
first-class family entertainment” (6). They get the first disturbance in their interpretive 
undertaking with the unconventional beginning to which Birdboot reacts immediately: 
“You can’t start with a pause! If you want my opinion there’s total panic back there” 
(Stoppard, 7).  The  gap  in  their  perception  widens  during  the  performance  as  the 
mystery of the play becomes the mystery of their own life. Using a familiar genre of 117 
detective  stories  and  creating  a  plot  that  does  not  fit  in  the  signification  system, 
Stoppard obstacles the way of familiar modes of perception or easy interpretation. 
The  two  critics,  who  are  supposed  to  find  meaning  and  solve  the  mystery  of 
interpretation, prove to be the mysterious figures devoured by the performance. The 
play demonstrates how critics try to give a shape to a performance, interpreting it with 
their fantasy or evaluating it to their own benefit. The pre-interpretive cultural-based 
subjectivity, which is parodied by Stoppard as “the public voice” or “critic voice” (15), 
affects both critics and spectators. This critical voice, which both the critics and the 
audience  use  to  sustain  “the  pronouncement of opinion” or to  give  shape  to  the 
ideas, as Stoppard demonstrates, is like language arbitrary in nature and has nothing 
to do with reality.  
Besides, Birdboot/Simon and Moon/Inspector Hound parallel beings, which take 
form in two different levels of fictionality for the audience, suggest that the looking 
subject can transform the observed object. The mechanism that works between them 
also proposes that the subject can be reformed by its relations to the object. From 
this view, critics’ interpretations can change the objects of their observation due to 
the  relation  they  have  to  them.  Birdboot,  for  instance,  explicitly  ask  for  Moon’s 
complicity in bringing fame to Cynthia, one of the actresses in the whodunit, because 
he has a love affair with her. Language is his assistance in this reality-making: “I don’t 
put  words  into  your  mouth  but  a  word  from  us  and  we  could  make her”  (9).  His 
criticism is not a search for truth or meaning; it is a manipulation of truth and order. In 
portraying  the  partiality  of  the  two  critics  and  lack  of  objectivity  in  their  criticism, 
Stoppard  demonstrates  how  subjective  any  extraction  of  reality  from  a  text  or  a 
performance can be. Both Moon and Birdboot are deeply obsessed with their own 
desires and replicate them on the object of their observation. Moon, as a second rate 118 
critic, desires to get rid of his rival Higgs; therefore the symbolic order of the whodunit 
becomes a place for the fulfillment of his hidden desire for killing Higgs. Birdboot’s 
criticism also derives strongly from his sexual tendencies and is everything except an 
objective commentary on the play. His object of admiration, which has changed from 
Felicity to Cynthia, is the basis of his theatrical judgment in the symbolic order of 
Stoppard’s play. He is permanently thinking about the means of bringing fame  to 
Cynthia and seducing her by his criticism. 
Because  of  their  disparate  standpoints,  the  dialogs  between  the  two  critics 
sound totally absurd. Each of them follows his own line of thought and does not react 
or even listen to the other side. Consequently, language becomes dysfunctional in 
their interaction and loses its vocation to convey meaning. In the following dialog, for 
instance, the characters are so obsessed with their own personal engagements that 
they never come to a point of understanding each other: 
 
Birboot: Do you believe in love in the first sight? 
Moon: It’s not that I think I am a better critic- 
Birdboot: I feel my whole life changing- 
Moon: I am but it’s not that. 
Birdboot: Oh, the world will laugh at me, I know…. 
 
Their realities deviate from each other and become totally subjective. What we hear 
is actually two parallel monologs, which do not even overlap each other. Their dialog 
lacks the features of a real conversation. In Stoppard’s plays as Uchman suggests: 
 
The physical reality is tinted by subjective, personal 
elements.  It  is  something  different  to  individual 
people.  On  the  other  hand,  while  providing  a 119 
description of it, the people try to interpret it, to find a 
logical  explanation  of  the  seemingly  absurd 
elements.  In  doing  so,  they  make  use  of  their 
individual,  subjective  impressions  and  employ 
language as a means of describing it (97). 
 
This  irrelevancy  of  language  is  accompanied  by  an  absence  of  logic. 
Characters’  faulty  way  of  reasoning  makes  the  conversation  hilariously  funny. 
Stoppard  creates  a  pastiche  out  of  their  seemingly  serious  engagements.  The 
fruitless  endeavor  to  interpret  the  object  of  observation  in  After  Magritte  turns  to 
reality-making in The Real Inspector Hound. In this creation of reality, however, the 
interpreters become the victim of their own imagination. By entering the structure of 
the whodunit, the two critics change their identity from inspectors or interpreters to 
the victims of the jealousy of other dreamers. In the new structure they lose their pre-
interpretive awareness and the discordance of their thoughts, emotions, and actions 
cause them to appear farcical. This movement from meaning to non-meaning, which 
happens on two levels, breaks the expected order of both plays. The critics, who 
have  a  seemingly  sound  judgment  as  subjects  in  one  play,  lose  the  analytical 
frameworks of thought in the thriller and begin to defend themselves as observed 
objects. This dual identity, which sums up subject and object, self and other, mind 
and body, dismantles the established metaphysical thought, which interprets reality, 
self, and identity in terms of binary oppositions. Stoppard breaks the centredness that 
both  critics  and  audience  desire  and  put  them  in  a  signification  system  which 
deprives them of the security of binary thinking or rational solutions. 
The search for a rational solution in whodunit, which is an inseparable aspect of 
this genre, is reversed in Stoppard’s play. The incorporation of the fictional audience 120 
of  the  first  play  into  the  structure  of  the  second  play  creates  a  breach  in  the 
signification system and blocks the logical solution. The logocentric assumption in 
this genre is that a logical explanation exists and should be acquired. The logical 
explanation that Puckeridge, the third rate critic, has killed Higgs, the first rate critic, 
and goes on to kill the second rate critics Moon and Birdboot to clear his way,  is 
acceptable in itself. Nonetheless, the way that this solution is related to the fictional 
structure of the thriller and the coincidental merging of fictional and real makes the 
dénouement implausible and illogical. This anti-Aristotelian implausibility is intensified 
as the critics, who have left their seats to take the roles of victims or murderers on the 
stage,  are  criticized  by  the  characters,  who  are  occupying  their  chairs  of  critics. 
Evaluating  the  play  as  not  having  “pace,  point,  focus,  interest,  drama,  wit  or 
originality”  (40),  the  character/actors of  the  detective  story  take a  new  identity  as 
observing subjects.  
Although the death of the critics on the stage is considered as a new game of 
the playwright (of the first play) to mislead the audience, the critics’ interference in the 
structure of whodunit destroys the sovereignty of the author in it. The complexity of 
the metadramatic techniques in this play not only disrupts the continuity of narrative 
but also the referentiality of language. Consequently, the hermeneutic tendency in 
the audience to interpret is confronted with a deadlock. The predesigned perception 
assumes that the chaos comes to order and the mystery is solved in a meaningful 
denouement. As Birdboot formulates it: 
 
It is at this point that the play for me comes alive. 
The groundwork has been well and truly laid and the 
author  has  taken  the  trouble  to  learn  from  the 
masters  of  the  genre.  He  has  created  a  real 121 
situation, and few will doubt his ability to resolve it 
with a startling denouement. Certainly that is what it 
so far lacks, but it has a beginning, a middle and I 
have no doubt it will prove to have an end(31). 
 
But the play proves to be just the opposite; the “clean show,” which Birdboot admires, 
turns to a chaotic mess, which swallows the two critics as its victims. In this play the 
clarity and order of the beginning ends in a confused resolution. 
Ironically the chaos is created first as the two critics enter the structure of the 
whodunit.  By  involving  themselves  in the plot,  they  reverse  the  logical  order  and 
make the situation more confused and complicated. Like “the catalystic figure” or “the 
outsider,” whom Moon blames for the chaos created in the structure of whodunit, the 
two  critics  plunge  “through  to  the  center  of  an  ordered  world”  and  set  up  “the 
disruptions”(Stoppard,15).  “The  shock  waves”  as  Moon  asserts,  “will  strip  these 
comfortable people- these crustaceans in the rock pool of society” (15), expose them 
to a void of conception and deprives them from logocentric interpretations. Hence the 
contact  between  the  audience  and  the  text  is  blocked  and  the  playwright’s 
delogocentric  desire  is  fulfilled.  The  finite  system  of  signification,  which  both  the 
audience and the critics explore, dissolves in non-meaning and non-signification. 
The signification system is also distorted by the different roles played by one 
character and the movement between different levels of reality or fictionality.  The 
incompatibility of the unfamiliar theatrical or linguistic conventions with the audience’s 
normative frame of reference creates the deconstructive effect that Stoppard aspires. 
In R&GAD the two characters just move between real and symbolic worlds or past 
and present and keep their names. In RIH, however, the characters take different 
identities and different names. Birdboot plays the roles of Simon and Birdboot at the 122 
same time; Moon appears as Inspector Hound; and worse of all, Puckeridge takes 
the roles of Magnus, Mc Coy, Albert and himself. “Self” and “other” are so interwoven 
in the two plays that sometimes a dialog of one identity is followed by the words of 
the other. Even Moon, who is reluctant to participate in this new-identity game and 
warns Birdboot to leave the fictional realm and get back to the real one, takes his 
fictional role after recognizing the dead body as Higgs’. Lest his  hidden desire for 
removing  Higgs  from  his  way  is  revealed,  he  announces,  as  the  Real  Inspector 
Hound, that he is in “a position to reveal the mystery” (42). Instead of revealing the 
mystery, however, he hides the truth by declaring the corpse to be McCoy. Truth, as 
Magnus complains, becomes just a set of words, those of Moon, who in the double 
role of critic/inspector tries to shape it the way he desires: 
 
Magnus: We only have your word for that, Inspector. 
We  only  have  your  word  for  a  lot  of  things.  For 
instance-McCoy. Who is he? Is his name McCoy? Is 
there any truth in that fantastic and implausible tale 
inflicted in the Canadian street? (43) 
 
The arbitrariness of the relation between reality and language, stressed in this 
dialog, is also displayed in the instability of the names. One signifier (the given name 
of a person) is shared by different signifieds and makes the identification in a definite 
system impossible. Since signification can work only through difference or putting 
each signifier in its linguistic context, the different levels of fictionality in  this play 
hinder the text from falling in a given context. “Categories”, as Schwanitz asserts, 
“are not only the instruments of analysis but- much more importantly- they also form 
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breach in the audience’s mental composition. The very name of the Real Inspector 
Hound proves to be the most unreal identification system in the play, emphasizing 
that the names are just arbitrary attributions and cannot carry specific identities or 
meaning. Every stable system of signs is supported by social codes and structures. 
By undermining these codes, Stoppard’s creates unsteadiness between signs and 
the things they name and destabilizes the sign system.  
The destabilization of the signification system and the deconstruction of text and 
performance  are  also  caused  by  implausibility.  The  unobserved  corpse,  which 
questions the trustworthiness of observation, the characters, whose mobile identity 
makes  them  unnamable,  and  the  fusion  of  the  audience  with  the  actors,  which 
disturbs  the  borders  of  self  and  other,  render  Stoppard’s  play  a  deconstructive 
nature.  Stoppard  takes  the  familiar  cognitive  structures  from  the  spectators  and 
drives them to a non-cognitive void.  
Critic’s superficial search for philosophical interpretations in the structure of a 
thriller is parodied in the farcical treatment of these characters. Moon, affirming that 
the  whodunit  “aligns  itself  uncompromisingly  on  the  side  of  life,”  criticizes  the 
inadequacy of the presence of Descartes’s dictum “Cogito ergo sum” in the thriller: 
Moon: Je suis, it seems to be saying, ergo sum. But is that enough? I think we 
are entitled to ask- and here we are concerned with what I have referred to 
elsewhere as the nature of identity…I think we are entitled to ask – Where is 
God?(25)  
 
Stoppard’s parody is targeting the intellectual efforts to over-interpret a work of art. 
Even Birdboot is stunned by such an interpretive expectation and asks perplexedly, 
“Who?”(25)  Moon’s  effort  to  relate  a  sophisticated  philosophical  issue,  like  the 
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inspiring idea, to an entertaining detective story is ridiculed here. The critics’ desire to 
impose meaning on a text from outside or from a cultural context irrelevant to the 
narrative of the play is the source of a pastiche for Stoppard. The irrelevancy of such 
discussion to the performed melodrama is extreme farcical. Moon, however, insists 
on giving an intellectual touch to the whodunit: 
 
Moon: If we examine this more closely, and I think close examination is the 
least tribute that this play deserves, I think we will find that within the austere 
framework of what is seen to be on one level a country-house week-end, and 
what a useful symbol that is, the author has given us- yes I will go so far- has 
given us the human condition. 
 
This  bombastic  interpretation  and  Moon’s  ludicrous  endeavor  to  over-interpret  a 
cheap  melodrama  becomes  the  target  of  Stoppard’s  mockery.  He,  like  Derrida, 
questions  the  interference  of  predetermined  cultural  or  linguistic  structures  in  the 
process of cognition or extraction of meaning. “To search for a meaning in drama,” 
proposes Rothstein, “in order to explain the rules by which the dramatist plays may 
contradict the nature of drama itself as Stoppard thinks of it” (130). Rothstein believes 
that  for  Stoppard  theater  is  just  a game and should  be  treated  like  a  game  too. 
Although in every game there are some rules that should be followed, they are just 
valid for that particular game; they do not have any meaning or universal suggestion. 
Stoppard insists in his plays that reality and meaning are irrelevant to theater. This 
irrelevancy  can  be  observed  in  the  free  movement  of  the  characters  between 
different worlds of real and fictional in The Real Inspector Hound.  
Game  playing  is  also  interwoven  in  the  structure  of  Stoppard’s  plays.  In 
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throughout the play:  Tennis,  card  playing,  solving  riddles,  role  playing  and  finally 
language games: 
Cynthia: Simon? 
Birboot: And I call yours bluff! 
Cynthia (imperturbably): I meld. 
Felicity: I huff 
Magnus: I ruff 
Birdboot: I Bluff. 
Cynthia: Twist. 
Felicity: Bust 
Magnus: Check. 
Birdboot: Snap  
 
This wordplay, which is a part of the game, stresses the irrelevancy of the words to 
reality. Each word acquires a new signification in the structure of the game; so does 
the narrative in the structure of language. Haney II believes that, “Liminal interiority in 
theater involves a void of conceptions shared by performer and spectator” (8). He 
attributes this void to “the gap between words and thoughts, in the background of all 
language and ideas as a silent beyond-ness, and immanently within knowledge as its 
generative condition of unknowingness”  (8). In other words, every play should be 
perceived  within  a  series  of  rules  that  the  playwright  sets.  In  Rothstein’s  view, 
Stoppard  changes  the  conventional  expectations from  an  audience. He maintains 
that, “An audience obeys certain rules. It sits in pre-determined seats and remains 
seated throughout the performance, saving intermissions.”(1979:174) The spectators 
in Stoppard’s play- the two critics- are restless throughout the play. They talk, they 
comment  on  the  play, they  object  to  the rule-breakings,  and they  interfere  in  the 
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theater,  Stoppard  demands  his  audience  to  notice  their  casual  process  of 
interpretation. 
The progression of the play, as in  After  Magritte, proves to demonstrate the 
unreliability of perception and its exposure to different other factors. The audience is 
subject to the epistemological questions about the way it can acquire knowledge and 
the extent of trustworthiness of this knowledge. Jernigan believes that, “A thoroughly 
postmodern work would simultaneously raise ontological questions about the nature 
of the past and epistemological questions about how we are to know the past, all the 
while remaining incredulous about that past’s grand meta-narrative” (2001:148). In 
Jernigan’s  view,  Stoppard  raises many  epistemological  questions,  but finds finally 
answers for them; therefore he does not categorize Stoppard as a postmodern writer. 
He differentiates between the anti-realism of Stoppard and that of Caryl Churchill and 
maintains that instead of “encouraging his  audience to leave with widely different 
perspectives, Stoppard strives to instill homogeneity of thought” (2001:66). I think, 
anti-representational narrative form, the infusion of fiction and reality, the disruption of 
the  coherent  narrative,  and  logical  impossibility  are  the  characteristics  that  make 
Stoppard’s dramatic works delogocentric. By destroying the illusion of absolute space 
and  time,  he  establishes  a  kind  of  relativity  in  his  plays,  which  is  postmodern  in 
nature. The Real Inspector Hound, for instance, as Brassell mentions, “Demonstrates 
the unreality of all acting, and invites the audience to consider whether, in terms of 
another  focus  beyond  their  perception,  they  too  are  no  more  than  actors  in  a 
play”(101). Furthermore, by incorporating the two critics in the world of the detective 
fiction, he destroys the consistency of conventional time and space and creates his 
own conventions for the game he has devised. The characters enter their dreams, 
where they can fulfill their desires. Birdboot takes the role of Simon,Cynthia’s lover, 127 
and Moon, who is afraid of being accused of killing his rival Higgs, takes the role of 
the Inspector, ostensibly to discover the truth, really to hide it a long as possible. In 
answering Magnus’ question about the identity of the body, Moon answers: “I don’t 
know. Quite unlike anyone I’ve ever met. (Long Pause.) Well…now…” (41) The long 
pause,  which  is  indicative  of  his  hesitation  and  confusion,  helps  him  incorporate 
himself in his new role. Being afraid of revealing his hidden desires to kill Higgs, he 
intentionally hides the identity of the corpse. His invented story about the encounter 
of Simon and McCoy in Canada is a fictional mixture of the different narratives and 
has nothing to do with the truth he claims to have just learned. Stoppard deconstructs 
the genre of detective stories by replacing the detective role as the discoverer of the 
truths  by  an  anti-  detective  game  player.  The  spectator/critic  takes  the  role  of  a 
playwright, trying to manipulate the plot for achieving a logical dénouement. Stoppard 
suggests that, the inspector/critics not only impose the cultural/linguistic context on 
the events they are observing, but also create the truths the way they like.  
Whodunit,  an  established  genre  of  the  twentieth  century,  emphasizes  the 
solvability  of  the mysteries  by  appealing  to  the  reason. Taking for  granted  that a 
discoverable truth and a logical order exist and can be restored, the detective story 
aims  at  finding  the  truth  and  restoring  the  order.  In  The  Real  Inspector  Hound, 
however, the existing elements deliberately negate the fundamental purposes of the 
genre. The coherent narrative discourse and plot is distorted; the Apollonian control 
is replaced by Dionysian disorder; the ability of language to refer truthfully to the 
world  is  denied;  the  dramatic  representation  is  replaced  by  metadramatic  self-
referentiality;  the  teleological  conception  of  art  is  parodied;  and  finally  the  strict 
classical  structure,  comprising  of  beginning,  middle  and  end,  is  defied.  The 
metadramatic  and  ironic  features  of  postmodernist  art  take  the  place  of  the 128 
narrative’s  logical  sequence  and  serious  undertakings.  In  the  disjointed  world  of 
Stoppard’s  play,  the  fragments  function  by  the  law  of  random  events  and 
unpredictable possibilities. Birdboot, who accidentally answers the telephone on the 
stage, is involved in the plot and incorporates the chaos into the orderly-designed 
plot of the whodunit. The linear progression of the plot is disrupted and the narrative 
is  disintegrated  into  fragments. The  absence  of  an  organizing  center  (desired  by 
Birdboot) or a divine truth (desired by Moon) leads to a pagan multitude of meaning. 
Complexity makes the accessibility of a unique solution improbable. Furthermore, the 
repetition of performance, especially in the scenes followed by the entrance of the 
two  critics  in  the  plot  of  the  detective  story,  subverts  the  representational 
expectations  of  the  realistic  drama  and  emphasizes  the  freedom  for  endless 
possibilities  and  combinations.  Stoppard  invites  his  audience  to  overcome  their 
interpretive desires and stop searching for the patterns ruling the endless interplay of 
disparate events. He challenges our quest for fixing the meaning by rationalizing and 
asserts  that,  “the  speculative  unity  of  knowledge”  (Lyotard)  is  denied  to  us.  By 
presenting  something  beyond  the  control  of  playwright,  characters,  or  audience, 
something  that  destroys  the  neat  ordering  of  cause  and  effect,  Stoppard  causes 
disruption in the mind of controlling subjects As Haney maintains:  
 
Instead  of  emphasis  on  epistemology,  so 
characteristics for  detective  fiction,  Stoppard’s  play 
focuses more openly on the ontological dilemmas of 
the  logic  governing  his  projected  worlds.  Thus  the 
function of the visually powerful set opening the play 
is to puzzle the audience and to facilitate their visual 
and  verbal  apprehension  of  the  generative 129 
mechanisms  resting  on  the  alternatively  employed 
parody and defamiliarisation”(146). 130 
 
Chapter 6   
 
 
Playing with Wittgenstein: Stoppard’s Dogg’s Hamlet and Cahoot’s 
Macbeth 
 
 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein suggests that language becomes 
meaningful just within given cultural contexts. In other words the meaning of a word is 
determined by the context in which it is used. Then, he proceeds to examine the 
different  ways  of  language  acquirement  by  individuals  and  the  reason  of 
misunderstandings in communicating by language. For this purpose, he depicts a 
builder and his assistant during the construction of a building. There are a limited 
number of words they need to communicate, namely the names of the material they 
use. They employ a language consisting of the following words: block, pillar, slab, 
and beam. Wittgenstein calls this a “primitive language.”Then, he imagines a society 
in which the only language system is this. The adults teach the children to use this 
language by pointing to the objects they name. This ostensive teaching (hinweisende 
Lehren) establishes “an association between the word and the thing” (Wittgenstein 
4e).  He  concludes  later  that  this  kind  of  teaching  has  nothing  to  do  with 
understanding of a word because “with different training the same ostensive teaching 
of  these  words  would  have  affected  a  different  understanding”  (5e).  He  calls  the 131 
different processes of naming objects or communicating ideas “language games”: “I 
will  call  these  games  language  games  and  will  sometimes  speak  of  a  primitive 
language as a language game” (5e).  
Looking from this perspective, a word makes sense only within the language 
game in which it is used. Therefore, in his view, reviewing philosophical problems in 
terms  of  words  is  often  problematic  because  words  have  different  functions  in 
different  language  games.  The  difference  remains  unnoticeable  by  the  individual 
because the symbols, letters, or phonemes that represent a word remain the same. 
The source of perplexity is the dependence of the meaning on the context in which it 
is used and the multiplicity of the contexts or the language games in which the words 
are employed. Because of the multi-functionality of words, neither presence nor the 
fixed nature of the written texts can stabilize the meaning. Thus, labeling things or 
naming them is just a kind of preparation for involving in a game. By giving names to 
objects, we are not rendering them a fixed or true meaning; we set conventions to 
play  on.  Truth,  therefore,  is  a  concept  from  the  language  game  of  logic,  and  is 
inapplicable to our everyday reality; its meaning for the logical philosopher radically 
differs in other contexts. In other words, signification system is not a stable one and 
can change from one game to another game. 
A  narrative,  which  is  also  a  signification  system,  suffers  from  the  same 
instability. Every narrative is a game with some rules, which should be discovered to 
become comprehensible. The application of words in this system does not facilitate 
interpretation because the writer’s encoding strategies do not always correspond to 
the reader’s decoding methods. Like all other games we do not need to understand a 
literary  game;  we  should  engage  ourselves  in  its  course.  Dogg's  Hamlet  and 
Cahoot’s  Macbeth are  two  also  two  literary  games,  which  aim at  entertaining  the 132 
audience.  Dogg's  Hamlet  is  based  fundamentally  on  a  part  of  Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations in which the process of ostensive learning is depicted. In 
this  section  a  group  of  construction  workers  are  shown  building  a  platform  by 
throwing different pieces of wood in a line. Stoppard describes it in the preface as 
following: 
 
An  observer  notes  that  each  time  the  first  man 
shouts 'Plank!' he is thrown a long flat piece. Then 
he calls 'Slab!' and is thrown a piece of a different 
shape. This happens a few times. There is a call for 
'Block!' and a third shape is thrown. Finally a call for 
'Cube!' produces a fourth type of piece. An observer 
would  probably  conclude  that  the  different  words 
described different shapes and sizes of the material. 
But  this  is  not  the  only  possible  interpretation 
(Stoppard, 1980). 
 
Stoppard’s depiction of this scene in Dogg's Hamlet emphasizes the possibility of 
different interpretations.  
The play begins with a game of catch between two schoolboys performed in 
Dogg language, a language consisting of English words with new meanings. Abel, for 
instance, tests a microphone by counting, “sun, dock, and trog,” instead of one, two, 
and three. The game continues introducing new players, like the schoolmaster Mr 
Dogg, who speaks the same language. The complication begins as Easy, the truck 
driver, enters the scene carrying the material for building the theater platform. His 
common English greeting offends the headmaster because in Dogg’s language it is 
an insult. On the other hand, Easy, who cannot understand any of their words, reacts 133 
confusedly to the manipulated English they speak. The two different games they play 
block  their  contact.  By  showing  a  diagram  of  the  platform,  Easy  succeeds  in 
communicating with Dogg. Then, Dogg positions the boys and the truck driver in a 
line to carry the lumber from the truck to the stage, where the platform is arranged to 
be built. When he calls, "plank", which means "ready" in Dogg language, the first 
piece of lumber is passed down the line. Since it is a plank, Easy thinks that he has 
understood what is going on and he also calls out, "plank." Confusion is first aroused 
when  after  the  first  few  planks,  lumber  in  the  shape  of  blocks,  cubes,  and  slabs 
come. After constructing the platform, some letters appear on the blocks that say 
“maths old egg.” Seeing this phrase, Mr. Dogg gets angry and knocks Easy through 
the wall. The driver is compelled to reconstruct the wall, which this time displays the 
phrase  “Meg  Shot  Glad.”  Easy  is  again  knocked  through  the  wall.  The  second 
reconstruction of the wall is ostensibly successful and the ceremony begins by giving 
different awards to a student named Fox by Mr. Dogg. Then, Mrs. Dogg announces 
that it is time for William Shakespeare's Hamlet. When all three exit the stage, the 
Lady, who was helping the headmaster by awarding the trophies, is clearly shocked 
that the wall now reads GOD SLAG THEM. Mr. Dogg looks angrily at Easy and he 
readily hurls himself through the wall. Easy learns Dogg language in the course of 
building the platform and starts speaking it. During the rebuilding of the wall for the 
last time, Easy and the school boys exchange some insults about Mr. Dogg. With the 
appearance  of  the  words  “Dogg’s  Hamlet”  on  the  wall,  Easy  announces  the 
beginning of the play, a confusing version of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Mrs. Dogg and 
the students are the actors and Dogg’s favorite student, Fox Major, plays the role of 
Hamlet. The version is so condensed that it turns to be more comical than tragic. 
Although the play is performed in English, the English of Shakespeare’s play has a 
performative function for them; they cannot communicate by it. Upon the conclusion 134 
of the play, Easy begins deconstructing the stage by carrying a cube away, thanking 
the audience in Dogg language using the word “cube.” Whether he has learned the 
language or he is referring to the cube he is carrying away remains ambiguous.  
In the introduction to the play, Stoppard asserts that, in the case of ostensive 
learning(Wittgenstein  construction  builders  or  Stoppard’s  stage  builders),  “the 
observer could have made a false assumption, but the fact that he on the one hand 
and the builders on the other are using two different languages need not be apparent 
to either party”(1993: 142). As long as they do not consider the difference between 
languages and the language makes sense, they can communicate. “This happy state 
of affairs,” as Stoppard suggests, “would of course continue only as long as, through 
sheer co-incidence, each man’s utterance made sense(even if not the same sense) 
to the other”(142). However,  the undecideability of meaning, which is the result of 
different  language  games  that  different  parties  play,  is  the  source  of  comical 
misunderstandings.  The  best  example  is  the  story  that  “Easy  with  considerable 
gusto,” relates and “falls flat being, of course, not understood” (142). Even radio, 
which is supposed to have a standardized language, is incomprehensible for Easy. 
His question, “What wavelength are you on?” shows the degree of his irritation with 
language. It seems that he is in a wonderland where his realities have turned to 
dreams. He finally dares asking Dogg, “What’s your game?”(158) He answers “cube,” 
and goes away. All Easy’s efforts for understanding these people or making them 
understand him remain ineffective.  
The estrangement of English language happens not only in the dialogs of the 
headmaster  and  the  schoolboys  but  also  in  the  prologue  of  Dogg’s  Hamlet, 
performed by Shakespeare: 
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For this relief, much thanks. 
Though I am native here, and to the manner born, 
It is a custom more honoured in the breach 
Than in the observance 
Well. 
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark. 
To be, or not to be, that is the question. 
There are more things in heaven and earth 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy- 
There is a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Though this be madness, yet there is method in it. 
I must be cruel only to be kind; 
Hold, as t’were, the mirror up to the nature. 
A countenance more in sorrow than in anger. 
(The lady in audience shouts “Marmalade”) 
The lady doth protest too much. 
Cat will mew, and Dogg will have his day! 
 
Shakespeare’s prologue, whose chaotic structure resembles Lucky’s speech, is an 
amalgam of famous quotations of Hamlet, which, being put together randomly, are 
evacuated from their established meaning. As Stoppard’s Shakespeare affirms, the 
custom  of  theater  is  more  honored  in  the  breach  than  in  observance.  The  self-
referentiality of the monolog, which discusses the state of theater, turns to nonsense 
about cat and Dogg as it progresses. The Shakespeare of the play even accuses a 
lady in the audience of protesting too much. He comically warns the philosophers like 
Wittgenstein who search for clarity that, “There are more things in heaven and earth 
than are dreamt in your philosophy.” Both Lucky and Stoppard’s Shakespeare mock 
logical philosophy, which aims at interpreting the existence within the realm of logic. 
Shakespeare even admires the “madness” of literary games. The postmodern artist 
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invalidity  of  ordered,  logocentric  structures,  both  in  philosophy  and  in  art;  the 
“Madness” of Dionysian art is honored for having a “method.” 
Stoppard’s parodic treatment of the pompous discourse of conventional prolog 
and  his  pastiche  of  its  presumed  elements  demystifies  the  logos  of  conventional 
theater. The myth of immobile signification is also obliterated in this play; Stoppard 
makes  his  audience  question  themselves  if  Shakespeare  language  is  more 
comprehensible  for  the  contemporary  readers  than  Dogg  language. 
Comprehensibility,  clarity,  rationality,  and  causality  are  proved  to  be  arbitrary 
conceptions.  The  quotations  from  Shakespeare’s  play,  which  create  a  sort  of 
disarticulation of the rational language, help Stoppard criticize the mediated language 
of the conventional literary, religious, and scientific discourses. He disconnects the 
various  discourses  present  in  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet  by  presenting  them  in  an 
incongruous  synthesis  of  rational  logos.  The  fragmentation  and  repetition  of 
Shakespeare’s prolog and the abridged text of Hamlet reflect the linguistic chaos, 
which  is  resulted  in  the  absence  of  an  absolute  language.  The  incompatibility  of 
Shakespearean language with the context of modern English is as confusing and 
misleading  as  Dogg language.  In  the  absence  of  logic  or  interpretation,  one  can 
easily  laugh  at  the  madness  of  the  world.  Wilcher  in  “Stoppard  and  the  Art  of 
Communication”  argues  that,  “Since  language  is  constantly  changing,  each 
generation gradually loses touch with its own speech-community, retaining out-of-
date idioms which begin to sound bizarre, until eventually whole language-systems 
fall into disuse”(www. english. fsu. edu/ jobs/num08/Num8Wilcher.htm).  
The confusion rises when the spectator/readers, as the participant in the literary 
game, approach the narrative and its language with different sets of assumption as 
the original context. By contrasting the three languages of the play, Stoppard proves 137 
the  problematicity  of  language  as  a  medium  of  communication.  The  disjunction 
between words and reality, or between words and the different referents that each 
spectator  imagines,  destabilizes  the  concept  of  language  as  an  interpretable 
meaningful system. Stoppard’s Dogg language, which comes close to the linguistic 
“informese” or primitive language, helps Stoppard create an interesting comedy in 
which the nature of language and its practicality in communication is questioned. The 
game-like  usage  of Wittgenstein’s  theories  is  aimed  at  teaching  the  spectators to 
discard their habitual thinking in the framework of English language and focus their 
perception  on  casual  inference.  The  pragmatic  functions  of  English  words  are 
changed so that the audience does not understand anything if it relies on its past 
knowledge. Like Easy, the spectators gradually learn to adopt the new language, but 
no  one  knows  if  the  inferred  meaning  is  also  meant  by  the  characters  or  the 
playwright. As Wilcher maintains: 
 
Each piece of language is only ‘a way of putting it.’ 
Other  ways  can  be  tried,  but  every  attempt  to 
complete  the  circuit  of  communication  between 
writer and reader will be thwarted by the nature of 
language.  The  writer  must  wrestle  to  encode 
meaning  in  an  appropriate  pattern  of  words;  the 
reader must wrestle to decode the meaning from the 
words.  But  difficulties  arise  at  each  stage  of  the 
process—because  it  is  a  process  and  therefore 
subject  to  the  operation  of  time.  First  of  all,  the 
message  that  the  writer  seeks  to  communicate  is 
unstable, like the writer himself and everything else 
in a time-governed world (PDF doc.). 
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Stoppard’s  play  is  a  double  game,  one  with  Wittgenstein  and  one  with  the 
audience.  Keir  Elam  believes  that,  “W hat  Stoppard  attempts,  in  effect,  is  to 
out_wittgenstein Wittgenstein, applying to the latter’s dramatized primitive language-
game the very ‘it could be this too’ principle expounded later in the Philosophical 
Investigation” (2001: 184). Although Easy learns Dogg language by similar ostensive 
learning that Saint Augustine describes, whether the audience is also able to decode 
this  language  and to understand  Stoppard remains  dubious. The  defamiliarisation 
that Stoppard in his literary game creates is the outcome of the contrast between the 
schoolboy’s  usage  of  common  English  and  what  the  audience from these  words 
understands on one hand, and the contrast of elevated archaic language of Hamlet 
with the primitive language of construction builders on the other hand. The language-
game in which Easy learns Dogg Language is not comparable with the literary game 
in  which  the  audience  decodes  the playwright’s  language.  Stoppard  changes  the 
signifiers  so  that they  refer to unfamiliar  signifieds,  emptying  them from  accepted 
meanings. As Wilcher states it: 
 
If the configuration of sense-impressions that makes 
up  each  individual’s  experience  of  being  alive 
changes from moment to moment, then any pattern 
that  the  mind  creates  to  embody  experience  in  a 
form that can be communicated to other minds will 
be a valid expression only of what was, not of what 
is. The self that seeks to express its knowledge of 
the  world  participates  in  the  flux  of  all  temporal 
things. Furthermore, the medium of language is not 
only  difficult  to master,  but  is  itself also  subject  to 
time.  Having  spent twenty  years  ‘trying  to  learn  to 
use words,’ says Eliot, he has discovered that ‘every 139 
attempt/Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of 
failure(PDF doc..). 
 
The resulted incomprehensible language dissolves the centeredness of the text 
and creates confusion. Stoppard demonstrates how the dominancy of clichés has 
deprived  the  contemporary  audience from creative  understanding.  Bereft  of  these 
clichés, they are unable to communicate with a text. The continuity of narrative is also 
broken  by  the  use  of  different  languages.  Finally  the  endless  interpretational 
regresses frustrate the audience and make them submit to the game the playwright 
plays on them and quit their interpretational strategies. This “non-finality of definition” 
(Elam)  and  the  aporia  of  meaning  that  Stoppard  creates  is  in  Derridean  term 
deconstructive.  The  author’s  attempt  to  express  the  “unsayable”  by  appealing  to 
language is as difficult as its discovery by the audience/reader.  
The expression  of  the  “unsayable”  in a non-decodable  language  becomes  a 
political goal in Cahoot’s Macbeth, which is dedicated to Pavel Kohout, the dissident 
Czech  playwright.  The  play  shows  the  efforts  of  dissident  artist  to  save  theater 
performance from censorship by holding private performances like that of Macbeth. 
The  perpetual  interruptions  of  the  their  performance  by  different  events,  like  the 
arrival and departure of the inspector and his Secret police, the entrance of the truck 
driver  of  Dogg’s  Hamlet;  and  the  symbolic  construction  of  a  wall,  hinder  the 
performed play from completing its course and coming to an end. The main conflict of 
the play arises from the desire of the authorities to control language or discourse. 
The harmless Inspector of The Real Inspector Hound, who was in search of truth, 
turns to be the sinister agent of secret police in this play, who tries to fix established 
truths by controlling the discourse of society and finding the transgression of rules in 140 
the  performance.  To  protect  themselves  from  the  censorship  of  the  dominant 
discourse, the audience adopts a new language, Dogg, introduced to them by Easy. 
The funny language game of Dogg’s Hamlet turns to a verbal “hide and seek” in this 
play. The Inspector’s logocentric desire for finding a clear-cut single meaning, which 
can provide an ordered basis for supporting the authoritarian regime, is confronted 
with the centrifugal disorder of Dogg language and the fragmented performance. The 
centeredness of word in the Inspector’s desired discourse gives place to the chaos of 
différance in the discourse of the small audience of dissidents. First, they resort to 
Shakespeare’s narrative to criticize the power, but the transparency of this discourse 
proves to be prone to despotic interpretations; therefore they decide to substitute it 
by  the  confusing  sign  system  of  Dogg  language  to  demolish  the  authority  of  the 
totalitarian discourse. The deferred end gives a comical, fragmentary nature to the 
performed  Macbeth  and  modifies  its  tragic  effect.  The  different  language  games 
employed in Stoppard’s play create a linguistic and theatrical collage, which depicts 
the  strangeness  of  performing  under  a  totalitarian  system.  In  this  play,  Stoppard 
explores the relation between language and power and the way language can be 
manipulated. 
 
The  relationship  between  language  and  power  is  the  focus  of  Foucault’s 
investigations of discourse. In his view in every society the production of discourse is 
dictated  by  the  authorities.  There  are  different  prohibitions  that  control  our  free 
speech: moral, social, political, and ritual. The authorities decide the authenticity of 
truth, the acceptability of behaviors, the virtue or wickedness of the words, and the 
righteousness  of  the  power.  The  will  to  truth  settles  its  dominant  discourse  and 
excludes  all  other  existing  discourses.  In  Stoppard’s  play,  the  inspector, 141 
representative of the prevailing totalitarian discourse, tries to control the discourse of 
the dissidents. To do this, he needs the mastery of the language they speak. The 
dissidents, on the other hand, should hinder him from accessing their language. Both 
Macbeth, with its unfamiliar language, and Dogg help them obstacle the access of 
authorities  to  their  discourse.  The  main  conflict  of  the  play  derives  from  the 
challenges of the two discourses to nullify each other. 
Inspector’s desire to produce a unique interpretation of a text is expressed in the 
following dialogs: 
Inspector: (to Macbeth.) Now listen, you stupid bastard, you’d better get rid of 
the idea that there’s a special Macbeth which you do when I’m not around, and 
some other Macbeth for when I am around which isn’t worth doing. You’ve only 
got one Macbeth. Because I’m giving this party and there ain’t no other. It’s 
what we call a one-party system….So let’s have a little of the old trouper spirit, 
because if I walk out of this show I take it with me (188). 
Or 
Inspector: Who’s to say what was meant? Words can be your friend or your 
enemy, depending on who’s throwing the book, so watch your language (191). 
He not only tries to confine the interpretations to a single one, but also insists that 
any narrative other than the prevailing one should be demolished. He even threatens 
that the one-party system will show violence, if they trace any violation of the law of 
this hegemonic discourse. The inspector himself is a master of language games and 
plays skillfully with language. Bursting in the middle of the performance of Macbeth, 
he asks the hostess if her house is the National Theater. After hearing her negative 
answer, he begins a sarcastic show of an innocent police detective: 
 142 
Inspector:  Isn’t  it?  Wait  a  minute-I  should  have  made  a  mistake…is  it  the 
National academy of Dramatic Art, or, as we say down Mexico way, NADA? 
…No?  I  am  utterly  nonplussed.  I  must  have  got  my  wires  crossed 
somewhere….(185) 
 
His theater should warn the dissidents that the regime is aware of the rules of their 
game and has traced their deviation from the normalized discourse. 
He also stresses  on his dissatisfaction with the interference of other voices in 
the singular monologue of the totalitarian system, affirming that they cannot “project 
their voices around.” The audience and the hostess are warned against the danger of 
intervening voice of literature and are required not to put themselves “at the mercy of 
any Tom, Dick or Bertolt.” In Foucault’s view the dominant discourse controls the 
society by classification, ordering and distribution. The control system is therefore 
against  the  commentary-  principle  and  author-principle.  They  do  recognize  the 
existence of the individual writers, but they try to limit their function to the admirer of 
the grand  narratives.  The  authors  must  fit  their narratives  in  the  structure  of  the 
totalitarian system and do not try to give hidden messages in form of symbolism or 
other literary devices. The audience is thus warned against the temptation of any 
“Tom, Dick, or Bertolt,” who, deviating from the grand-narratives, aims at misleading 
them. For maintaining the monophony of discourse, the Inspector has persecuted 
“the Committee for Free Expression” and asserts that he can put an end to any kind 
of idea, which dares to exist outside the “normalization” process. The totalitarian truth 
should not be disturbed with any “infection of an uncontrolled idea” (Stoppard 194). 
In Cahoot’s Macbeth, Intertextuality, fragmentation of narrative, defamiliarisation 
of  language  and  chaotic  performance  help  Stoppard  delogocentrize  the  dominant 
discourse.  Being  entrapped  in  the  web  of  this  confusing  system,  the  Inspector 143 
hopelessly struggles to assimilate the unfamiliar forms of expression, making them 
compatible to the predominated frames of meaning. Words in this system, like the 
dissidents, can be his enemies. As Scolicov in “Stoppard’s Intertextual Web” puts it: 
 
Even more than weapons, the words have become 
the  dissidents  themselves,  refusing  to  accept  the 
dictates  of  any  predetermined,  fixed  meaning.  Let 
loose in Dogg’s Hamlet, they seem to run wild here. 
The spiritual dexterity of the dissidents playing with 
the words, passing them around as in a ball game, is 
contrasted with the Police Inspector’s frustration at 
not  being  able  to  follow  these  quick  moves.  Our 
enjoyment  as  spectators  and  readers  depends  on 
our own ability to free ourselves from the accepted 
meanings  of  the  words  and  follow  what  is  taking 
place  despite  the  willful  neglect  of  conventional 
dictionary meaning (PDF.doc). 
 
Finally the dissidents’ manipulation of language affects the Inspector and makes him 
lose control over his own language:  
 
Inspector:  Thank  you.  Thank  you!  Thank  you!  Scabs!  Stinking  slobs-crooks. 
You’re nicked, Jock. Punks make me puke. Kick back, I’ll break necks, smack 
chops, put yobs in padlocks and fix facts. Clamp down on poncy gits like a ton 
of bricks (210). 
 
Easy, whose entrance in the structure of the play helps the dissidents to discord 
the  governing  discourse  by  adapting  his  Dogg  language,  returns  to  his  common 
English at the end of the play, asserting the playfulness of the whole experience: “It’s 144 
been a funny sort of week. But I should be back by Tuesday” (211). The dissident’s 
language game, however, keeps abolishing the dominancy of the unifying system. 
The will to power, exemplified in the narrative of Macbeth, which tries to fixate the 
icons and signifiers, fails and the words remain in a system of différance, losing their 
relation  to  any  object  or  truth  outside  the  experience  in  which  the  audience 
participates. Stoppard’s play demonstrates how a self-contained system of signifiers, 
dissociated from their conventional signifieds, can function successfully. As Scolincov 
points out: 
 
For Stoppard, language has thrown off the yoke of 
semantics and become an acrobat taking upon itself 
risks  without  the  safety  net  provided  by  the 
frameworks of the past. Instead of serving plot and 
character,  language  now  enslaves  them,  turning 
them  into  intertextual  elements  with  which  it  can 
play, re-arranging them in patterns that express its 
novel ideas (PDF). 145 
 
Chapter 7   
 
 
The Construction and Disruption of Power Structures through 
Discourse: Softcops and Mad Forest 
 
 
The  relationship  between  power  and  language  has  always  been  very 
controversial.  Many  contemporary  philosophers,  like  Nietzsche,  Lyotard, 
Wittgenstein,  Derrida,  and  Foucault  have  explored  the  role  of  language  and 
discourse in establishing power. Foucault, for instance, believes that power creates 
values through realizing its concepts in a sign system, excluding some areas as evil. 
In  other  words,  the  discourse  of  power  functions  mainly  through  “exclusion”;  it 
excludes  all  discourses  that  are  not  in  the  framework  of  power  and  all 
unapproachable areas  as  wicked. In  Foucault’s  view,  the “three great  systems of 
exclusion” work mainly by prohibition (1972: 219). He suggests that,  “W e have three 
types of prohibition: covering objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, the 
privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject” (216). The web, created 
by  the  interrelation  of  these  prohibitions,  is  “most  tightly  woven”  in  the  areas  of 
sexuality  and  politics.  The  process  of  value  formation  creates  moral  and  political 
taboos that form and deform the subjects of power, namely human beings. The will to 
domination- individual, religious, or political- seeks to present its values as truth and 146 
its desire to dominate as the will to truth. This ostensible “will to truth” in the dominant 
discourse claims the right to prohibit others as untrue, mad, unreasonably feminine, 
belonging  to  lower  races  or  violating  the  law  and  order.  Since  truth  can  only  be 
secured by language, the violence of power manifests itself in the  truth discourse. 
The different punishments that the individual, religious, or political powers impose on 
others  can  be  implemented  in  a  complicated  system  of  words.  This  symbolic 
employment  of  power  in  language  occurs  throughout  the  process  of  physical 
realization of power and so is violence institutionalized. The dichotomy between true 
and false, emphasized in this discourse, also appears in other fields, defining the 
different  concepts  in  terms  of  binary  oppositions:  sane/insane, 
appropriate/inappropriate, white/black, man/woman, and so on. By this binary sign 
system the authorities can include people in power structure or exclude them from it. 
The representation of power and its justification in a sort of theater playing is very 
important for the establishment of the oppression discourse. Consequently, theater, 
not as art but as a social activity, gains special importance. Theodros Kiros argues 
that, “Power would be a fragile thing if its only functions were to repress, if it worked 
only  through  the  mode  of  censorship,  exclusion,  blockage,  and  repression  in  a 
manner  of  a  great  superego,  exercising  itself  in  a  negative  way.”  (1998:  2)  The 
strength of power lies in its ability to produce “effects at the level of desire- and also 
at the level of knowledge” (Kiros, 2). The writing of a complicated system of law and 
keeping this sacred system inaccessible for laymen on one hand, and referring to 
these written words as a basis for the punishment of the excluded members on the 
other hand, give a special power to the statesmen to control different fields of family, 
beliefs,  state,  education  and  production.  The  objection  of  the  oppressed  to  this 
written law is interpreted as transgression and is punishable. In Foucault’s view, this 147 
system of law making also stresses on the internalization of values and disciplines of 
power. As Kiros observes: 
 
One  of  the  most  important  effects  of  power  is  its 
astonishing  production  of  highly  “disciplined” 
individuals.  The  disciplined  individual  of  modernity, 
however,  did  not  consciously  choose  to  discipline 
himself/herself.  Rather,  one  of  the  silent  forces  of 
power is that it disciplines through internalization of 
value, such as the law, the norm, or the normal, etc 
(3). 
 
In  this  sense,  power  discourse  is  present  in  every  individual.  The  visible 
embodiments  of  power,  the  king,  the  dictator,  the  tyrant,  are  substituted  in  many 
modern societies  by  the  disciplined  individuals  who  try  to  discipline  others.  Kiros 
suggests that, “Power governs indirectly, by producing truths that are reexperienced 
by individuals as if it is they who organized them” (4). In Foucault’s view, language, 
as  the  main  hegemonic  medium,  undertakes  the  task  of  legitimating  power  and 
disciplining individuals. The “linguistic subjects” in different fields of religion, politics, 
education,  literature,  psychology  and  even  philosophy  help  power  maintain  its 
domination. 
The  criticism  on  Foucault  is  his  negligence  of  individual  resistance  in  this 
system. His critics believe that, the desires in individuals sometimes stand in contrast 
with the “totalizing structures” and modify, change, or subvert the power structures. 
The “excluded” oppose the established way of behavior by deviating from the norms 
of society and making  new discourses. The large “empire” of women, black people, 
non-westerns, outsiders, and insane artists are trying to “write back,” to create the 148 
discourse  of  the  oppressed.  Since  they  have  no  other  medium  except  language, 
subverting the structure of this language, or at least finding a new approach towards 
it, is in the agenda of these individuals. Approaching the established texts skeptically, 
questioning the values set in this sign system, and avoiding given answers should be 
the aim of a new sign system, which aims at liberating language from logocentric 
interpretations. 
Caryl Churchill is among those authors who, in their opposition to the dominant 
systems, try to question rather than providing predetermined answers. She herself 
asserts that “playwrights don’t give answer, they ask question” (qtd. in kritzer 1988: 
1). Churchill, As Kritzer maintains, “deals with some of the most difficult questions of 
contemporary  life-  and  typically  concludes  with  these  answers  resolutely  left 
unanswered.”(1991: 1) Her approach to the different issues of postmodern, as Kritzer 
suggests, is rather “playful, startling, and subversively comic rather than authoritative 
and confrontational”  (1991:  446). She  challenges  not  only  against  the  oppressive 
structures, but also against the logocentric disposal of these structures. Her aim is to 
intersect the dominant discourse by posing questions, the answer to which should be 
sought by the audience/reader in the world outside the stage. The experimentation 
with new forms of expression gives her the opportunity to discover new potentialities 
in  text  and  performance.  Different  issues  like  language  and  its  relation  to  power, 
history, race, class, gender, erotic identity, and the patriarchal system in theater are 
examined in a new light in her theater. In Cloud Nine (1979), for instance, history 
takes a new dimension. The Victorian patriarchal value system proves to be present 
in  the  postmodern,  postcolonial  individuals  without  any  difference  in  time.  In 
Churchill’s works the untold, hidden, or invisible histories of the past are retold in a 
new narrative. The polyglot, multicultural, anti-heterosexual, disruptive characteristic 149 
of her work provides her audience with vivid examples of open and indeterminate 
texts  or  non-authoritative  expressions.  The  reader/viewers  of  her  works  begin  to 
revise their interpretation of individual words, scenes, plot or theater in general. The 
theatricality  that  she  employs  renders  the  experience  of  the  audience  a  unique 
characteristic. The women roles played by men and vice versa, the child substituted 
by  a  doll  (Cloud  Nine),  the  women  who  are  manlier  than  men  (Top  Girls),  the 
multiplicity  of  the  roles  each  actor  plays  and  heteroglossia  (Mad  Forest),  the 
displacement of center, and fragmentation of the narrative and language (Blue Heart, 
This Is A Chair) render her work the features of postmodern experimental art. She 
expounds  the  provisional  and  fragmentary  aspects  of  signification,  the  arbitrary 
nature  of  reality  and  identity,  the  centrifugal  pull  of  history,  the  fragility  of  grand 
narratives,  the  gradual  disintegration  of  awe-inspiring  authority,  the  collapse  of 
authoritarian explanations of the world, and the inaccessibility of meaning. Her works, 
which subvert the Aristotelian “structural and stylistic unity” (Kritzer, 1991: 2) and his 
primacy as a reference in drama, are concerned with plurality, marginality, ambiguity, 
parody, and pastiche. “Her plays,” as Kritzer maintains, “offer fragmentation instead 
of wholeness, many voices instead of one, demands for social change instead of 
character development, and continuing contradiction instead of resolution.”(1991: 3-
4) The consistency of character is intentionally undermined; the mimetic theories are 
denied; and the phallogocentric conventions are destabilized. Producing her theater 
in the framework of different workshops and introducing choreography and music into 
the structure of her plays have liberated her theater from the authority of text and 
playwright. Churchill has established her individual discourse in theater in the course 
of her career as a playwright and has moved towards a delogocentric performance. 150 
Churchill’s earlier plays, which challenge most of established institutions and 
definitions, are discussed very often; therefore, I will concentrate on her more recent 
plays to demonstrate how her politics of style has developed. Many critics believe 
that after A Mouthful of Birds she has started a kind of experimentation in theater, 
which differentiate her style from that in her earlier plays. Her recent works are more 
concerned  about  the domination of language  on  individuals  and the role that the 
prevailing discourses play in deciding the meaning and establishing the social and 
political structures. The violation of the aesthetic conventions of the traditional male-
oriented theater in her early works has turned to an upheaval of the aesthetic norms 
and a denial of any kind of representation. The obstacles in the way of establishing 
an  independent  subjectivity,  the  difficulty  of  acting  in  a  sign  system  that 
fundamentally denies feminine consciousness, and the insufficiency of language to 
cover  the  experience of  chaos  in  postmodern  age  are  all  portrayed  in  Churchill’s 
recent works.  
The  idea  that  a  loyal  representation  in  theater  serves  to  give  an  authentic 
picture of reality is the basis of classic and realistic theater. The dominant patriarchal 
ideologies assumed particular modes of presentation in theater. Space, time, action, 
and character delineation were strictly defined. The stages remained inaccessible to 
those who dared to deviate from these established conventions. Women were mainly 
excluded  from  performance  or  remained  on  the  margin.  There  was  an  army  of 
marginalized  women  in  theater,  like  Ophelia,  who  at  best  could be  the  source of 
inspiration for men. As Kritzer states it: 
 
The  operation  of  patriarchal  ideology  in  structuring 
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in  male-dominated  culture.  Individual  subjectivity  is 
constructed  by  means  of  a  self/other  opposition  which 
establishes the self as a mediator between all that is truly 
individual  (including,  but  not  confined  to  the 
unconsciousness) and the finite choices offered by a given 
society  (including  language,  appearance,  and  modes  of 
behavior) (1991:7). 
 
This  male/female  or  self/  other  division  pushed  the  women  in  the  established 
frameworks, depriving them from self expression. The hegemony of the patriarchal 
grand  narratives  made  them  interpret  their  identities  according  to  the  normalizing 
discourses  and  created  identity  crises  in  them.  The  meaning  they  gave  to  their 
experiences was an acquired or borrowed one. They had no choice except finding 
new potentialities in language and new ways of expression. 
The voice of the disempowered women, however, began to open its way to the 
male-dominated  stages  after  the  feminist  movements  of  the  1970’s.  Actresses, 
women directors, and playwrights tried to express themselves and to establish a new 
identity on the stage. Appearing on the same stage without changing its pillars by 
producing new narratives and modes of performance, was indeed restricting oneself 
in the same structures. To break the hegemonic structures, one needs to subvert the 
narratives that help power set up itself. What Churchill has achieved in her recent 
plays is an anti-narrative, which challenges not only the existing master narratives 
including theater, but also the language itself. Through a fragmentary pastiche of 
form,  she  demonstrates  how  the  ostensibly  firmly-constructed  power  structures 
create chaos and how this chaos brings about their own collapse. The ironic pictures 
that her works present make the audience question their established beliefs and their 
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In Softcops, for instance, following Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, Churchill 
shows  how  “penal  mechanism”  with  the  help  of  educational  system  establishes 
power discourse. This play, which has its setting in nineteenth century France, is the 
outcome of Churchill’s reading of Discipline and Punish and the memoirs of Vidocq 
and Lacenaire, the robber and the cop who changed their roles at different moments 
in  their  career.  Being  impressed  by  the  attempt  of  the  hegemonic  systems  in 
depoliticizing illegal acts and excluding the criminals as a separate class, Churchill 
concentrate  on  the  exclusion  systems  in  her  play.  Like  Discipline  and  Punish, 
Softcops portrays how the new modern systems of control are formed and how they 
start to separate the poor, the criminal, and the insane from the rich, the obedient, 
and the sane and how this exclusion is justified. Churchill traces the development of 
the punishment system from a public one, which applied violence to the body of the 
criminal  in  a  theater  of  menace, to  a  softer  system  of  turning  individuals  to  self-
disciplined agents, who not only control their own behavior, but also that of others. 
Foucault compares the public execution of the eighteenth century  with the prison 
rules of the nineteenth century to show how the new codes of law and order have 
developed. The most important change in the penal system, according to Foucault, is 
the disappearance of punishment in the public.  
Softcops  demonstrates  how  this  new  system  of  punishment,  which  aims  at 
“panopticism”-  a  term  used  by  Foucault  to  describe  the  moderate  way  of  control 
through self observation- develops. After  being  confronted with the threat of  street 
revolts in the scenes of public punishments of criminals, especially the political ones, 
the dominant systems start searching for other mediums to control criminality. The 
representative of the authorities, Minister, summons the ideologue, Pierre, and the 
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Pierre proposes a didactive theater of punishment to affect the public, whom he takes 
for a passive audience. The self-observation system, in his view, should be taught by 
a didactive theater in which the punishment of the body of criminals, like Aristotelian 
tragedy, would simultaneously create fear and pity and purge the unlawful tendencies 
in the spectators: “There is a balance if I can get it. Terror, but also information. 
Information  but  also  terror”  (Churchill  1983:  6).  Panoptic  system,  as  Foucault 
maintains, will be chiefly successful with schoolchildren, madmen, and subordinates. 
Pierre’s delight at having schoolchildren in the scene of public punishment in the first 
scene of the play is suggestive of such kind of ideas: 
 
Pierre: Ah, you brought them for me. I need children with their soft minds to take 
the impression (6). 
 
Nonetheless, his positivistic idealism, which aims at imprinting the “tabula rasa” of 
children minds, proves to be invalid because the children do not react the way Pierre 
expected. Pierre’s didactive theater is not only ineffective, but also dangerous for the 
system because the revolting potential of the  public has been neglected in it. The 
next step is finding a new system which can reduce the dangers of a public show. 
The  suggestion  of  the  modern  positivist  of  the  play,  Pierre,  is  a  place  for  the 
confinement of large groups of prisoners: 
 
Pierre:  But  I  dream  of  something  covering  several  acres  and  completely 
transforming-as you know. I won’t bore you. But if the minister is impressed 
today I hope for a park (6). 
 
In  this  imaginary  “park,”  the  fear  of  punishment  should  hinder  the  criminals  from 
violating the rules in any form and makes them love their duty, as the Headmaster 154 
expresses it (6). Information, as Pierre emphasizes, plays an important role in this 
system. The interrelation of power- knowledge-discourse is demonstrated in Pierre’s 
insistence  on  writing  a  speech  for  the  magistrate  and  the  condemned  men.  (6) 
Nevertheless,  the  presented  information  should  be  a  controlled  one;  written  texts 
hinder the discourse from going astray. The  course of the performance, however, 
happens to run out of control. The deviation of Lafayette, one of the criminals, from 
Pierre’s written text becomes the source of frustration for Pierre and revolt for the 
audience.  A  group  of  the  spectators,  affected  by  Lafayette’s  speech,  attacks  the 
scaffold, trying to free him. After this defeat, Pierre tries to realize another utopiac 
dream for controlling the discourse: 
 
What I visualize you see is a garden of Laws. Where, over 
several acres, with flowering bushes, families would stroll 
on a Sunday….Different coloured posters. Guides to give 
lectures on civic duty and moral feeling. And people would 
walk  gravely  and  soberly  and  reflect.  And  for  the  worst 
crime. Patricide. An iron cage hanging high up in the sky. 
Symbolic  of  the  rejection  by  heaven  and  earth.  From 
anywhere  in  the  city  you  could  look  up.  And  see  him 
hanging there, in the sun, in the snow. Year after year. 
Quietly take it to heart. A daily lesson (14). 
 
In his patriarchal “garden of laws” patricide is the worst crime. Those who insult the 
father-figure, king, will suffer a long-term punishment and their destiny will become an 
example for other people, who gradually take the message of the power to heart. The 
Minister, however, doubts the effectivity of such utopian solutions and asserts that, 
“Reason uses whips” (16). Pierre, though totally fascinated by the idea of the garden 155 
of laws, finally realizes the impracticality of such an idea and confesses that it never 
happens (30). It is Vidocq, the criminal/policeman, who finds the alternative: 
 
Pierre: Vidocq is bringing some order into crime. He knows who the criminal are 
and he will catch them. But then what? What do you do with them? If you don’t 
use their bodies to demonstrate the power of law- Never mind. Let someone 
else solve it…(Ibid) 
 
The final solution is proposed by the social scientist Jeremy Bentham, whose 
theory is an upgrading of Pierre’s scheme: 
 
Bentham: No, no, your idea has to be reversed. Let me show you. Imagine for 
one moment that you’re the prisoner. This is your cell, you can’t leave it. This is 
the central tower and I’m the guard. I’ll watch you day and night (39). 
 
What  he  describes  seems  like  a  prison  or  a  concentration  camp,  which  mainly 
excludes  the  “unwanted”  from  the  wanted  by  putting  them  in  a  closed  society. 
Bentham’s contribution to panoptic system is indicative of the role of human sciences 
in stabilizing power relations. 
Both Foucault’s and Lyotard’s analysis of knowledge stresses that a claim to 
truth is also a claim to power because truth can determine the right and is able to 
exclude those who are wrong. The concepts of normal and abnormal are also formed 
in  this  discourse:  normal  is  a  standard  against  which  people  are  measured.  The 
sound  man,  the  dutiful  citizen,  and  the  submissive  child  are  all  "normal"  and  the 
madman,  the  criminal  and  the  defiant  child  “abnormal.”  The  state  takes  the 
responsibility  of  purifying  the  society  through  confining  the  abnormal  people  to 
prisons,  mental  hospitals  or  pedagogical  centers.  In  Foucault’s  view,  norms  are 156 
constantly  used to evaluate  and  control us.  They  also exclude  those  who  cannot 
conform to "normal" categories. The power to punish establishes its “normalization” 
process with the help of discourse. The educational system undertakes to carry out 
these  systems  by  categorizing  the  students  into  “the  very  good,  the  good,  the 
mediocre, the bad” (31). Bentham’s soft control system works like a hidden observer, 
or in Kiebuzinska’s term “a panoptic eye of surveillance” (131). The feeling of being 
watched even hinders the prisoner from contacting each other. As Pierre describes it:  
 
You can see all of us prisoners and we can’t see each 
other.  We  can’t  communicate  by  tapping  on  the  walls 
because you’re watching us. Is that right? Mr Bentham? I 
understand how it works…. (39) 
 
Pierre is finally forced to give up his utopian garden and his didactic theater, 
accepting that “the application of Mr. Bentham’s panopticon” is “far more reasonable” 
(40). The so called reformatory of Bentham is watched by a big brother, who, despite 
his  tendency  towards  “beating,”  accepts  the  cell  as  a  better  alternative.  (41)  The 
rehabilitation system not only aims at reforming the convicts, or turning them into 
spies, but also extends its domain to the patients and ordinary people. The dialog of 
the  last  scene  of  the  play  between  Holiday  maker  and  Pierre  shows  that  the 
categorization of the people has found new dimensions. Now a “long nose and close-
set eyes” can be signs of abnormality. The call for “an association of workers” (47) is 
also defined as a crime. Pierre’s utopia of a garden of law has proved to include the 
“whole  city.”“All  on  the  great  panoptic  principle”  (48)  is  the  result  of  exclusion 
discourse. Pierre’s last speech, however, shows that the system does not work that 
rosy  that  he  claims.  Although  he  wants  to  define  their  panopticism  as  a  security 157 
system for defending  the citizens, he mixes up the different systems of education, 
registration, supervision, cure, normalization and punishment in a slip of tongue (49). 
His broken utterance affirms that the controlling system includes all social institutions 
and  does  not  differentiate  between  the  subordinates.  Not  only  Pierre  and  the 
authorities,  but  also  the  Holidaymaker,  as  an  ordinary  citizen,  have  adopted  this 
categorization  system  and  differentiate  people  according  to  their  appearances. 
Separating himself from others, and feeling safe as included, Pierre presents a comic 
figure, which is unaware that the unstable borders of categorization may include him 
as well. Churchill’s implicit criticism of the public view makes the audience question 
their  own  standpoint  in  the  complicated  system of power-knowledge.  As  Jernigan 
states it: 
 
No  doubt,  Churchill  intends  the  character  of  the 
Holidaymaker to cause the audience to be uncomfortable 
in  just  the  way  that  Kritzer  suggests.  For,  if  categorical 
distinctions among prison inmates, hospital inmates, and 
finally even students have dissolved, the implication is that 
these  distinctions  have  broken  down  with  respect  to 
various audience members as well. The very role that this 
character  fulfills  as  one  who  is  on  holiday  is  similar  in 
nature to that filled by the audience members themselves, 
engaged as they are in a similar act of leisure. To put this 
another way that points to the paradox shared by Churchill 
and Foucault, the audience members are meant to identify 
with  the  Holidaymaker,  and  this  identification  should,  in 
turn,  make  them  question  their  own  role  in  the 
power/knowledge system: are they themselves repressed 
subjects?  or  are  they,  rather,  oppressive  producers  of 
knowledge? (2003:36) 158 
 
The  narrative  of  the  play  does  not  allow  a  consistent  story  or  outstanding 
character delineation. The characters are meant to be either in the power structure or 
among the oppressed; no personal information is given. Some characters like Vidocq 
and minister appear and disappear without having any roles in the progression of the 
story;  they  are  just  tools  which  help  the  system  work  or  symbols  through  which 
Churchill presents the historical function of the individuals. The introduction of the 
English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham- whose panoptic system is also discussed in 
Discipline  and  Punish-  and  the  influence  of  the  social  sciences  on  the  modern 
systems of control, show how the master narratives develop and how global their 
influence is. The presence of this enlightened reformer with his rehabilitation system 
(panoption) and his interference in the formation of hegemonic system emphasize the 
interaction  of  knowledge  and  power  structures.  Kritzer  believes  that,  “As  an 
intermediary between the source material and the play, Churchill keeps her viewpoint 
in the background, stays within the conceptual boundaries of the original- even in the 
using  the  metaphor  of  theater-  and  does  not  broaden  the  scope  of  Foucault’s 
argument” (1999:318). Churchill, however, stresses that she had the outline of the 
play in mind and reading Foucault’s book just helped her find a narrative for her play. 
Even if Kritzer’s claim is true, the intertexuality between her play and Foucault’s study 
place the narrative in the boundary of postmodern interplay of ideas, which denies 
pure originality.  
Churchill’s decentralizing “l'écriture feminine” in Softcops stands in contrast to 
the  male  cast  and  denies  the  individuality  of  those  in  power.  The  fact  that  no 
character in this play has a value or a story as an individual renders them a comic 
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scientific enterprise for amending control systems in Churchill’s play. Instead of giving 
humanistic shape to the cruel system of punishment, Bentham’s reforming ideas turn 
to a larger system of control of mind and body. Pierre’s utopiac undertakings make 
him a funny, unsuccessful stage manager, whose didactive strategies turn against 
him.  His  playing  the  role  of  a  dog  for  Vidocq,  fetching  the  coins  that  he  throws, 
demonstrates  the  ambivalent  nature  of  mastery/slavery  of  ideas  to  power  and 
criminality; his submission to Bentham’s panoptic system makes him a double slave 
of power and knowledge.  
By portraying the failure of Pierre’s didactive theater, Churchill also questions 
the efficiency of the patriarchal, traditional system of theater. Her sardonic discourse 
stands in contrast with holistic authority of all-male cast of the play. Palma believes 
that Churchill’s play, as a feminine comedy, defies male dominancy both in society 
and in theater (1992: 74). He argues that, “In her use of the revue, Churchill tries to 
make Foucault’s historical survey of evolving structures of state power accessible to 
an audience viewed and defined primarily in terms of their position as theatergoers, 
as the audience of a musical revue, not as people who are victims of these evolving 
structures” (1992: 74).  
Her  rejection  of  the  conventional  mimetic  aesthetic  and  her  criticism  of  the 
discourse  of  power,  develop  later  to  the  episodic  plot  in  Mad  Forest.  Churchill 
assimilates the narrative of this play with the chaotic state after the collapse of power 
structures  in  Romania.  The  performance,  which  is  the  outcome  of  a  workshop, 
depicts the country in time of the downfall of the communist regime, overwhelmed by 
confusion and mistrust. Through the scenes of wedding engagements of two families, 
this play explores the reactions of ordinary people to the realities (or illusions) of 
revolution. The title of the play alludes to the story of a horseman who, being lost in 160 
the forest where Bucharest now stands, named it “mad forest.” Kiebuzinska believes 
that the title derives from “the difficulty of finding access to the paths of the subject by 
the foreign playwright and workshop group, and relates to the tentative, inconclusive 
shape the play assumes by going around the subject instead of penetrating through 
the mazes of history and ideology in Romania” (231).  
The  disjointed  truth,  which  the  workshop  members  as  foreigner  observed, 
affected the structure of the play and made it a collage of fragmented narratives. 
Each narrative is introduced by a statement, once in Romanian and once in English: 
“Lucia are partu oua. Lucia has four eggs”; “Doi oamani stau la soare. Two men are 
sitting in the sun”; or “Elevii asculta lectia. The pupils listen to the lesson.” The titles 
are suggestive of banal things or situations, but what they portray is the difficulty of 
living under control. Having four eggs or buying meat, which seem banal to us, are 
luxurious events for Romanian people in the socialist structure. One of the two men 
sitting in the sun is in fact a security who blackmails Lucia’s father (the other man) 
because of Lucia’s marriage to an American. The lesson that the pupils must learn is 
not a scientific one; it is a part of the grand narrative of the totalitarian system, which 
they have to assimilate: 
 
Flavia: Today we are going to learn about a life dedicated 
to  the  happiness  of  the  people  and  noble  ideas  of 
socialism. The new history of the motherland is like a great 
river with its fundamental starting point in the biography of 
our  general  secretary,  the  president  of  the  republic, 
Comrade  Nicolae  Ceausescu,  and  it  flows  through  the 
open  spaces  of  the  important  dates  and  problems  of 
contemporary  humanity.  Because  it  is  evident  to 
everybody that linked to the personality of this great son of 161 
the nation is everything in the country that is more durable 
and harmonious (Churchill 1990: 20). 
 
Flavia’s bombastic lecture, whose claim to truth is emphasized perpetually, is a great 
lie, which manipulates not only the contemporary events, but also the historical facts. 
In the dominant discourse of communist party the leader is the “founder of man,” and 
Romanians  are  the  fighters  against  “fascism  and  war”  for  achieving  “freedom,” 
“justice,”  and  “progress.”  Like  in  Sofcops,  educational  system  is  demonstrated  to 
have an active role in establishing the grand narratives of the power and presenting a 
manipulated  sort  of  knowledge.  Flavia’s  stupefying  history  class  is  followed  by  a 
scene  that  demonstrates  how  Radu’s  whisper  “down  with  Ceausescu”  terrifies  a 
queue of people who are waiting for meat. All the scenes in the first Act are indicative 
of a large scale theater that dominates the life and language of Romanian people. 
Being perpetually under control, like the dissidents in Cahoot’s Macbeth, they have 
invented their own language to communicate.  
They have also invented a symbolic system of behavior in which truth does not 
play any roles. The contradiction between their uttered words and the reality of their 
everyday  life  discards  the  validity  of  their  narratives  or  their  language. The  same 
ambivalence dominates the spectators’ consciousness as the viewers of the play. 
Although they observe how the society is infected by the myth making discourses of 
truth, their positions force them to construct a truth out of the play. Nevertheless, the 
characters’ parallel lives and the secret languages they use, make the extraction of 
any truth difficult. This difficulty is magnified by Churchill’s interweaving of parallel 
languages-English and Romanian-in the structure of her play. The play, being the 
outcome of a workshop of English/ Romanian artists, reveals its polyglossia in its 162 
structure and discourse. Polyglossia or heteroglossia, a Bakhtinian term, as Wing 
maintains,  “Would  seem  to  be  a  remarkably  appropriate  term  for  describing 
Churchill’s  strategies,  especially  since  it  playfully  recalls  Bakhtin,  whose  theories 
have proved to be irresistible to a wide range of scholars struggling to construct an 
ethical  framework  for  discussing  political  theater  in  an  increasingly  deconstructed 
universe” (1998: 131). By producing “polyglossia,” in her theater, Churchill contradicts 
Bakhtin who believes that theater is inherently monophonic. The many voiced-ness of 
her  play  is  a  protest  against  the  sovereignty  of  unifying  strategies  of  the  truth 
discourses,  whether  in  theater  or  in  society.  Questions,  manipulation  of  words, 
inventing incomprehensible languages, and finally silence are the strategies that both 
Romanian people and Churchill use to free themselves from the grips of a totalitarian 
language. Furthermore, these are the devices that help Churchill demonstrate the 
difficulty  of  extracting  truths  among  a  heterogeneous  multitude  of  information 
presented to us from different sources. The second Act of the play is particularly 
indicative of the complexity of finding a single narrative among the different voices 
that relate the events of revolution; Polyphony deprives history from intactness.  
The first Act, which is supposed to depict Lucia’s marriage, turns to be a vivid 
image of the misery of life in Romania under communistic tyranny. The shortage of 
food,  represented  through  the  importance  of  Lucia’s  eggs,  the  perpetual  power 
failure, the control of private issues, like contraception or abortion (scene seven), and 
the way that ordinary people cope with their situation turn the expected cheerfulness 
of a marriage to a bitter gloominess. Marriage is just an opportunity for Lucia, already 
pregnant from another man, to fulfill her nomadic desires. She dreams of escaping 
from the troublesome life in Romania to the rosy horizons of America. The whole act 
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Ceausescu’s  reign.   “ T o   m a ke  sure  that  the  people  enacted  their  role  effectively,” 
maintains Kiebuzinska, “institutionalized paranoia became the means of control at 
every  level  of  private  life”  (242). The  different fragments that  Churchill  in  this  act 
chooses  serve  to  show  the  power  relations.  “How  the  power  of  unseen  systems 
controls human thought and behavior, and how the symbols of suppression regulate, 
govern, and ultimately eliminate resistance” (Kiebuzinska 241), constitute the main 
theme of this act.  
People are in perpetual attempt to keep to their roles and do not reveal anything 
that can be dangerous for them. The following scene is indicative of this role playing: 
Radu: Down with Ceausescu 
The woman in front of him starts to look around, then 
pretends  she  hasn’t  heard.  The  man  behind 
pretends he hasn’t heard and casually steps slightly 
away from Radu. 
Two  people  towards  the  head  of  the  queue  look 
round  and  Radu  looks  round  as  if  wondering  who 
spoke. They go on queuing. 
 
The reaction of the people displays the degree that these “unseen systems” and their 
paranoia have destroyed their resistance. Their silent playing, which can be seen 
throughout the first act, shows the dumbness of language under the dominance of 
paranoia.  Gestures  take  the  place  of  language,  which  has  been  deprived  of 
signification. Words, as in the scene of lucia’s conversation with the doctor, are not 
related with a outside reality; they negate it:  
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Doctor: There is no abortion in Romania. I am shocked that you even think of it. I am 
appalled that you dare suggest I might commit this crime. 
 
Lucia: Yes. I am sorry. 
Lucia gives the doctor an envelope thick with money and some more money. 
Doctor: Can you get married? 
Lucia: yes. 
Doctor: Good. Get married. 
The Doctor Writes again, Lucia nods (24-25). 
 
The  artificiality  of  language  and  its  non-relation  reminds  us  of  abstract  painting. 
Instead of being a means of grasping or communicating reality, it has turned to be a 
dangerous  medium.  Out  of  fear  of  being  overheard,  the  people  whisper  in  the 
presence of a loud radio, communicate through gestures, or remain silent. 
Their appeal to jokes, these distorted languages, is another way to be relieved 
from  the  suppressed anger.  The  symbolic defamiliarisation of  jokes  can  save  the 
reality  for  them.  The  vast  situational  irony  of  their  life,  for  instance,  finds  its 
articulation in the joke about the dominance of man over God because of his great 
power  in  defying  God’s  will  for  creating  order.  Man  creates  “chaos,”  and  no 
authorizing power, no text can bring this chaos under control, suggests Churchill. The 
danger  of  being  overheard  by  the  system  made  jokes  the  only  possibility  to  talk 
openly.  The  honest  moments  of  communication,  cannot  happen  in  reality;  the 
characters can only express themselves truthfully when they are speaking with unreal 
creatures like angels or ghosts (Flavia in scene twelve and the Priest in scene nine) 
or  through  their  defiant  jokes.  Both  laughter  and  speaking  with  metaphysical 
creatures  have  healing  effects  for  them.  In  their  speeches  with  ghosts,  they  can 
reveal their inner thoughts and sufferings without being compelled to censor them. 165 
The self-knowing, self-mirroring entities serve as a pre-symbolic or imaginary mode 
of  identification.  Through  the  co-presence  of  the  temporal  existence  (the  other), 
which carries a latent insight within itself, the character can overcome the problems 
of self. Both Flavia and the Priest are hesitant about the roles that they are playing in 
the structure of power and need approval from a metaphysical “other” to give them 
self-confidence. As Kiebuzinska observes, “Only in exchanges between the real and 
other-worldly  characters  are  questions  of  authenticity  raised,  for….it  isn’t  simply 
thought  and  identity  that  are  suppressed  as  an  outcome  of  sinking  down  inside 
oneself”(238). Being authentic or telling the truth, as Flavia states it, “Would hurt” 
(Churchill 26). Therefore, they refuse to be honest with themselves and with others. 
As Kim suggests, “They escape their pain causing situations as home, society, and 
identity”(1999:203).  Instead  of  knowing  subjects,  we  have  manipulated,  helpless 
objects of power or “useful bodies” –in Foucauldian term-in Mad Forest. 
Act two serves to break up the original, though fragmentative, narrative of the 
two families of Vladu and Antonescue with pseudo-original monologs of Romanian 
people. These monologs, which recount the week-long revolution, are apparently the 
words  of  those  who  participated  in  and  observed  the  uprising.  The  pseudo-
authenticity of the monologues stands in contrast to the theatrical role playing and 
has an alienation effect. Eleven actors play the sixty roles of this act, representing 
different  Romanian  people.  Although  each  monolog  starts  with  a  detailed  self-
introduction, the assumption of a real identity is denied by the playing of different 
roles  by  one  actor.  The  identification  of  the  role  with  the  actor  is  intentionally 
eliminated and the constitution of the speaking subject is shown to be governed by 
the  macrodynamics  of  power.  The  absence  of  any  signification  system  and  the 
difficulty  of  identifying  the  actors  with  their  roles  contradict  the  presence  of  the 166 
characters  as  real  entities;  individuals  lose  their  importance  in  this  dynamics. 
Moreover, the body of the actor as signifier cannot connect itself to a unified signified, 
namely the conventional personality. The actors’ alienation from the characters help 
Churchill destroy the stability of identity, emphasizing the variety of the roles that an 
individual adopts. As Kim observes, “For Churchill character is no longer a stable 
locus of identity with which the spectator can identify” (202); it is a semiotic sign, 
which can assume different signifieds. In addition, the multiplicity of narratives in this 
Act emphasizes the difficulty of coming to a conclusion about the reality of events 
during the process of shifting of power from one party to another. The polyphony 
occurs in two levels: in the outer level of performance (theater body) because of the 
abundant  views  that  the  spectators  hear  and  in  the  inner  level  of  actor’s  body, 
because of its multifunctionality. The confusion that this collage of voices creates is 
representative of the chaos and perplexity of the situation. The uncertainty and fear 
aroused  by  the  disruption  of  power  structures  in  Romania  renders  the  pseudo-
reportage  a  postmodern  characteristic.  Churchill  shows  how  many  different 
interpretations of a situation may exist and how uncertainty is the normal state of 
performance. “Was it really a revolution or a coup d'état,” is a question that engages 
both  the  mind  of  characters  and  that  of  the  audience.  The  playwright,  however, 
provides no answer for this question; she lets the spectators find their own answers. 
Like in Stoppard’s After Magritte eye-witnessing proves to be invalid and unreliable 
because everyone has his own interpretation of the observed events and this affects 
the  reality.  The  inability  of  the  characters  in  coping  with  the  quick  changes,  the 
multivocality of events, and the constantly renewed identity of the actors turns this 
Act  to an effective  portrayal  of  the  revolutionary  chaos.  Not only  have  the actors 
many  identities,  but  also  the  events.  This  multivocality  turns  Churchill’s  play  to  a 
hypertext.  167 
Act  III,  which  again  depicts  a  marriage,  begins  with  a  scene  in  a  hospital. 
Churchill’s  typification  of  characters  culminates  here  in  her  refusal  of  giving  an 
identity to the individuals or labeling them with proper names. They are intentionally 
reduced to their situation or the disease they suffer from, like “Sorethroat” or “Patient. 
Due to the rupture of the totalitarian order, the individuals are now overwhelmed with 
paranoia and insecurity. Being released from the dominion of power structure, they 
do  not  know  how  they  should  manage  to  do  without  it.  The  futility  of  the  crazy 
struggle of the characters for finding the truth among a chaotic collage of narratives is 
identical with that of the audience, the playwright, and her workshop. They all try to 
summarize the events in a text, but the chaos escapes shaping. 
The second scene of the Act depicts a vampire and a dog in conversation. The 
surrealism of the scene, however, is immediately discarded by the use of human 
body  for  these  roles. These  poor  creatures  can  be  symbolic  of  those  who  use a 
chaotic situation for their own gain. The Dog is searching for an owner. Like those in 
a society who should belong to a master or else they become disoriented, it feels 
miserable and forsaken. Its sentimental illusion that a mutual relationship may exist 
between an owner and a dog is expressed in its last dialog with the Vampire: “You 
could talk to me. I could talk to you. I’m your dog”(Churchill 1990:50). Instead of 
giving support to the miserable dog, the Vampire “puts his mouth on the Dog’s neck.” 
Churchill powerfully portrays how the long-lasted hegemony deforms the individual 
desires  and  how  the  post-revolutionary  chaotic  state  provides  the  possibility  of 
collective vampirism. This vampirism proves to be the general state of being in the 
post-revolutionary society.  
The  anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, anti-gypsy fervors, which were repressed to 
the latent reservoirs during the reign of totalitarian regime, reappear in the form of 168 
new xenophobic tendencies in the later scenes of this Act. After the first fantastic 
scene, the play once again revisits the Vladu and Antonescu families in Florina’s 
Wedding,  which  turns  to  a  battlefield  of  different  ideas  in  the  post-revolutionary 
Romania.  The  audience  is  immediately  able  to  see  a  change  in  the  characters 
because  they  express  themselves  freely  and  their  conversations  are  not 
overwrought. But after a period of euphoria and freedom, the situation reveals itself to 
be as irrational and tense as before. The desire for order, which is expressed in 
Bogdan’s  repeated  sentence,  “This  country  needs  a  strong  man,”  contradicts  the 
chaos  prevailing  Florina’s  wedding.  Moreover,  the  articulated  animosity  against 
Hungarians or gypsies shows the depth of the domination of the power structures 
and master narratives over their minds. Although they all claim a search for truth, 
they  become  completely  violent  when  they  encounter  other  versions  of  truth.  As 
Kiebuzinska  states  it,  “In  Mad  Forest,  Churchill  playfully  calls  attention  to  the 
continuity of words like “human face,” “truth,” and “realistic basis” from one act to the 
other. These words signal to what extent these terms from Socialist Realism have 
entered into the discourse of ordinary life”(245).  
Flavia’s conversation with Florina, for instance, shows her extreme desire for a 
single truth: 
 
Flavia:  I’m  going  to  write  a  true  history,  Florina,  so  we’ll  know  exactly  what 
happened. How far do you think Moscow was involved/ in planning the coup? 
Florina: I don’t know. I don’t care (82). 
 
Her  naïve  struggle  to  present  a  single  version  of  history,  demonstrates  her 
logocentric  desire  for  having  fixed  metanarratives.  She  is  unable  to  live  without 
master narratives or attaching to a party and is ready, as she herself asserts, to teach 169 
anything if it is given to her: “let them give me a new book, I will teach that”(69); truth 
for her is a written narrative presented to her by an authority. Other characters of the 
play also try to find an established source for truth. For Lucia the western media is 
the source for truth; if it confirms the revolution, then, there was a revolution: 
 
Radu: Who was shooting on the 22nd? After that, what was going on? It was all 
a show. 
Lucia: No, it was real, Radu,/ I saw it on television(57). 
 
They  do  not  even  trust  their  personal  experiences  without  the  confirmation  of  a 
reliable (!!), authoritative source. Their personal life is dominated by the paranoia of a 
conspiracy  behind  their  backs.  The  conspirers  can  be  Ceausescu’s  family, 
Hungarians, gypsies, Jews, or their own neighbors. The weddings in Churchill’s play, 
as Wing observers, “Begin as difficult attempts to straddle national, ethnic, and class 
differences and disintegrate into indecipherable hostilities featuring the two families 
and  their  guests,  and  significantly  including  what  could  be  seen  as  the  cyborg 
constructions  of  a  vampire  and  an  angel”  (140).  The  chaos  prevailing  Florina’s 
wedding is indicative of the hidden despotic structures inside the individuals, which 
make them intolerant of any otherness of thoughts or origins. 
The will to exclusion and its consequent xenophobia not  only  have deformed 
their life but also their language. The paranoiac silence of the first Act changes to 
broken sentences in the second one and ends in a cacophony of angry voices in the 
last scenes. The latent masculine violence rises as the authoritative control system 
loses its dominance; the vampire in them finds its way out to their language. The play 
and the text lose their linguistic control as well; the signification system collapses as 
the violence rises. The institutionalized violence, which had its source of justification 170 
in  the  rhetoric  of  truth,  gives  place  to  the  violence  based  on  racial  truth  of  the 
masses. The binary conceptualization assumes a single subjectivity and excludes all 
other subjectivities out of focus.  
Churchill tries to break the violence of such conceptualization by her cacophonic 
polyphony.  Throughout  the  play  the  overlapping  dialogs  create  a  sort  of 
unintelligibility, but in the end the voices are so blended that they deny the audience 
any accessibility to the language. The aloofness is intensified by a complete shift 
from English to Romanian at the end of the play. The created gap can no longer be 
filled by any linguistic or logical link. Not only truth but also the hopes for perception 
are  lost  in  the  last  dialogs.  Churchill,  as  Kim  suggests,  “Links  nomadic  flights  to 
linguistic  nomadism”(248).  Due  to  Malkin’s  definition  in  Memory–Theater  and 
Postmodern  Drama,  Mad  Forest  can  be  categorized  among  postmodern  memory 
theaters. Malkin maintains that, “One of the distinguishing features” of this theater “is 
its overabundance of disconnected stimuli: conflicting discourses, intruding images, 
overlapping  voices,  hallucinatory  fragments.  There  is  no  easy  way  to  read  or 
organize-  or  to  bind-  this  sensual  and  discursive  overload”  (29).  In  Mad  Forest, 
memory  and  history  prove  to  be  just  one-dimensional,  artificial  accounts  of  past, 
which cannot be fitted in the realities of the events. 
The intratextuality of the play, manifested in the repetition of the dialogs in the 
last scene and the multiplicity of the roles played by one character in Act II, are other 
postmodern  features  of the play.  The repeated words  sound  like  voices  that  are 
captured in a festive orchestra, they don’t have any meaning: 
 
Bogdan: This country needs a strong man. 
Irina: You’r not going to marry a Hungerian. 171 
Mihai: Nothing is on a realistic basis. 
Flavia: Isn’t history what’s in the history book? 
Florina: The head doctor locked the wounded in a room. 
Radu: Who was shooting on the 22
nd? That’s not a crazy question. 
Lucia: Whose side was he on? 
Ianos: You are on trial for genocide. 
Gabriel: The Hungarians make people despise us. 
Angel: I try to keep clear of the political side. 
Vampire: You begin to want blood (91). 
 
In  this  fragmentary  dialog,  the  scattered  sentences,  which  are  in  no  structural 
connection with each other, demonstrate the disintegration of society and its medium 
of  communication,  namely  language.  Depicting  all  characters  speaking 
simultaneously in Romanian, “the play concludes, then, on a note of indecipherable 
chaos. Individual voices merge and produce a roar that annihilates meaning.” (Kritzer 
163) By employing a fragmentary structure, heteroglossia, and unreliable narratives, 
Churchill  challenges  the  audience  with  a  performance  that  is  overwhelming, 
confusing  and  indecipherable.  Ellen  Diamond  attributes  the  fragmentation  in 
Churchill’s plays to the globalization of postmodern age, asserting that she has found 
“formal ways of grappling with the historical pain of fragmentation” (2005, 477).  172 
 
Chapter 8   
 
 
Towards a delogocentric narrative 
 
 
Churchill’s engagement with form began with her early works. The overlapping 
dialogues, the manipulation of time and space, the dialog between figures of different 
historical eras, the attribution of many roles to one actor, and the  employment  of 
passive  actors  without  role  playing  were  the  anti-conventional  experiments  that 
helped Churchill deconstruct traditional notions of the plot. Her formal experiments, 
however, found a new dimension after A Mouthful of Birds (1986), in which dance is 
an  inextricable  element.  By  employing  an  episodic  structure  and  Ian  Spike’s 
Choreography,  Churchill  succeeds  to  create  an  unconventional  play.  Each  of  the 
seven episodes in this play is dedicated to an ordinary person, who is obsessed by 
possession.  These  episodes  are  not  structurally  in  the  framework  of  a  coherent 
narrative. The play fragmentary shape, contrary to Euripides’ The Bacchae, which 
acquire “physical wholeness” (Kritzer 344) at the end, remains disjointed. As kritzer 
observes: 
 
The  play  explores  the  irrational  asserting  that  value  of 
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point  for  each  of  the  episodes  is  emotional  rather  than 
logical, and results in each of the characters temporarily 
abandoning  conscious  choice  and  self-control.  The 
interludes, rather than prompting thought, undermine the 
attempt to construct a rational narrative of what is being 
presented (1988:337). 
 
Churchill’s deconstructing strategies led her to new experiments with form and 
resulted  in  the  elimination  of  binary  oppositions  of  natural/supernatural  in  Striker 
(1994), the disconnection of narrative’s continuity in Heart’s Desire (1998) the non-
relation in This is a Chair (1997), and the evacuation of words from their established 
meaning and minimizing them in letters in Blue Kettle (1998). Jernigan believes that 
Churchill  in  her  recent  short  plays  uses  “ontological  disruptions to  dramatize  how 
epistemological  repression  disrupts  the  likelihood  of  emancipation”  (2004:23).  I 
believe that, Churchill has created emancipation in performance. By liberating her 
narratives from the sovereignty of standard language, one-voicedness, and theatrical 
conventions, she has succeeded in establishing an anti-discipline theater, which is 
free from patriarchal, logocentric tradition. 
The  chaotic  narrative  of  Mad  Forest,  in  which  language  proves  to  be  just  a 
superficial means of communication, appears again in Striker, an anti-mimetic play 
peopled with goblins and ghosts from the world of British legends and fairy tales. The 
deformed language of this play is manifested in the opening sentence: "Heard her 
boast beast a roast beef eater, daughter could spin span spick and spun the lowest 
form of wheat straw into gold, raw into roar, golden lion and lyonesse under the sea, 
dungeonesse  under  the  castle  for  bad  mad  sad  adders  and  takers  away."  This 
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at  no  means  meant  to  be  understood.  Dialog  in  this  play  loses  its  conventional 
function as an essential means of presentation. Furthermore, noises, pantomime and 
choreography break the traditional authority of text, discarding the hope of finding 
meaning. The trauma-stricken  women  of  this  play  are  pictured  in  the  moment  of 
cognitive  disruption,  in  the  moment  of  entanglement  in  the  confines  of  a  long 
nightmare. Their language is a nightmarish one too, full of broken, irrelevant words, 
phrases, or sentences. As Janelle Reinelt states it: 
 
Writing  in  dance  sequences  and  giving  the  Striker  a 
Joycean-like language, part fairy-like, part gibberish, this 
play  transcends  all  Churchill’s  previous  experiments, 
figuring  the  past  as  a  haunting  in  present,  and  making 
theatricality viable the interior landscape of schizophrenic 
subjectivity, which has its own logic and representational 
syntax ( 2000: 188). 
 
 
This chapter will discuss three of Churchill’s later plays in which the deformation 
of conventional narrative culminates in the formation of an anti-narrative text. In This 
is  a  Chair,  for  instance,  the  disruption  of  linguistic  structures  happens  on  an 
epistemological level. After Wittgenstein's destabilization of the general suppositions 
about the representational power of language in Tractatus, some writers, following 
his presumptions, tried to move away from the noun-based syntax, experimenting 
new modes of expressions in decentralized sentences. In his view, language can 
perform its communicative function, if the two parties involved in a dialog move in the 
same referential system of signs. What Churchill in This is a Chair does is disturbing 175 
the communicative function of language by devising a new sign system in which each 
sign must be interpreted anew. The first linguistic disruption happens in the naming of 
her play. The appearance of Magritte’s drawing, “This is not a Pipe,” on the cover 
stands  in  explicit  contrast  to  the  title,  “This  is  a  Chair.”  If  Magritte  negates  the 
possibility of representation by explicitly stressing that his painting is not a real pipe, 
Churchill  negates  the  object  (pipe) by  affirming  that  “this  is a  chair.” Wittgenstein 
believes that after learning a language, the people practice it by calling out the words 
they  have  learned  or by  reacting  to  them.  The  referentiality  between  the  signifier 
(word) and the signified (object) in these language games helps them communicate. 
By  breaking  the  referentiality  between  the  image  and  the  written  words,  Magritte 
interferes in the primary perceptive process of the observers to disturb their cognitive 
integration As Foucault in his book “This is not a pipe” observes: 
 
The  exteriority  of  written  and  figurative  elements,  so 
obvious  in  Magritte,  is  symbolized  by  non-relation-  or  in 
any case by the very complex and problematic relation-
between the painting and its title. This gulf, which prevents 
us from being both the reader and the viewer at the same 
time,  brings  the  image  into  abrupt  relief  above  the 
horizontal line of words (1983: 36). 
 
Churchill creates the same non-relational gulf in her play. In the vein of Magritte, she 
uses non-relation to stop the habitual perception and mental completion. All attempts 
of the reader/observer for fixing meaning, or closing cognitive gaps are frustrated by 
the playwright’s artistic manipulation. The written words not only stand in contrast 
with  the  image,  but  also  cancel  out  the  transparency  of  presence;  hence,  the 176 
straightforwardness  of  perception  is  challenged.  While  the  title  shows  language's 
double negation of the real, Churchill’s textual performance amounts to a destructive 
affirmation—or an affirmation of destruction; thus the referentiality between language 
and real is destroyed. Consequently each signifier floats in an unstable and multi 
functional  relational  system,  creating  several  meanings  and  eliminating  them 
immediately. If the reader/viewer, assuming the unreliability of his first impression, 
tries to go beyond the surface meaning and close the gap in cognition by analyzing 
the play itself, he will be frustrated again; the same non-relation exists between the 
title of each scene (it is emphasized in the stage direction that it must be clearly 
displayed or announced in the performance) and what the reader/spectator observes. 
The arbitrary, non-referential system that Churchill by naming or giving a title to these 
scenes creates proves to be the source of perpetual frustration or even a trap for the 
audience. Each title, as a signifier, proposes an expected content or a signified the 
access  to  which  is  denied  to  the  audience.  This  open-endedness  of  signification 
involves the audience in a language game without rules and regulation; every one 
can set his own rules for playing this game. This fluidity of language liberates the 
imaginative or creative faculties in the audience and frees them from their bondage to 
language.  
The  first  scene,  for  instance,  is  named  “The  War  in  Bosnia,”  but  instead  of 
seeing anything relevant to this topic the audience observes a couple having their 
date  in  a  London  street.  The  seven  following  scenes  are  labeled  with  important 
political  and  social  issues  like  “Pornography  and  Censorship,”  “The  Labor  party’s 
slide  to  the  Right,”  “Animal  Conservation  and  Third  World  Economics:  the  Ivory 
Trade,” “Hong Kong,” “The Northern Ireland Peace Process,” “Genetic Engineering,” 
and “The Impact of Capitalism on the Former Soviet Union,” whereas they depict 177 
banal scenes of ordinary life. The text lacks a center; and there is neither a central 
character  nor  a  central  narrative  in  it.  The  potential  narrative  of  each  scene  is 
intentionally obliterated by the playwright. Elaine Aston believes that, “Each scene in 
effect  suggests  that  characters are  caught up  in  much bigger  narratives  than the 
audience has access to” (2001:111). Churchill intentionally avoids constructing any 
narratives around the non sequiturs of her play, and makes them a definite number of 
similar situations that can be repeated indefinitely. Because of the lack of center in 
her text, the reader can put the beginning or the end anywhere or even read it vice 
versa. This delogocentrized text has no power over the audience or the performance; 
it  discards  both  the  surveillance  of language and that of traditional text over the 
stage. As Foucault in This is not a Pipe observes: 
 
The similar develops in series that have neither beginning 
nor end, that can be followed in one direction or as easily 
as  in  another,  that  obey  no  hierarchy,  but  propagate 
themselves  from  small  differences  among  small 
differences.  Resemblance  serves  representation,  which 
rules  over  it;  similitude  serves  repetition,  which  ranges 
across  it.  Resemblance  predicate  itself  upon  a  model  it 
must  return  to  and  reveal;  similitude  circulates  the 
simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of the 
similar to similar (44). 
 
The similitude of the scenes of the play circulates their common sense of alienation 
and anxiety and renders them a reversible relation.  
The engagement of ordinary people with the banalities of personal life, and their 
indifference to the current political or social problems are intensified by the labeling of 178 
the scenes with existing legitimation or emancipation narratives. The confusion and 
chaos that prevail the life of these people discard the optimism that this indifference 
can  liberate  them  from  the  anxiety  of  living  in  a  chaotic  world.  I  disagree  with 
Jernigan who believes that, Churchill in this play “accomplishes very little ideological 
critique of the status quo” (2004: 38).  Although she does not directly criticize the 
power-knowledge-language system, like in Sofcops or Mad Forest, she displays how 
the abjection and  paranoia  of  power  systems  have  destroyed  the  personal  life of 
ordinary  people.  The  metropolitan  anxiety,  which  hinders  the  character  from 
engaging themselves with other issues, is the result of tenseness of urban life in 
globalized  cities.  In  these  cities,  which  are  dominated  by  a  larger  national  and 
international  capitalist  economy,  most  people  do  not  have  the  liberty  to  live 
contentedly.  The  speed  of  life and  the  complexity  of deep  spatial  divisions  within 
these  cities  affect  the  lives  of  individuals.  Moreover,  globalization  has  deepened 
urban spatial and social divisions and has increased the social disparity. Individuals 
feel isolated and overwhelmed by existential angst in these spatial divisions. Their life 
is  so  manipulated  and  normalized,  in  Foucauldian  term,  that  they  do  not  mind 
reacting to the problems outside their habitual engagements. They are perpetually 
under  time  pressure  and  are  anxious  that  they  may  lose  this  normal  state  for 
something worse.  
This anxiety is displayed in the deformed dialogues and the language that the 
characters use. In the first scene, for instance, Mary comes late to an appointment 
and  declares  that  she  has  to  leave  immediately  because  she  has  another 
appointment: 
 
Mary. No, it’s really awful, what I have to do is jump in a cab and go whizzing 
off. Because I have to be there by half past seven(8). 179 
 
The word “whizzing” in this dialog is suggestive both of the speed and the noise 
involved in living in globalized cities. The pressure that people in their routine life 
experience is manifested in Mary’s statement: 
 
It was the arrangement I made first you see and somehow 
it slipped my mind and I thought we might have time for a 
drink anyway but then I was late finishing work and there 
was a holdup on the tube it stopped in the tunnel for about 
five minutes people were starting to get nervous you could 
see from the way they kept on reading or just staring into 
space but deliberately because they were getting nervous 
and anyway can we make it another time I’m really sorry 
(9). 
 
There is no punctuation in this dialog; the speaker is compelled to utter the whole 
statement in a long breath to save time. Time pressure hinders individuals from an 
appropriate articulation. Furthermore, her speech demonstrates the agitation of living 
in  metropolitan  cities.  Her  depiction  of  the  passengers  of  the  speedy  tubes  is 
suggestive of individuals’ helpless efforts to overcome their restlessness. By keeping 
on  “reading”  or  “just  staring  into  space”,  they  try  to  repress  the  psychological 
pressure  to  the  borders  of  unconscious  and  remain  in  the  boundaries  of  “normal 
behavior.”  
With the progression of the play, the destructive effect of this pressure on the 
characters’ language becomes more obvious. Distress builds its own language. In 
Hong Kong scene, for instance, the characters display their trauma-stricken state in 
their broken sentences: 180 
 
Leo: no good coming in now and saying  
Tom: but listen why don’t we just 
Leo: too late 
Tom: impossible to talk to 
Leo: should have thought of that 
Tom: you are so 
Leo: Piss off. 
 
Or 
 
Leo: long time 
Tom: wet coat 
Charlie: ah lovely 
Tom: how you 
Charlie: traffic 
Tom: pretty busy  
 
The  speedy  life  hinders  them  from  expressing  themselves  fully.  There  is  no 
syntaxically correct sentence in these dialogs; they are phrases or words that are cut 
from  their  original  syntax.  Each  phrase  stands  aloof  in  the  text  and  reveals  no 
reference; the extraction of meaning is left to the reader/spectator. Moreover, the 
deformed syntax, which manifests itself in the absence of subject in each sentence, 
undermines  the  validity  of  the  dialog.  The  foundational  approach  to  language 
stresses the triumph of the subject over the world or the meaning over chaos by 
acknowledging that the negation of the real thing by a word brings an operational 
concept  into  being.  Churchill's  non-foundational  approach,  however,  adopts  a 
language that demolishes  the  concepts  by  ignoring  them,  creating  a  profusion  of 
meaning in discourse. The omission of the “subject” in these dialogs, discards the 
possibility of overcoming the pandemonium of the world.  181 
Her  choice  of  words  is  also  indicative  of  the  breaking  forces  that  these 
fragmented selves experience. Their alienation, their disconnection with an ordered 
language, their deep disappointment, and their fear of the unknown are all displayed 
in the words they utter. The phrases like “impossible to talk to,” “can’t trust,” “piggy 
eyes,”  “terrible  for  you,”“supposed  to  be  terrifying,”  “putting  poison  in  my  body,” 
“traffic,” “busy,” “so tired,” or “exhausted,” dominate their conversations, turning them 
to non-communicative dialogs. The familiarity of these words,  which are pregnant 
with the violence of the situation, disturbs the consciousness of the audience. Even 
the repeated scene of feeding a child by the parents -labeled once with “The Labour 
Party’s  to  the  Right”  and  once  with  “The  Northern  Ireland  Peace  Process”-  is 
prevailed with this implicit fretfulness. The parents threaten their child that her refusal 
of eating may bring bad consequences. Ellin Diamond attributes this language to 
globalization, which she links to postmodern condition. In her view, “Globalization, a 
world-shaping  discourse,  needs  its  own  dramatic  vocabulary…”  (2006:481)Aston 
interprets  the  disruption  between  individuals  and  political  issues  to  “the  failure  of 
contemporary  lives  to  connect  nationally  or  internationally  with  the  political” 
(2001:111). 
This disconnection is effectively demonstrated in the last scene, which depicts a 
couple who hear a crash as they are going to bed. The whole scene portrays them 
searching for the source of the crash that sounds like a bomb. But instead of reacting 
actively to this external phenomenon, they try to overcome their fear by negating it. 
Although  Eric  finds  the  sound  more  like  the  sound  of  a  bomb,  her  wife,  Maddy, 
convinces him that it was something harmless like the collision of a building or a 
firecracker: 
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Maddy: What was that? Was that a bomb but far more likely. 
Eric: no far more likely 
Maddy more likely a building some kind of construction 
Eric. Demolition 
Maddy: some kind of building 
Eric: some kind of building site or a road accident a crash but it’s the wrong kind 
of sound for that was more (29). 
 
Maddy, who tries to abate the tenseness of the situation by denying it, discards Eric’s 
observation  that the  sound  was  more  than that of  a  construction  site.  She finally 
convinces him to give up the idea of a bomb explosion: 
 
Eric: So anyway I don’t think it was a bomb anyway 
 
By stressing the unreliability of their senses, they can relieve themselves from 
the strain of menace and feel secure again. After some minutes, they speak about 
the phenomenon as a past experience, trying to examine its authenticity by capturing 
it in time: 
 
Eric: Yes you said that must be what we heard because we’d just sat down to 
the soup 
Maddy: yes we said we must have heard it because it was ten past one. 
Eric: Well, it’s near enough half past eleven (30) 
 
Using  past  tense  in  speaking  about  the  unpleasant  experience  makes  them  feel 
secure  in  their  “room”;  the  outside  menace  is  sent  to  the  past  background. 
Nevertheless, they try to record the time of event precisely  in order to check the 
reality  of  the  event.  The  authenticity  of  their  sense  experience  should  be  later 
confirmed  by  an  authoritative  source  like  media.  Their  distrust  on  personal 183 
experience  and  their  inability  to  react  to  a  simple  phenomenon  renders  their 
personality a comic touch. Furthermore it displays how the controlling systems have 
destroyed  their  sense  of  resistance. Without  the  dominant discourse,  they  cannot 
even be sure about  the  reality  of an event;  it  should be  interpreted by  a  reliable 
source. Eric even decides about a trivial matter like bathing with difficulty and let 
himself be manipulated by Maddy, who tries to persuade him to go to bed without a 
bath.  Their  dialogs,  like  all  other  ones  in  the  play,  lack  any  punctuation;  the 
sentences are uttered without commas or full stops. Personal language has lost its 
power and vividness in the presence of oppressive forces. Aston suggests that, “As a 
culture of ‘hyper-representation’, the postmodern generate anxiety because it is no 
longer possible to know what is real” (2000: 88). 
Immediately after this scene the last title of the play “The Impact of Capitalism 
on  Former  Soviet  Union”  appears  without  being  followed  by  a  scene.  The  title 
remains  aloof  in  a  vacant  space,  like  the  Mouth  of  Not  I,  stressing  the  non-
relationality between the grand narratives of the age and private lives. The absence 
of  political issues in private lives and their irrelevancy to the suffering of ordinary 
people  is  magnified  by  the  emptiness  of  a  bombastic  title,  belonging  to  Marxist 
metanarrative of modernism. Perhaps Churchill wants to show the superficiality of 
such  issues,  which  are  at  large  manipulated  by  the  dominant  discourse.  The 
devastating  effects  of  the  repressive  force  of  panoptic  systems,  the  formation  of 
which  was  portrayed  in  Softcops,  are  demonstrated  in  this  play  implicitly.  The 
oppressive systems not only hinder the people from interfering in political concerns 
but also deprive them from personal happiness. All characters in this play are shown 
to be suffering from psychological distress, the source of which is the anxiety of the 
external world. A date that falls flat because of the disability of a character to catch 184 
with time; a daughter who resists being supervised; a threatening addictive boy friend 
who should be thrust away; a fear-making medical system, which cannot be trusted 
because it cares more about money than the health of the patients; the violence of 
the outside world that makes people prefer to remain in the constraints of their private 
security;  and  a  void  that  cannot  be  filled  with  any  words  are  all  familiar  local 
narratives that are faded in the “whizzing” of “grandnaratives.” Churchill, however, 
does not directly encourage the audience to do something against the hegemonic 
systems that have devastated their lives; she makes them question this status quo by 
highlighting the despondency of their everyday life.  
The staging of the play at the Royal Court Theater was so that the audience 
appeared  on  the  stage  and  the  titles  and  actors  in  the  auditorium.  This  shift  of 
position and the consequent space that is created not only disturb the customary 
expectations,  but  also  discard  the  authority  of  the  play.  It  seems  that  the 
actor/actresses  are  watching  the  spectators.  In  the  end  of  the  play,  the  written 
programs are thrown on the spectators by the performers in the auditorium. Aston 
attributes  this  “back  to  front  staging”  to  Churchill’s  intention  to  propose  “a  direct 
connection between the on-stage lives of the audience and the everyday struggle 
shown in the scenes- lives, in or out of the theater, that inhabit a different reality to 
the global conflict and struggle that surrounds us” (112). In my view, by shifting the 
space  that  conventionally  belongs  to  performers,  Churchill  aims  at  showing  the 
decentredness of performance as well. Although Derrida’s deconstructive aspirations, 
Foucault’s  critique  of  discourse,  and  Magritte’s  critical  approach  to  mimetic  art 
provide  a  background  for  this  performance,  Churchill  escapes  the  dominancy  of 
theory  or  the  authoritative  monophony  of  theater  by  placing  audience  in  an 
unconventional space. She avoids being a convincing voice and situates her text and 185 
actors in a speculative position. By breaking the conventions of theater and deleting 
the centrality of the constitute fragments, she creates a delogocentric performance. 
Jernigan  thinks  that  Churchill’s  avoidance  of  a  direct  “reference  to  Foucault”  or 
“Magritte”  in  this  play  “challenges  and  disrupts  comfortable  association  and 
encourages private and local response rather than shared metadramatic agreement” 
(2003: 39). The aesthetic aspect of performance can also be another reason for this 
non-referentiality.  Churchill  neither  discusses  a  political  issue  nor  presents  a 
philosophical theory; she depicts language in its critical points. As Kim observes: 
 
Churchill’s theater disrupts language from within to 
reveal  the  limits  of  its  representational  possibility. 
Her theater questions traditional theater’s signifying 
process  as  it  represents  the  “unknown  realm.”  If 
Churchill’s  theater frequently  approaches  what  she 
calls  “the  impossible  object”  in  the  introduction  to 
Traps, it questions what we understand as fixed and 
real (247). 
 
“The impossible object” is one that, like Churchill’s play or her anti-narrative structure, 
creates an aporiac amalgam that resists analysis.  
The structural undecideability in the title turns it to an impossible object as well. 
Since the dividing line between different possibilities is intentionally eliminated, an 
aporia of meaning happens. The poles of meaning are so displaced that the Hegelian 
dialectical movement of Aufhebung cannot function anymore. The title and the text in 
this play can be a lot of “simultaneously either or”s in Derridean term (Derrida 1971: 
59);  they  resist  being  defined  in  a  closed  system.  The  semantic  richness  of 
undecideability renders Churchill’s text and its title its multidimensionality and puts it 186 
in opposition with the meta-texts of traditional theater. The title implicitly proposes 
that  the  work  that  the  reader/spectator  is  going  to  observe  “is  not  a  play.”  The 
unfamiliar “impossible object” they are observing can be a chair or an anti-play or 
whatever the audience may call it.  
The same ontological impossibility of the title prevails the fragmentary form of 
the play and prevents the audience from fixing a meaning or putting the play in a 
closed  system  of  reference.  One  cannot  decide  if  Churchill  is  stressing  the 
importance of political issues or their superficiality in comparison to human suffering. 
Does  she  approve  the  disruption  between  bourgeoisie’s  privacy  and  political 
concerns,  as  some  critics  accuse  her  of,  or  she  tries  to  shed  light  on  the 
emasculation of personal life by panoptic systems? The inquiry remains open-ended.  
The same open-endedness exists in Blue Heart. This play, which is consisted of 
two short plays, “Heart’s Desire” and “Blue Kettle,” concentrates on the deteriority of 
language and life in the globalized world. This deterioration is suggested in the name 
of the play “blue heart.”Since heart is usually associated with red, the color of blood 
and the symbol of love, passion, and life energy, the attribution of color blue to it 
detaches the title from falling in categorized perception or stereotypical interpretation. 
The  stereotyped,  automatized  repetition,  which  leads  to  the  straightforward 
recognition, is substituted by a novelty unseizable by stale reception. The word heart 
is  put  in  a  structure  capable  of  more  or  different  meanings  and  its  immediate 
recognition  is  postponed  by  estrangement.  Defamiliarisation  perturbs  the 
referentiality between real thing and its presentation in literature and comes close to 
Derridean rejection of semantic oneness. This defamiliarisation of  heart, however, 
proves  to  be  emptied  from  its  modernist  aspect  of  creating  novelty  in  literature 
because the reader/spectator realizes later that the title is just a combination of the 187 
two subtitles of the play and does not have any hidden transcendental meaning. The 
playful combination shows resistance to such interpretations.  
The  deconstruction  of  sentimentalism  in  the  title  is  accompanied  by 
demytholization and desacralization of sentimental concepts of home and family life 
in the component plays. The first play, Heart’s desire, is built around the waiting of a 
family for homecoming of their daughter Susi from Australia. The play has only one 
scene,  which  is  repeated  several  times.  The  repeated  scene,  which  intentionally 
defers  the  conclusion  or  closure,  introduces  the  members  of  this  family  as  Brian 
(father), Alice (mother), Lewis (the drunkard son), and Maisie (the romantic aunt). 
Churchill’s digression from traditional narrative structure and mimetic conventions of 
theater is manifested from the beginning of the first scene in the unfamiliar staging of 
the  play.  The  repetition  of  the  different  versions  of  one  scene,  which  are 
simultaneously the same and different, implicitly defies the traditional linearity of the 
plot. The characters enter and exit the stage several times, returning whether with a 
new costume, or a different approach to the subject, or a new piece of information, as 
if they had forgotten a part in their former rehearsal and they must perform it correctly 
now. These revisionary repetitions resembles to the revisions that an author in the 
course of the production of a text makes. The repetitive entrances and exits of the 
characters and the repetition of the same scene break the continuity of the narrative 
and  create  restlessness  in  the  audience.  In  the  style  of  ballad,  the  inferential 
repetitions of the play let the audience access a new piece of information each time, 
stressing the fragmentary nature of knowledge and subjectivity. The scene, with its 
multiple versions, deconstructs the concept of narrative and its expected linearity. 
Each version differs from others and resembles them. Furthermore, the structural 
fragments rather negate than supplement each other. The information added to the 188 
story in each entrance does not help us close the gaps in narrative and complete it 
because the source of this information changes each time - once Maisie, once Alice, 
once  Lewis  and  so  on.  Besides,  the  contradiction  between  different  pieces  of 
information stresses the unreliable, subjective nature of knowledge and suggests the 
co-existence of multiple truths. In a version of the scene, for instance, Alice leaves 
her husband and affirms that she cannot bear the situation any more, but the next 
version  shows  her  still  present  in  the  scene.  These  quick  changes  cause  the 
audience to mistrust the authenticity of the information they acquire. They cannot 
differentiate  between  real  and  unreal;  reality  proves  to  be  as  subjective  and 
fragmentary  as  knowledge.  Furthermore,  the  absence  of  the  daughter,  whose 
presence may bring about the closure of this fragmentary structure, is intentionally 
postponed. Her short presences are immediately denied by the resetting of the scene 
or  the  former  contradictory  information  that  she  has  abstained  from  coming.  In 
Derrida’s  view,  the  dynamic  vigor  of  repetition  originates  from  negation,  from  the 
essential  impossibility  of  supplementing  an  absence.  In  Churchill’s  play,  even 
presence cannot cancel out absence. The daughter homecoming fails to complete 
the narration, and the play returns to its beginning in the end. Like in Waiting for 
Godot, the end of the play does not mean a dénouement of the plot; the characters 
continue outside the temporal structure to wait and the spiral form goes on winding 
and winding; homecoming remains open-ended and waiting becomes eternal.  
Not  only  homecoming  but  also  family,  as  a  center  for  patriarchal  society,  is 
demythified  in  this  play;  home  is  shown  to  be  a  place  of  conflict,  violence, 
dissatisfaction and betrayal. The daughter has fled from this canon to a “far away” 
Australia; the mother has been unfaithful to her husband for years; the son has taken 
refuge in alcohol to compensate for the family’s misconduct and superficiality. The 189 
privacy of home is also shown to be insecure because it is perpetually intruded by 
strangers: the children who storm in and out of the kitchen; the gunmen who come in 
and kill all family members; the official who burst in asking for their documents; and a 
huge bird from the surreal world, which takes their privacy for its nest. The personal 
life is portrayed as unhappy and manipulated as in This is a Chair. The menace of 
the unknown is present in every moment of their life. As Brian complains: 
 
I happen to know that a great many people are wrongfully convicted and I don’t 
live  in  a  dream  that  suggests  that  terrible  things  only  befall  people  in 
newspapers. 
 
They are robbed of the modernist dream of progress. They know that they are living 
in a dangerous age in which nothing is certain or secure and it causes unhappiness 
and frustration in their hearts. 
The characters, like those in Churchill’s other play Ice cream, dream of finding 
happiness  in  a  far  promised  land.  The  daughter  has  escaped  from  home  to  find 
happiness in a remote country; the aunt dreams of living in Australia to have the 
same beautiful experiences as her niece; Brian threatens his wife that he would join 
his daughter in Australia; Alice craves for leaving the unpleasant home for a better 
life. The nomadic desire, however, remains unfulfilled; they stay in the constraints of 
their banal life despite its increasing menace. Kim differentiate between Churchill’s 
“nomadism” and that of Pinter for her stress on “her characters’ cultural dilemma vis-
a-via the status quo” (248). In his view, the desire of Churchill’s characters exceeds 
the  dominant  signifying  systems,”  whereas  Pinter’s  characters  suffer  from  “the 
impossibility of identifying ….with clearly defined familial subject positions” (ibid). 190 
The  characters’ desire to escape from  the dominant order manifests itself in 
their language as well. The arbitrary order of language seems to be a hindrance for 
the  articulation  of  their  chaotic  situation.  The  emotional  climaxes  disrupt  their 
language and make them talk in broken sentences or single words: A good example 
is the resumed scene after their being murdered by the intruding gunmen,  which is 
performed in half-articulated sentences: 
 
Brian. She’s taking 
Alice. Not 
Brian. We should have 
Alice. We should not 
Brian. She’ll be 
Alice. She is a woman 
 
Another  example  is  the  scene  after  the expulsion  of  their  son  out  of  their  house 
because of his violation of the family’s rule of not entering the sacred kitchen drunk. 
In this scene their language reaches its most critical point and is reduced to single 
words: 
 
Brian. time 
Alice. realy. 
Brian. the plane 
Brian. exhausted 
Alice. Thirtyfive 
Brian. your daughter. 
Alice. thirtyfive 
 
Stress  breaks  the  links  of  signification  system  and  distorts  their  language.  The 
repetition of the word “again” for three times before the word “waiting” and Alice’s slip 191 
of tongue to say “sleem peased” or “pleem seased” instead of “seem pleased” shows 
how they suffer from the tense situation and how words have lost their functions in 
their  world.  The  characters  give  up  the  words  because  they  are  unable  of 
communicating their stressful experiences.  
However, instead  of  moving  towards  silence,  like  Beckett’s  characters  in  his 
later  plays,  they  invalidate  language  by  talking  it  out,  by  unconscious  parroting. 
Although the ringing of the doorbell or the resumption of the scene rescues them 
momentarily  from  tension,  the  same  existential  angst  and  confusion  of  Beckett 
characters can be felt in the characters of this play. Furthermore, Churchill provides 
us with a good example of the performative role of language. She employs different 
techniques  like  the  increasing  the  speed  of  performance  or  word  utterances,  self 
referentiality, or repeated words with different meanings to show how language loses 
its  communicative  features.  Being  dissatisfied  with  the  limitations  of  language, 
Churchill, like Beckett, searches for other tools for the articulation of the “unsayable.”  
She also aims at destroying or deconstructing the language-based subjectivity of the 
audience. As Rabascall observes: 
 
The  play  with  language  will  inevitably  carry  with  it  an 
awareness  of  the possibilities  of  disruption of  the  social 
order  mentioned  by  Weedon,  a  social  order  that  is 
characterised by following the main tenets of patriarchy. 
Therefore, a subversion of the rules of language as they 
exist in society will also bring about a questioning of the 
rules of the social order in which language exists, as well 
as a dismantling of the construction of the subject. In the 
light  of  a  poststructuralist  feminist  reading  this  offers 
subversive possibilities of dissidence, since it opens the 192 
way to a questioning of the Symbolic Order of things and 
shows the possibility of a return to the Imaginary through 
this dismantling of the logos (2000: 247). 
 
Churchill’s anti-narrative style results in a kind of emancipated narrative, the narrative 
that seeks to invalidate the legitimacy of the established grandnaratives like home 
and homecoming. 
The  second  play,  Blue  kettle,  deconstructs  the  same  myth  of  warmth  and 
security of home. Derek’s search for a home or a mother is revealed to be cheating 
naive old women by making them believe that he is their illegitimate son. It is indeed 
a hobby for him and a way for gaining some money. Mythical quest for identity turns 
to be a process of dissolution of  self, accompanied by a gradual disintegration of 
language. The play ends up in the collapse of language into two letters of “b” and “k.” 
Early  humans  started  interaction  by  babbling  and  brought  order  to  their 
communication  by  a  structured  language.  In  Churchill’s  play,  however,  language 
moves from its initial order toward a chaotic babbling. The gradual substitution of the 
words  by  "blue"  and  "kettle"  ends  in  using  broken  syllables  and  single  letters  to 
present  a  word.  The absolute  unintelligibility  of  the  last  scene  is  indicative  of  the 
success  of  the  playwright  in  omitting  language  from  the  structure  of  human 
interaction. The encoding of a language that transgresses the borders of normality is 
an attempt in the part of the playwright to invalidate the power/language structures 
outside the symbolic order of the play. Turning the grand narrative of quest into a 
treacherous, playful game and fragmenting its discourse into babbling help Churchill 
establish  an  anti-narrative  which  denies  all  the  norms  of  conventional  writing. 
Through the dislocation of social and linguistic signs, she succeeds to deconstruct 
language and the order it signifies.  193 
This  dislocation  begins  with  the  title  of  the  play  “Blue  Kettle.”  The  semantic 
disparity, created in the defamiliarized attribution of color blue to kettle, extends to the 
linguistic structure of the play as, by and by, many verbs, nouns, and adjectives are 
replaced by the words “blue” or “Kettle.” In order to see how Churchill succeeds in 
deferring meaning in a Derridean sense, it is better to return to the text. In the third 
scene Derek and his girl friend Enid for the first time start expressing themselves in 
terms  of  blue  and  kettle.  The  frequency  of  these  words  is  not  so  drastic  at  the 
beginning; therefore the spectators can easily substitute them by a word from their 
linguistic  background  or  by  referring  to  the  text  itself.  In  the  following  dialog,  for 
instance, the word blue can be replaced by think: 
 
Enid. And you think there’s money in it. 
Derek. Of course I blue there’s money in it (46). 
 
With  the  progression  of  the  play,  however,  the  referentiality  becomes  impossible 
because the broken words no longer refer to the objects or ideas in the real world or 
in the text. Furthermore, one word is used to refer to different irrelevant things. This 
chaos of signification resists the extraction of meaning and negates the constructive 
understanding. In Mrs. Vane’s expression, “blue, I’ve forgotten blue than I ever blue,” 
there is no possibility of inferring any meaning. The words dissolve into syllables of 
“bl” and “Ket” and finally into “b,” “t,” and “k” as the play proceeds. The last dialogs of 
the  play  are  demonstrative  of  how  deformed  language  happens  to  be.  The 
schizophrenic babbling of the characters resembles the uncontrolled talking of mad 
people or drug consumers: 
 
Mrs Plant. T t have a mother? 
Derek. K 194 
Mrs Plant. B happened b k? 
Derek. Tle died ket I  ket a child. 
Mrs Plant. Bl bl ket b b b excuse? 
Derek. Ket b like. Or not. 
Mrs Plant. K k no relation. K name k john k k? K k k Tommy k k John. K k k 
believe a word. K k Derek. 
Derek. B 
Mrs Plant. Tle hate k later k, k bl bl bl bl shocked. 
Derek. K, t see bl. 
Mrs Plant. T b k k k j l?  
Derek. B. K (68-69). 
 
Rabascall  believes  that,  “Churchill's  play  allows  the  reader/spectator  to  apply 
Derrida's theories to emphasise the temporality of the "fixing of the meaning" through 
the use of a constant deferral of the signifiers and an underlining of the impossibility 
of existence of the signifieds (277-78). Although Churchill’s aesthetic strategies in 
deconstructing the dominancy of language and text in theater have brought her close 
to Derrida’s theories, her style negates any presentation or teaching of theories in 
performance. 
Churchill’s aesthetic strategies also turn memory to an unstable signifier. It is 
shown to be a language-based, variable concept rather than a fixed one based on 
real events. By faking stories about the past, Derek can manipulate the subjectivity of 
his invented mothers and create new realities for them. His stories, which play the 
role  of  the  lost  pieces  of  a  puzzle  in  the  wholeness  of  their  identity,  help  these 
mothers recreate  their past with  the help of new narratives. Mrs. Vane even sees 
memories  indistinguishable  from  identity  and  asserts  that,  “My  memories  are 
definitely what I am.” Even Derek thinks that, without memories “you wouldn’t know 
who you were” (56). Enid, on the other hand, denies the usefulness of memories or 195 
their connection to identity. By portraying the dependency of memory on language, 
Churchill discards the idea that subjectivity is based on reality. Since the authenticity 
of  memories cannot be  tested, everyone can manipulate  them and invent a false 
identity. Realities, like the role  of family  in the construction of identity, prove to be 
arbitrary fictions in this play. As Rabascall suggests: 
 
One  of  the  fundamental  aspects  that  appear  in  this 
rendering of the play is, once again, a sharp criticism on 
the  institution  of  the  family  as  the  basis  of  modern 
societies,  and  how  this  parallels  the  construction  of 
subjectivity. In fact, what the play shows is how arbitrary 
family life is, how artificial it can be from the outset. The 
construction of subjectivity is directly related to this notion 
of the family as an arbitrary construct. Thus, one of the 
aspects underlined by the play is how subjectivity is also 
arbitrarily  constructed,  and  this  is,  indeed,  a 
poststructuralist idea (278-79). 
 
Derek’s  fictional  manipulation  of  reality  resembles  that  of  a  dramatic  text;  it  can 
change  our  subjectivity  and  make  us  uncertain  about  our  perceptions.  Jernigan 
believes that, “In Blue Heart, Churchill does evaluate the ways in which plays are 
produced in such a way that she raises ontological-epistemological questions about 
the relation between theatre and the real world” (2004:26).  
Blue Kettle, unlike Heart’s desire, seems to end conventionally with a resolution 
of the conflict after Derek’s revelation of truth. Nevertheless, the fake mothers’ refusal 
of  accepting  the  truth,  which  manifests  itself  in  the  collapse  of  their  language, 196 
emphasizes humans’ tendency towards forgetting the unpleasant truths and living on 
pleasant fictional illusions. As Aston observes: 
 
In  brief,  both  Heart  Desire  and  Blue  Kettle  deploy  a 
number of dramaturgical strategies to alienate the “real; to 
challenge the tradition of mimesis, thereby inviting us to 
contemplate a dislocation of family and home; a world in 
which there is no real sense of belonging. Most significant 
perhaps is the daughter’s absence, continued absence, or 
non-return  in  Heart’s  Desire.  The  daughter,  the  woman 
who  travels  in  different  countries  does  not  return  to the 
“place”  of  home,  which  is  dis-placed,  dis-located  in  the 
fantastic distortion of the “real” (2001:116). 
 
The disappearance of real also suggests that we are living in a world where a 
massive amount of fictions are daily presented to us. Finding truth among all theaters 
in which we are involved by resorting to language ends in the same babbling of Blue 
Kettle. The proof of the authenticity of these narratives is not an easy task. Churchill’s 
liberating strategies aim at breaking the hegemony of these narratives. She tries to 
create  a  new  discourse  (l’ecriture  feminine?)  for  liberating  the  dramatic  text  and 
performance  from  the  tyranny  of  authors.  Her  workshop  productions  provide  the 
opportunity for the actors to add their voices to the voice of author and change the 
performance from a single voice tyranny of the playwright to a polyphonous choir. 
They oppose the hegemonic dominant discourses and their controlling theater.  197 
 
Conclusion 
 
With his contemplations on the role and capacity of philosophy, literature, and 
language  in  answering  the  ontological  and  epistemological  questions,  Samuel 
Beckett  inaugurated  a  sort  of  delogocentric  approach  to  dramatic  text  and 
performance,  which  resulted  in  what  may  be  called  a  postmodern  theater.  His 
assertion that, “The key word in my plays is perhaps,”  comes very close to what 
Derrida defines as  “undecideability”.  Nonetheless,  Beckett,  like  his  work,  escapes 
any categorization. If modernist philosophy, as Lyotard observes, “Wants to stabilize 
the referent, to arrange it according to a recognizable point of view, which endows it 
with a recognizable meaning (Lyotard 1984:14), Beckett cannot be called modernist 
because he defies such “recognizable meaning.” On the other hand, his art lacks the 
polyphony or carnivalesque desired by postmodernists. His high literary style, which 
is far from popular arts of postmodern, brings him close to modernists. Throughout 
his works his voice can be heard uttering his protest or contemplating on different 
ontological  issues.  His  strict  adherence  to  his  texts  and  stage  directions  in 
performance also demonstrates this one-voicedness and his Apollonian control than 
Dionysian chaos of ritualistic theater, aimed by postmodernists like Artaud. Yet, his 
interest  on  “the  shapes  as  opposed  to  the  validity  of  ideas”  (Dearlove  1982:  3) 
removes  him  from  modernism.  His  literature  has  “the  ambiguity  and  fluidity” 
characteristic of non-relational arts. His metadramatic texts refuse to fall in the order 
and strong sense of reality, which prevails most of modernist literature. As worton 
mentions: 198 
 
What  Beckett  says  in  his  plays  is  not  totally  new. 
However, what he does with his saying is radical and 
provocative; he uses his play-texts to remind (or tell) 
us  that  there  can  be  no  certainty,  no  definitive 
knowledge, and that we need to learn to read in a 
new way, in a way that gives us space to bring our 
contestations  as  well  as  our  knowledge  to  our 
reception of the text” (1995, 81).  
 
I  leave  the  impasse  of  finding  definitions  for  his  art  and  appreciate  his  skeptical 
attitude  towards  all  definitions  and  categorizations,  which  makes  his  art 
delogocentric. Beckett once asserted that, “I produce an object. What people make of 
it is not my concern” (qtd. in Worton 67). 
Worton, however, believes that, “In the context of twentieth-century theatre, his 
first  plays  mark  the  transition  from  Modernism,  with  its  preoccupation  with  self-
reflection,  to  Postmodernism  with  its  insistence  on  pastiche,  parody  and 
fragmentation”(69). Certainly some characteristics like self-reflectivity, repetition, anti-
mimetic  theatricality,  undermining  the  author  function,  and  decentralizing  the 
narrative, remove him from the constraints of modernist literature and bring him very 
close  to  poststructuralist  interpretations  of  language  and  art.  Postponing meaning 
and  origin,  produced  by  the  inherent  “différance”  of  language,  creates  an 
inaccessible realm in language, which both Beckett and Derrida call “unnamable”. 
Deconstruction  in  Beckett  is  both admitting  this  “unnameability”  and parodying all 
efforts,  especially  of  his  characters,  for  deciphering  this  realm.  Murphy,  Vladimir, 
Hamm,  and  the  character  of  The  Unnamable  all  fail  in  his  logocentric  efforts  to 
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They are also unable to name “I” or to reach the origin of self. The denial of “I” 
by Mouth in Not I is resulted from this inability; Beckett’s character/actors must move 
in an incoherent structure of the self. In Derrida’s view, accessing a “silent voice” that 
is  “unbound  by  time  and  space”  was  “one  of  the  fundamental  projects  of  the 
traditional theory”(Kearney 359). The possibility of such project, however, as Kearney 
maintains, is “its very impossibility” (359). By depicting his characters’ defeat in their 
impossible undertakings, Beckett deconstructs the logos of this project. Not only his 
characters, but also Beckett himself, whose struggles for mastering language remain 
futile, are ridiculed in his work. As Kearny observes: 
 
Beckett’s writing masterfully deconstruct itself by directing 
our  attention  to  itself  as  writing,  that  is  a  system  of 
sounding signifiers irretrievably at odds with the ideal of a 
corresponding silent signified. It is only by deconstructing 
the word’s pretention to achieve self-adequation by means 
of silence, that we can uncover its hidden self-alienation. 
The irony which Beckett makes such great play of is, of 
course, that one obliged to use language to deconstruct 
language (360). 
 
This realization results in his tendency towards playful treatment of subjects. 
Taking  his  texts  as  literary  games,  Beckett  seeks  to  develop  this  playfulness  to 
everything  in  his  literary  work,  even  to  most  significant  philosophical  concepts. 
Beckett makes his audience revise his position towards theater and text by  putting 
the concepts of God, truth, meaning and language in the inappropriate context of his 
language  games,  The  game  playing  in  Beckett’s  drama  happens  in  two  levels: 
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the text, or the games played between characters or other elements of performance. 
His characters are also perpetually experimenting with  narration as game: Vladimir 
and Estragon try to join the fragments of a lost past in a narrative; Hamm changes his 
tone  from  narrative  to  normal  and  constantly  amends  the  text  that  this  voice 
produces; Mouth reshapes her narration each time that she hears other voices; and 
Krapp  seeks  to  entrap  his  past  voice  in  a  framed  narration.  They  delight  in 
constructing and deconstructing their narration; it is a game for them. The game, as 
Scwab suggests, “is a private use of language, which no longer requires one to mean 
what one say, but which gives one the freedom to play with the familiarity of old and 
empty rules” (90). 
Beckett  changes  the  concept  of  passive  reception  of  audience  to  active 
interaction.  During  the  process  of  their  narration/games,  the  characters  show 
awareness  of  their  being  observed.  They  speak  to  the  audience  and  admit  its 
presence. Even the wordless performances of Breath, Quad, and Act without Words 
have a silent narration, which demands the viewer’s attention. This feeling of being 
observed makes the actors of Beckett’s plays feel clumsy in their naked roles. They 
should perform among all disturbances and pressures that they feel on the body and 
mind. Their relationship to the text is also different. They should utter words whose 
precise spatial and temporal arrangements are not usual. Performing the roles of 
characters whose subjectivity can never be fully incarnated and their place in the 
actions and words of the play can never be grasped, causes a kind of fragmented 
performance. The actor/actresses should try to gather all these fragments in a loose 
performing strategy which is absolutely different from a conventional performance. 
Beckett  himself  asserts  that,  his  characters  unlike  Kafka’s  hero  who  “has  a 
coherence purpose….seem to be falling to bits” (qtd. in Malkin 40) The vivid images 201 
of these fragmented suffering characters remain in the memory of the audience even 
if  the  stories  behind  them  are  forgotten.  As  Gontarski  suggests  Beckett  is  most 
postmodern when he creates images (on stage and in language) that suggest the 
mutability and plurality of meaning (16).  
 
Stoppard’s  performances  add  a  new  dimension  to  Beckettian  game:  the 
employment of the texts of other authors as the playground for his narration/games. 
The  intertexuality  between  his  texts  and  those  of  Shakespeare,  Wilde,  Beckett, 
Christie, and Pirandello, negates the originality desired by modernism and renders 
him  the  opportunity  to  deconstruct  these  texts  as  literary  or  ideological 
metanarratives. Intertextuality affirms différance because it is the same and differs 
simultaneously. In his intertextual plays, Stoppard assembles origin and its negation, 
text and countertext, audience and actor, past and present, self and other, presence 
and  absence  under the  single  roof  of  his  farcical  performance.  In  his  games  the 
emancipation narratives of the age and other serious artistic or philosophical views 
turn to a postmodern pastiche. Besides, the parody and travesty in his works magnify 
the disjunction of ideas, the distortion of language, and the funny nature of acting. 
The extreme theatricality of his works stands in opposition to realistic presentation of 
world.  The  language  and  texts  of  other  authors  become  the  playing  field  of  his 
humorous  enterprise.  Furthermore,  the  metadramatic  nature  of  his  works,  which 
manifests itself in the self- reflectivity of his plays, and their explicit declaration of their 
non-relationality, is the point of departure of these works from mimetic theater. His 
metadramatic theater diverts conventional expectations of the audience and takes 
away  their  certainties.  In  his  works,  the Apollonian solid  views  are  replaced  with 
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Stoppard engages himself with postmodern issues like non-relationality of art 
(after  Magritte),  the  nature  of  knowledge  (Arcadia),  postcolonialism  (Indian  Ink), 
Philosophy  (Jumper),  and  arbitrariness  of  language  (Dogg’s  Hamlet  and  Cahoot’s 
Mabeth) in a comic manner. The disparity between his subjects and the context in 
which they are put leads to the creation of a sophisticated pastiche in his works. In 
Jameson’s  view,  "Pastiche  is,  like  parody,  the  imitation  of  a  peculiar  or  unique, 
idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it 
is  a  neutral  practice  of  such  mimicry,  without  any  of  parody's  ulterior  motives, 
amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter" (1991:17). Stoppard transforms 
the  literary  works  or  philosophical  ideas  that  he  employs  to  a  pastiche  by  his 
delogocentric strategies. Travesty, After Magritte, Arcadia, and The Real Inspector 
Hound experience such transformation.  
Although  Stoppard’s  conservative  attitudes  make  some  critics  not  categorize 
him as a postmodern playwright, the features such as playfulness, open-endedness, 
discontinuity, self-conscious reflection on the genre of theater, and emphasis on the 
audience’s  participation  in  performance  render  his  works  their  postmodern 
characteristics.  Heuvel  believes  that,  “Stoppard  and  his  plays  will  frustrate  any 
attempt  to  impose  an  either/or  logic  in  terms  of  their  relationships  to postmodern 
ideas  and  aesthetic”  (213).  However, Stoppard’s  observation  that, “None of us is 
classifiable,” is suggestive of a postmodern stand. 
Churchill’s  plays,  though  having  many  common  characteristics  with  those  of 
Beckett  and  Stoppard,  as  Aston  observes,  have  an  “experimental  style”  which 
demands “a different reading of the staged world: one where rules are broken and 
meaning is constantly being made and unmade through the language of performance 
rather than the word of the dramatic script” (2001:81). This language of performance, 203 
as mentioned before, is the outcome of workshops with the artists whose voices were 
included in her texts and performances. Additionally, introducing choreography and 
music into the structures of her plays opened a new space for the imagination of 
other artists to modify or change her authority as playwright. She does not discuss 
“the death of author” or playwright in her plays; she practices it.  
Her questioning of a knowing subject or a holistic plot of the mimetic theater 
made  her  think  of  a  new  narrative  in  which  stereotyped  roles  and  fragmented, 
episodic form take the place of a neatly organized narrative. Moreover she aims at 
omitting  all  authoritative  voices,  including  her  own  from  text  and  performance. 
Artaud’s desire that the stage should voice the inner turbulence of the human spirit, 
that spoken words should give their place to powerful scenery, that logic, reason and 
human language should be subverted in theatre, and that the experience of theatre 
should include the audience as part of the experience are to some extent fulfilled in 
Churchill’s  theater.  Churchill  lives  in  the  age  of  globalization  in  which  the  public 
spheres have changed a lot; hence, the modernist individualism has disappeared 
from  the  scenes  of  her  plays.  Moreover,  the  confusion  of  the  later  phases  of 
capitalism has destroyed the feeling of identity in her characters. They are all moving 
with the streams of external forces rather than the push of internal desires. None of 
the characters in her later plays, like A Mouthful of Bird, Hotel, Faraway, This is a 
Chair,  or  Blue  Heart,  enjoys  the  full  life  of  an  individual.  As  Pankratz  states  it, 
“Instead of creating idealized heroes and heroines, Churchill presents characters that 
are entrapped”(271). Although they are not transformed to clones, as in Number, yet 
they have more counterproductive and stereotypical behaviors than individuality. The 
hegemonic forces have turned them  to  “useful bodies,” which do not even have a 
story worth relating. Their nomadic desire to escape from the distress of their lives to 204 
new horizons is not individualistic either. It is the result of the deceptive large scale 
theater, which tries to sooth them by promising new opportunities in other countries. 
The dream of prosperous “faraway” is shown to be a delusion in Churchill’s plays like 
Ice Cream and Heart’s Desire. The chaos and fragmentation of an anti-narrative and 
the polyphony  of a  carnivalesque  suit  her characters better  than  a  highly  stylistic 
performance. A Kiebuzinska observes: 
 
A  characteristic  of  Churchill’s  plays  is  that 
representation of events is valid only when it opens 
up  a  space  for  reflection  on  the  difficulty  or 
impossibility  of  representation,  and  hence 
interpretation.  In  addition,  the  events  are  not 
recounted  as  an  unbroken  narrative  line,  but  as  a 
collage of related fragments (233). 
 
Churchill’s  delogocentric  strategies  not  only  deconstruct  the  foundation  of 
hegemonic thoughts, texts, and philosophies, but also disrupt the foundation of their 
own existences as texts, performances,  and products of language. Their disrupted 
language and their festive form, which are in proportion with the anarchy of the age, 
show  Churchill’s  playful  approach  to  serious  social  and  political  issues.  Her 
characters sing and dance their distress out and make the audience think about their 
own positions in these Dionysian rituals of misery.  205 
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Abstract Deutsch 
 
 
 
Der Zusammenhang der Realität mit der Sprache, die Unstabilität der Sprache 
als  ein  Signifikationssystem,  die  Repräsentationkrise,  und  die  Grenze  der 
Interpretation sind die Streitpunkte, die nicht nur die zeitgenössischen Philosophen 
sondern  auch  viele  Autoren  beschäftigt  haben.  Manche  Philosophen  wie  Derrida 
unterstellen, dass das westliche Denken das Wort als Sinträger betrachtet. Seiner 
Meinung nach beruht der Logozentrismus des abendländischen Denkens auf binärer 
Opposition oder externer Referenz wie der Präsenz von Gott, Wahrheit, Ursprung, 
Ursache,  Transzendenz  oder  einem  Zentrum.  Da  alle  diese  Begriffe  ohne 
eigentlichen Inhalt sind, und es kein transzendentales Signifikat gibt, auf das alle 
diese  Signifikanten  jeweils  verweisen,  wird  die  Sprache  zu  einem  unstabilen 
Signifikationssystem, deren Mittel keine fixierbare Bedeutung erschaffen wird. Aus 
dieser  Problematik  kommt  eine  Repräsentationkrise,  die  nicht  nur  die  Philosophie 
sondern auch die Literatur betrifft. Ob und wie man gegen die Grenze der Sprache 
anrennen  kann,  ist  nicht  nur  eine  philosophische,  sondern  auch  eine  ästhetische 
Frage.  Während  die  Antwort  der  Philosophen  wie  Derrida  eine  dekonstruktive 
Annäherung  zur  logozentrischen  Interpretationen  ist,  schlägt  die  Literatur  eine 
ästhetische Lösung vor: die Darstellung der Sprachkrise mittels der Sprache. Kann 
uns das experimentelle Kunstwerk der Autoren wie Samuel Beckett, Tom Stoppard 
und Caryl Churchill von der Illusion der Wirklichkeit befreien? Ist es möglich eine anti-
erzählenden  Erzählung  zu  schaffen,  die  die  Dominanz  des  beherrschenden 
Diskurses abschaffen kann? Diese Fragen zu erforschen visiert diese Dissertation 
an.  
Die ersten Versuche dieser Autoren gegen pure Repräsentation richten sich 
an neue Phantasiequellen außerhalb der Realität. Dramatiker wie Beckett, Stoppard 213 
und  Churchill  nutzen  die  Eigendynamik  der  Sprache  als  eine  Quelle  um  ihren 
Funktionsausfall darzustellen. Die Signifikate, die sich auf keine wirkliche Signifikante 
beziehen,  die  Charakteren,  für  die  es  kein  Duplikat  in  der  Realität  gibt,  die 
zerbrochene Subjektivität, die sich nicht mittels Sprache äußern kann, die Handlung, 
der  es  an  Einheit  oder  auch  Beschlussunfähigkeit  mangelt,  und  schließlich  die 
Sprache die nicht mehr eine ordentliche Sprache ist, stellen das Mittel, das diese 
Dramatiker  für  die  Dekonstruktion  der  Sprache  und  des  Textes  brauchen.  Diese 
Arbeit  wird  versuchen  bei  der  Analyse  ihrer  Theaterstücke  aufzuzeigen,  wie  die 
Methode,  die  diese  Autoren  genutzt  haben,  sich  im  Lauf  der  Zeit  geändert  hat. 
Becketts  Besessenheit  mit  dem  Unsprechbaren,  der  Sinnlosigkeit  oder  zerstörter 
Subjektivität  steigert  sich  zu  undeutlicher  Sprache,  Identitätsverlust  und 
Antirepräsentation bei Stoppard und kulminiert in Destrukturierung des Narrativs und 
der  Sprache  bei  Churchill.  Die  Einstimmigkeit  von  Becketts  Werken  ist  durch  die 
Polyphonie von Churchills Theaterstücke, die eine Mischung aus Theater, Tanz und 
Musik sind, ersetzt worden. Alle Theaterstücke, die in dieser Arbeit analysiert wurden 
haben  jedoch  eine  gemeinsame  Eigenschaft:  Sie  sind  Sprachspiele,  die  keinen 
Anspruch auf Realitätstreue oder transzendentale Wahrheit haben. 214 
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